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Abstract
This dissertation examines Friedrich Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical
authority and argues that, as an alternative to strictly supernaturalistic and rationalistic
models, his understanding allows the New Testament to speak authoritatively in Christian
religion in an age of critical, historical awareness. After classifying Schleiermacher’s
position in a typology of the doctrine of biblical authority, this dissertation explores his
conception of divine revelation and inspiration vis-à-vis scripture. It demonstrates that
although he did not believe there is warrant for the claim of a direct connection between
divine revelation and scripture, or that scripture is the foundation of faith, he nonetheless
asserted that the New Testament is authoritative. He asserted the normative authority of
the New Testament on the basis that it is the first presentation of Christian faith. This
dissertation examines Schleiermacher’s “canon within the canon,” as well as his denial
that the Old Testament shares the same normative worth and inspiration of the New.
Although this dissertation finds difficulty with some of Schleiermacher’s views regarding
the Old Testament, it names two significant strengths of what is identified as his
evangelical, content-based, and rationalist approach to biblical authority. First, it
recognizes and values the co-presence and co-activity of the supernatural and the natural
!ii

in the production of the New Testament canon. This allows both scripture and the church
to share religious authority. Second, it allows Christian faith and the historical-method to
coexist, as it does not require people to contradict what they know to be the case about
science, history, and philosophy. Thus, this dissertation asserts that Schleiermacher’s
understanding of biblical authority is a robust one, since, for him, the authority of
scripture does not lie in some property of the texts themselves that historians or
unbelievers can take away.
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Chapter One: Introduction
The Erosion of Biblical Authority
Edward Farley and Peter C. Hodgson began a chapter on the nature, authority, and
function of the Bible in Christian theology with these undeniable assertions:
Until recently, almost the entire spectrum of theological opinion would have
agreed that the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, together with their
doctrinal interpretations, occupy a unique and indispensable place of authority for
Christian faith, practice, and reflection. But this consensus now seems to be
falling apart.1
Indeed, the collapse of biblical authority since the Enlightenment is well-attested.2
What explains the erosion of biblical authority? Several reasons have been
offered,3 but certainly one of the primary causes is the advent of historical criticism in the
seventeenth century. Also known as the historical-critical method, a method that became
the dominant approach in the study of the Bible from the mid-nineteenth century until a
1

Edward Farley and Peter C. Hodgson, “Scripture and Tradition,” in Christian Theology: An Introduction
to Its Traditions and Tasks, rev. ed., ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press, 1994), 61.
2

Donald G. Bloesch, Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration & Interpretation, Christian Foundations
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994), 30-33; Edward Farley and Peter C. Hodgson, “Scripture and
Tradition,” 61, 72-77; Roy A. Harrisville and Walter Sundberg, The Bible in Modern Culture: Baruch
Spinoza to Brevard Childs, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2002), 10-13; Roy A.
Harrisville, “The Loss of Biblical Authority and Its Recovery,” in Reclaiming the Bible for the Church, ed.
Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1995), 47-48; Gordon D.
Kaufman, “What Shall We Do with the Bible?” Interpretation 25, no. 1 (January 1971): 96.
3

Robin Scroggs, for example, identifies these reasons: biblical ethics are said to be no longer suitable for
contemporary society; the theological claims of the Bible have been judged to be inadequate and outmoded;
biblical scholarship, influenced by history-of-religions approaches, has questioned the uniqueness of
biblical writings as compared with other ancient texts; and, liberation theologies have raised disturbing
questions concerning the apparent patriarchal and sexist ideologies in the biblical text. Robin Scroggs,
“The Bible as Foundational Document,” Interpretation 49, no. 1 (January 1995): 17-19.
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generation ago, historical criticism “seeks to answer a basic question: to what historical
circumstances does this text refer, and out of what historical circumstances did it
emerge?”4
The historical-critical method has shed much light on many areas of vital
importance to Christian thought. Nevertheless, some have asserted that it has also
fostered a rationalistic skepticism of the biblical text.5 One way it did so was to question
the historical nature of the text.6 Is the Bible historically accurate? Not exactly, said
many historical critics.7 They asserted further, that biblical texts were never intended to
be historical documents. Rather, such texts are only expressions of faith narrowly
defined, sometimes couched in myth, and bearing historical inaccuracies of various

4

Richard E. Burnett, “Historical Criticism,” in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed.
Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 290. For the features normally said to be
central to historical-critical study of the Bible, cf., John Barton, “Historical-Critical Approaches,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed. John Barton (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 9-12.
5

N.T. Wright, The Last Word: Beyond the Bible Wars to a New Understanding of the Authority of Scripture
(San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2005), 82. Wright claims that the Enlightenment made Reason the arbiter
of religious and theological claims, that it renounced the authority of the church and the Bible, and that it
avowed faith in the authority of nature and reason.
6

Regarding challenges to the Bible, Rowan A. Greer claims that both history and nature have been enemies
of the Bible since the eighteenth century. He suggests that nature was the preoccupation of the eighteenth
century and history in the nineteenth century. See Rowan A. Greer, Anglican Approaches to Scripture:
From the Reformation to the Present (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2006), 62. Van A.
Harvey addresses the problem historical inquiry raises for Christian belief and documents the shift from
Christianity’s will to belief to the Enlightenment’s will to truth in The Historian and the Believer: The
Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996;
repr., New York: Macmillan, 1966), 3-37. Harvey’s book is a classic discussion of the conflict between the
morality of historical knowledge and traditional Christian belief. Cf., e.g., 102-126.
7

That the text of the Bible reported accurately the events it describes was already seriously questioned by
the early nineteenth century, popularized by the then sensationalist findings of David Friedrich Strauss. Cf.
e.g., W.G. Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of Its Problems (Nashville, TN:
Abingdon Press, 1972), 120-205. For more on the post-Enlightenment challenge of history to biblical
authority, see Greer, Anglican Approaches to Scripture: From the Reformation to the Present, 112-39.
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sorts.8 Before the Enlightenment, biblical interpretation tended to read the Gospels as
“realistic narratives.”9 The “literal sense” of the biblical narratives and “historical
reference” were identical. But the rise of modern historical criticism meant that now
there were two worlds: biblical history and actual history.10
The rationalistic skepticism of the Enlightenment also challenged the Bible as
revelation. During the Protestant Reformation, the Bible was generally seen to be
authoritative because it was considered to be an inspired collection of writings that
originated from God. In contrast, chiefly by virtue of Enlightenment inquiry, for many,
scripture came to be seen primarily as a human document. Claims about a verbally
inspired text came into question with the rise of textual and source criticism. Doubts
were cast upon the Bible’s origins, authorship, and validity. Consequently, many
concluded that the Bible is not a unique deposit of revelation, the special qualities of
which would be due to its inspired origins.
Those who are skeptical of the Bible’s historicity and deny that it contains
specific revelatory content may be broadly identified as post-Enlightenment rationalists.11

8

Cf. e.g., Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, rev.ed., ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (New York: Harper &
Row, 1961).
9

Hans W. Frei surveys the ways in which biblical narrative has been read and understood from Luther to
Strauss and traces the change that took place in biblical hermeneutics during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, leading to a loss of the sense of realism in reading the biblical text, in The Eclipse of Biblical
Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1974).
10

Daniel J. Treier, “Scripture and Hermeneutics,” in Mapping Modern Theology: A Thematic and
Historical Introduction, ed. Kelly M. Kapic and Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Academic, 2012), 72.
11

For a more comprehensive description of this and the following group, cf. Wright, The Last Word:
Beyond the Bible Wars to a New Understanding of the Authority of Scripture, 3-6.
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Generally, they tend to deny biblical authority altogether or identify the locus of that
authority in how scripture functions in the life of the church.12 In contrast, those who
defend the doctrine of biblical authority based on their belief in the Bible’s historicity and
divine origin may be broadly identified as anti-Enlightenment supernaturalists.
Generally, they tend to identify the locus of biblical authority in some property of the
texts themselves, that is, in the content, rather than in the function, of Christian scripture.
Both function-based rationalists and content-based supernaturalists are open to
challenge on various grounds. It is unclear, for example, upon what basis function-based
rationalists who fully embrace historical criticism, but who still read the Bible with the
expectation that it speaks authoritatively, can assign more authority to biblical books than
to any other books if there are no distinctive properties of the biblical texts that set them
apart from other texts.13 Also, if the historical reliability of the biblical narratives cannot
be trusted,14 upon what basis could one expect them to have the power to “occasion new
occurrences of revelation” or to be useful to the Christian community in other ways?
Content-based supernaturalists seem open to the challenge that they fail to take
seriously what seems to be the historical nature of much of the biblical text. The inherent
danger of this failure is that without critical, historical inquiry there is no check on

12

Cf. e.g., David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).

13

E.g., “Why should one prefer, say, Leviticus to Dante’s Inferno, or Jude to Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation
of Christ? Yet, proponents of the liberal view of the Bible rarely suggest in any serious way that such later,
or even earlier, writings be used in public worship in place of Holy Writ.” Paul J. Achtemeier, Inspiration
and Authority: Nature and Function of Christian Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1999), 35.
14

Of course, most would agree that it might be overly-optimistic to think that we could get back to “what
actually happened,” arriving at “objective” historical truth.
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Christianity’s propensity to remake Jesus, never mind the Christian god, in its own
image.15 Furthermore, it is unclear how Christian scripture can be regarded as a unique
deposit of divine revelation when the biblical texts also contain factual errors,
discrepancies, and contradictions.16
If neither function-based rationalists nor content-based supernaturalists are able to
present a convincing case for biblical authority, can the Bible speak authoritatively in
Christian religion in an age of critical, historical awareness? And if so, how? These are
the overarching questions this dissertation answers.

Schleiermacher’s Alternative Model of Biblical Authority
This study argues that there is an alternative to strictly rationalistic and
supernaturalistic models of biblical authority, an alternative which successfully makes the
case for that authority. Friedrich Schleiermacher, nineteenth-century philosopher,
theologian, and biblical critic, provides us with a third way of understanding biblical
authority that has significant advantages to models which are strictly function- or contentbased.17

15

N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 10.

16

See Achtemeier, Inspiration and Authority, 45-61.

I argue in this dissertation that Schleiermacher’s model of biblical authority is neither strictly nor
absolutely content- or function-based. For him, it is the event that Jesus represents that has authority.
However, because Schleiermacher understands the New Testament to be somewhat of a record or
interpretation of that event, one may legitimately argue that in some sense, he does locate some authority in
the content of scripture, although not because it contains divine revelation. His claim, however, is that
whatever authority resides within the text is that of the event of Jesus’ conscious relationship with God,
which occurred, of course, before there was any text or church. One of Schleiermacher’s strongest
arguments, in my opinion, is that the earliest disciples of Jesus became Christians before there was a New
Testament.
17
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Chapter Two presents a typology of biblical authority and places Schleiermacher’s
viewpoint on this map. I broadly classify models of biblical authority as either contentor function-based and offer a description of each. Content-based theories view scripture
as authoritative by virtue of a content that is in some sense divinely disclosed. Functionbased theories derive biblical authority from the way scripture is used in the life of the
Christian community. Then, I briefly explain Schleiermacher’s third way, which I
broadly identify as evangelical, since its focus and center is what God did in Christ the
Redeemer.
Chapter Three examines Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation. I show that
although he has a robust understanding of divine revelation, he does not believe there is
warrant for the claim of a direct connection between divine revelation and the Bible.
Also, I take a look at the core criticism of Schleiermacher’s position: it does not allow for
a knowledge of God. Then, I conclude the chapter by responding to this fundamental
criticism.
In Chapter Four, I analyze his understanding of the meaning of “inspiration.”
Again, I demonstrate that although he believes in divine inspiration, this does not mean
that he views the Bible as a deposit of divinely-revealed truths. Rather, for him, the locus
of inspiration is the authors of scripture, not their words, and the agent of inspiration is
the common spirit of the church.
Chapter Five introduces Schleiermacher’s understanding of what makes scripture
authoritative: it is the first recorded expression of Christian faith. For him, the New
!6

Testament is composed of reports of the experience of redemption in Christ and of the
revelation of Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness. As such, Schleiermacher considered
those reports to be the original interpretation of Jesus’ consciousness of God, an
interpretation which was embodied in Christ’s words and deeds. The authority of
scripture for Schleiermacher, then, lies not in some property of the texts themselves, nor
strictly in the way scripture functions in the Christian community, but rather in our faith
that through them and in the community of faith we meet Christ.18 Also in this chapter, I
lay out the principal criticism of his understanding of biblical authority, that it rejects
scripture as the foundation of Christian faith. Then, after a close examination of one of
his sermons, I trace out his response to this criticism and the reasoning which underlies it.
Chapter Six continues the investigation into Schleiermacher’s conception of
scripture’s authority by examining what he believed regarding the normative character of
scripture. I identify his “canon within the canon,” and why he ascribed normative
authority to some parts of scripture over other parts. Also, I lay out his controversial
claim that the Old Testament does not share the normative worth and inspiration of the
New.

18

Schleiermacher’s assumption, fundamental to his entire dogmatic project, Christian Faith, is that
Christian faith is always and everywhere brought about in the same way, namely, by the personal impact of
Christ on persons of faith. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, trans. Terrence N. Tice,
Catherine L. Kelsey, and Edwina Lawler, ed. Terrence N. Tice (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox
Press, forthcoming), §127.2, §14.1. For the apostles, this impact was direct, while for us it is mediated.
Also, faith in Christ, for Schleiermacher, is rooted in community experience. That is where one is
confronted with Christ. Terrence N. Tice, Schleiermacher (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2006), 28,
37-38.
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In Chapter Seven, I review his doctrine of biblical authority, respond to his view
of the Old Testament, and discuss what I see as two major strengths of his conception of
biblical authority.
The focus of this study, then, is a careful analysis and evaluation of
Schleiermacher’s understanding of the nature, function, and authority of Christian
scripture. The primary source for this inquiry is his systematic theology, found in
Christian Faith. His theology on the doctrine of scripture may be found there, in
§§127-132. Other primary sources upon which I rely heavily are Brief Outline of
Theology as a Field of Study, On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics,
and On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke, as well as many of
Schleiermacher’s published sermons.

Significance of This Study
The significance of this research is two-fold. First, it makes a contribution to the
field of Schleiermacher studies, especially to those studies that relate to his understanding
of the doctrines of scripture and biblical authority. In reference to these subjects, Dawn
DeVries notes that although Schleiermacher works out a sophisticated doctrine of
scripture in several of his writings, and although he himself lectured more frequently on
the New Testament than on dogmatics, little attention has been given by biblical scholars
and theologians to his observations on scripture.19
19

Dawn DeVries, “Rethinking the Scripture Principle: Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Role of the Bible
in the Church,” in Reformed Theology: Identity and Ecumenicity, ed. Wallace Alston, Jr. and Michael
Welker (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 296.
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Second, this research contributes to a better understanding of the nature of
scripture and biblical authority in Protestantism and Evangelicalism. Earlier, I noted that
even though some believe that “the house of biblical authority has collapsed,” many still
try to live in it. This research, then, contributes to the ongoing Evangelical conversation
regarding biblical authority and its role in theological method, a significant
methodological issue still debated within Evangelicalism today.20 For many who
doggedly continue to look to scripture as an authority in Christian religion and who
continue to give scripture a central role in the church, this study provides valid reasons
for doing so.
What this study demonstrates is that it is possible for Christians to maintain a
robust doctrine of biblical authority without requiring them to contradict what they know
about science, history, and philosophy. Accordingly, I am convinced that critical
reflection on Schleiermacher’s conception of the authority of scripture has the potential to
affirm and clarify its nature and central role in Christian religion today.

20

For more information on the ongoing debate on the issue of biblical authority in Evangelicalism, see
Alister E. McGrath, “Evangelical Theological Method: The State of the Art,” in Evangelical Futures: A
Conversation on Theological Method, ed. John G. Stackhouse, Jr. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000),
28.
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Chapter Two: Mapping the Doctrine of Biblical Authority
The thesis of this dissertation is that Schleiermacher provides us with a third way
of understanding the doctrine of biblical authority, which has significant advantages over
content-based/supernaturalist and function-based/rationalist models. Before I delve into a
closer examination of this “third way,” however, I think the sensible move is to consider
in some small measure an aerial view of the field. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to
introduce a conceptual framework of the range of views on the doctrine of biblical
authority and then to locate Schleiermacher in this framework.
Because of the variety and complexity of the proposals defended on this subject
from the Enlightenment to the present day, to synthesize and do justice to them in one
brief chapter would be a formidable task and one which I will not undertake. So, in no
way will this be an exhaustive examination of any or all views of biblical authority. My
modest aim in this chapter is merely to explain a meaningful typology and illustrate the
content of those categories by offering an example of the type of theories which belong
there. Although I will refer to a handful of theologians and their conceptions of the
authority of scripture, my primary focus will be upon one theologian in each class. I will
use that theologian’s understanding of the authority of scripture to describe each category.
I have chosen Kevin Vanhoozer’s viewpoint to depict the content-based/supernaturalist
model and David H. Kelsey’s to describe the function-based/rationalist category. I will
!10

close the chapter with a classification of and brief introduction to Schleiermacher’s
alternative position.
The conceptual structure of the map of biblical authority models in this chapter is
my own contrivance, but in its design I have often referred to and leaned heavily upon the
typologies of others.1 I am suggesting that one way to classify most views on this subject
is to categorize them as either content- or function-based, and I am delineating them in
three ways. First, this classification differentiates theories based on their locus of
authority. Content-based approaches tend to identify the locus of authority in some

1

See the following sources for discussions of some of the more commonly-known systematic
classifications of biblical authority: Robert Gnuse, The Authority of the Bible: Theories of Inspiration
Revelation and the Canon of Scripture (New York: Paulist Press, 1985). Gnuse groups theories of biblical
authority into five categories: 1) Inspiration—Theologians in this camp affirm the priority of the divine
authorship of the Bible and assert that it is authoritative because of its inspired, revelatory content; 2)
Salvation history—Theories in this category view the Bible as an account of salvific events rather than as a
repository of ideational or propositional content. The source of authority may be the salvific events, the
interpretation of the events by biblical theologians, or history itself as the revelation of God; 3)
Existentialism—Theories of biblical authority in this category shy away from the notion that inspiration is a
quality of the text, but rather see in the text an occasion for a divine-human encounter. Here, the locus of
authority is the modern existential situation; 4) Christocentrism—In models in this category, a selected
norm is taken from part of the biblical text, or a crucial theological concept in the text serves as a norm to
interpret the rest of the Bible. Usually, these models favor the Christ event, the gospel, or the kerygma as
the locus of authority; 5) Limited authority—Gnuse places theories in this category that tend to view
scripture as authoritative because of what scripture does for the church, rather than because of what it is;
David H. Kelsey, Proving Doctrine: The Uses of Scripture in Modern Theology (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity
Press International, 1999). Although his work is technically an analysis of how theologians construe the
scripture they actually use to help them authorize theological proposals, I believe it may also serve as
somewhat of a systematic classification of biblical authority theories. Here are Kelsey’s categories: 1)
Scripture may be construed as containing inspired, inerrant doctrine; 2) It may be construed as containing
distinctive concepts; 3) Scripture may be construed as the recital of salvation history; 4) Scripture may
produce or foster an encounter with Christ; 5) It mediates a new revelatory occurrence by the poetic images
of scripture, religious symbols, and/or kerygmatic statements; Markus Barth, “Sola Scriptura,” in Scripture
and Ecumenism, vol. 3 of Duquesne Studies Theological Studies, ed. Leonard Swidler (Pittsburgh, PA:
Duquesne, 1965), 86-92; David Bartlett, The Shape of Scriptural Authority (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1983). Bartlett’s work evaluates the authority behind various types of literature found in the Bible; Paul J.
Achtemeier, Inspiration and Authority: Nature and Function of Christian Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Academic, 1999); and, Avery Dulles, “Scripture: Recent Protestant and Catholic Views,” in The
Authoritative Word: Essays on the Nature of Scripture, ed. Donald K. McKim (Eugene, OR: Wipf and
Stock Publishers, 1983), 239-261.
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property of the biblical texts themselves, whereas function-based approaches recognize
that locus in how scripture functions in the life of the church.
Second, another way to describe the difference between content- and functionbased conceptions of biblical authority is to ask where authority is concentrated. For
example, is religious authority to be found in the canon or the church? This is a key
question that continues to be discussed in theology to the present day. Admittedly, this is
a false dichotomy to some extent, since the church decided which Christian writings
merited canonical standing. Thus, one could argue that there is a sense in which the
church has ultimate authority over the canon. (I will show how this is both true, albeit
not the full truth for Schleiermacher, in Chapter Seven.) That said, content-based theories
tend to place religious authority in scripture. Function-based approaches are apt to
identify the church as having overriding authority.
Third, I am identifying content-based models as supernaturalist and functionbased models as rationalist. I am defining a supernaturalist understanding of biblical
authority as one which asserts that the production of scripture is due primarily, if not
entirely, to divine agency. We may identify this view of scripture as the traditional view;
it tends to see the Bible as a divinely-inspired source of revealed truths. Supernaturalists,
then, tend to insist upon an identical relationship between divine revelation and the Bible.
Conversely, I am defining a rationalist understanding of biblical authority as one in which
rational reasoning and critical inquiry reign. It tends to subjugate scripture to the claims
of reason, the result of which is that biblical writings are viewed as human documents.
!12

Now, let us turn to a description of theories that fall into the content-based/supernaturalist
class.

Content-Based/Supernaturalist Approaches to Biblical Authority
In this inquiry I am defining content-based/supernaturalist models as those that
view scripture as authoritative by virtue of a content that is in some sense identical with
divine revelation. Proponents of these models tend to argue that scripture contains
divinely-disclosed revelatory content and that, consequently, its underlying source of
authority lies in a certain property or characteristic of the biblical text itself. For
example, content-based models include those theories that construe scripture as
containing inspired, inerrant doctrine, distinctive concepts, or as the recital of certain
notable acts of God in history.2
I have chosen Kevin Vanhoozer’s theology of biblical authority to serve as an
illustration of the content-based/supernaturalist model.3 Vanhoozer asserts the authority
of the canon over the community of faith when he writes that “[i]f Scripture enjoys final
authority . . . it is because authority finally resides in the divinely authorized and

2

These are the initial categories that David Kelsey identifies in his typology. The representatives he selects
to exemplify these approaches are B. B. Warfield (scripture construed as inerrant doctrine), Hans Werner
Bartsch (scripture as containing distinctive concepts), and G. Ernest Wright (scripture as the recital of
historical events as the acts of God). See David H. Kelsey, Proving Doctrine: The Uses of Scripture in
Modern Theology (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999), 14-55.
3

Vanhoozer is Research Professor of Systematic Theology at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. He is
the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology and The Dictionary for Theological
Interpretation of the Bible. He is also the author of The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic
Approach to Christian Theology and Faith Speaking Understanding: Performing the Drama of Doctrine.
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appropriated discourse of the canon.”4 Here, he not only affirms his belief in the
authority of scripture, but also acknowledges a reason for it: the canon is “divinely
authorized.”
He ties that authority to scripture’s content. For Vanhoozer, the biblical texts
narrate and explain God’s story—what God began in the history of Israel and
completed in the history of Jesus Christ—which is also the story of humanity.
Scripture is a polyphonic testimony to what God has done, is doing, and will do
in Christ for the salvation of the world.5
Similarly, he suggests: “Scripture is Christ’s own witness to himself via the
commissioned agency of the prophets and apostles who authored it in the power of the
Holy Spirit.”6 He asserts that scripture is divine revelation, but he believes it is more:
“Scripture is holy not simply because its content is revealed or because God on occasion
uses its content to make himself known. Rather, it is holy because it is part of God’s
broader plan to give access to himself through Jesus Christ.”7

4

Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 166. Vanhoozer claims that a properly theological
account of scripture begins from the premise that God is a communicative agent, able to use language for
communicative purposes.
5

Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Scripture and Tradition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology,
ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 167. His understanding of the
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6
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7
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He further explains his understanding of the nature of scripture when he writes:
The Bible is the means by which the apostolic memory of what God was doing in
Christ is given specificity and substance. For, as Calvin rightly says, the only
Christ we have is the Christ of the Scriptures. Hence the ground of Scripture’s
indispensable role in the economy of the gospel is ultimately christological. The
Bible—not only the Gospels but all of Scripture—is the (divinely) authorized
version of the gospel, the necessary framework for understanding what God was
doing in Jesus Christ. Scripture is the voice of God that articulates the Word of
God: Jesus Christ.8
Certainly, Vanhoozer understands scripture to be authoritative because of its
divine origin and discourse and because it is a record of what God did in Christ. But his
conception of the nature of scripture is nuanced: God uses the human discourse in the
canon to perform certain actions. He writes: “In sum: it is the divine illocutions—God’s
use— that constitute biblical authority. Let us posit the notion of a “canonical illocution”
to refer to “what God is doing by means of the human discourse in the biblical texts at the
level of the canon.”9 He adds that
[a]ccording to our revitalized Scripture principle, then, the divine author is not
merely a teacher who passes on propositional truths or a narrator who conveys

8
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9
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the discourse of others but a dramatist who does things in and through the
dialogical action of others.10
When Vanhoozer asks: “Why privilege the church’s use of Scripture?” his answer
exemplifies the content-based/supernaturalist understanding of scripture’s authority. It is
that the Bible “is a text of divine discourse.” He elaborates:
The Bible is not Scripture simply because an interpretive community decides to
use it as such. On the contrary, it is the divine decision to authorize, appropriate,
assume, and annex these human communicative acts into the economy of
revelation and reconciliation.11
He goes on to assert that the church acknowledges what the Bible is, that it is divine
discourse, but that this acknowledgment does not make it so. In other words, he holds
fast to the notion that scripture’s authority is not conferred upon it by the church. Rather,

10
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he explains, scripture’s authority is inherent and due principally to its inspiration by the
Holy Spirit, a fundamental theme of content-based/supernaturalist perspectives.12
As it turns out, what is authoritative for him is biblical content that relates to what
he calls “the great drama of redemption.”13 He asserts that scripture is the supreme norm
for Christian faith and life, but not, he writes, “as an epistemic norm that caters to
modernity’s craving for certainty, but as a sapiential norm that provides direction for
one’s fitting participation in the great evangelical drama of redemption.”14

Function-Based/Rationalist Approaches to Biblical Authority
Whereas most content-based/supernaturalist theories derive the authority of
scripture from its perceived divine origins, a second category of theories express an
explicitly functional understanding of scripture. I am labeling models that derive
authority from the uses of scripture in the life of the Christian community as functionbased and rationalist.15 I broadly identify these as “rationalist” because they tend to
champion the post-Enlightenment skepticism that challenged the Bible as revelation and
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history. Theories in this class view biblical writings as human documents rather than
divine products.
Models in this category understand the authority of scripture in functional terms.
That is, “[t]he texts are authoritative not in virtue of any inherent property they may have,
such as being inerrant or inspired, but in virtue of a function they fill in the life of the
Christian community.”16 For example, for Karl Barth, scripture is authoritative not
because the Bible communicates divinely inspired information about God and God’s
ways, but because “it provides our normative link with God’s self-disclosure.”17 He
believes that, sometimes, biblical texts may function as occasions in which people may
encounter God when those texts are used in a Christian assembly as the basis of
preaching and worship. According to Barth, then, texts have the potential to render God’s
personal presence. Scripture is a fallible witness through which God in Christ personally
encounters the trusting reader or hearer. For Barth, to say that scripture is “inspired” is to
say that “God has promised that sometimes, at his gracious pleasure, the ordinary human
words of the biblical texts will become the Word of God, the occasion for rendering an
agent present to us in a Divine-human encounter.”18
According to Barth, the aspect of scripture that has the potential for rendering a
divine-human encounter is biblical narrative. Kelsey explains:

16
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Narrative is taken to be the authoritative aspect of scripture; it is authoritative in
so far as it functions as the occasion for encounter with an agent in history, viz.,
the Risen Lord. Hence we may say that scripture is taken to have the logical
force of stories that render a character, that offer an identity description of an
agent. Scripture does this by means of certain formal features of the writing,
certain patterns in the narrated sequences of intentions and actions. It is to these
patterns that the theologian appeals to authorize his proposals.19
Barth affirms, then, that in view of God’s personal presence in the world, a series of
theological proposals not expressly found in scripture, may be indirectly authorized “by
the patterns in biblical narrative that render an agent and sometimes occasion an
encounter with him.”20
David H. Kelsey shares Barth’s functionalist understanding of the authority of
scripture.21 Although neither Barth nor Kelsey are rationalists, I am using Kelsey’s
understanding of the nature of scripture to describe models in the function-based/
rationalist category.22 Kelsey asserts, for example, that biblical writings are authoritative
19

Ibid., 48.

20
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when they shape individual and communal life and thereby author new identities.23 Thus,
scripture’s authority is manifest when it functions to define the identity of the Christian
community and when it is used to nurture and reform the community’s common life. For
these reasons and on these bases, he holds that scripture also functions to authorize
theological proposals. He writes:
[T]o call certain texts ‘scripture’ is to acknowledge that they are authoritative de
facto in the church and that that authority is functional. That is, its authority
consists in its functioning to “author” or shape decisively communal and
individual identities. And to call them ‘scripture’ is to say that the community is
in fact committed to use them in this way in the course of Christian praxis.24
Kelsey also speaks of scripture’s authority de jure when he asserts that biblical
writings ought to be used in the common life of the Christian community “because the
power of God’s kingly rule graciously shapes human identity and empowers new forms
of life in persons through scripture.”25 He clarifies that this authority has little to do with
the content of scripture, but rather has everything to do with how scripture is used. He
23
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asserts that “biblical writings have authority, but the authority derives not . . . from their
‘content,’ but rather from the end to which they are used., viz., by God’s power to
empower new human identities.”26
Moreover, Kelsey denies that the authority of biblical writings is based on the
supernaturalist understanding that scripture is a deposit of divine revelation. In his
discussion of the nature of scripture, he explains that
what is authoritative about scripture is not a systematizable set of doctrines about
transcendent status [sic] of affairs and about arcane metahistorical histories, nor
is it a systematically elusive “word.” It is a heterogeneous collection of images,
parables, metaphors, principles for action, beliefs, emotion-concepts, etc,. each of
which is determinately particular and concrete.27
Like Barth, then, Kelsey denies that scripture is divinely inspired, as Vanhoozer or
Warfield understand the term.28 Accordingly, in his model of biblical authority, God is
not “saying” or “revealing,” but God is “shaping identity,” “using” the uses of scripture
toward a specific end: the actualization of God’s eschatological rule.29
That Kelsey does not believe that God authors scripture, does not mean that he
rejects the notion of God’s active presence there. For example, he affirms that
the practices that compose the common life of ecclesial communities seek to be
appropriate responses to the ways in which God relates to all that is not God,
including God’s way of relating in the person of Jesus, as those ways of relating
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are explicitly or implicitly narrated, commented on, celebrated, longed for,
alluded to, or assumed in various parts of canonical Holy Scripture.30
In fact, he believes the church ascribes authority to the biblical canon because to do so is
deemed, first and foremost, an “appropriate response” to God and to God’s way of
relating that is disclosed in and through texts that are first regarded as Bible, then
Scripture, then, ultimately as Holy Scripture.31
To recapitulate, then, for the traditional content-based/supernaturalist view of the
Bible as a divinely inspired source of revealed truths, Kelsey would substitute a
functional view. This view is oriented to the life of the church and correlates scripture
and its authority with the existential concerns of the believing community and individual.
He writes:
The functionalist analysis of “scriptural authority over the church” brings with it
an important implication concerning the conceptual home of some doctrines of
scripture in some theological positions. Scripture’s authority specifically for
theology . . . is a function of its authority for the common life of the church. It’s
authority for the church’s common life consists in its being used in certain rulish
and normative ways so that it helps to nurture and reform the community’s selfidentity and the personal identities of her members.32
Again, what is “normative,” according to Kelsey, is neither the content of the
Bible, nor that the Bible contains propositional revelation in the form of divinely given
information about God and his ways. Rather, as he explains:
Our analysis suggests that it is the patterns in scripture, not its “content,” that
make it “normative” for theology. . . . So scripture is authority for theological
30

Kelsey, Ecclesial Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 133. Cf. also, 14-15.

31

For Kelsey’s discussion of these terms, see Ecclesial Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 135-56.

32

Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology, 208.

!22

proposals, not by being the perfect source of the content that they fully preserve,
but by providing a pattern by which the proposal’s adequacy as elaboration can
be assessed.33
Interestingly, Kelsey’s concept of biblical authority, which looks to “patterns in
scripture” for the basis of that authority, is that such patterns are “decisively shaped by an
imaginative judgment about the mode in which God makes himself present.”34 Further,
that imaginative judgment “is logically prior to any exegetical judgments about the
[biblical] texts.”35
Kelsey contends that scripture “deserves” to be considered the theological norm
and that theologians “ought” (he puts both these verbs in quotes) so to regard it. But he
quickly adds that “this ‘objective normativity’ of scriptural authority is not undercut by
taking its ‘authority’ in terms of scripture’s functions rather than of its properties.”36 He
acknowledges that theologians who agree that scripture—in diverse ways, to be sure—is
“authority” for theological proposals disagree widely over the extent, content, and
meaning of canonical scripture other than to assert its “sufficiency” for an indicated use,
“the occasion for the presence of God among the faithful.”37
As illustrated by Barth and Kelsey, and to sum up, function-based models of
biblical authority are those that, broadly speaking, tend to understand that the authority of
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scripture derives from its uses in the life of the Christian church. Further, these models
may be labeled as rationalist because they defend the post-Enlightenment skepticism that
challenged the Bible as revelation and history. Theories in this class, therefore, view
biblical writings as human documents rather than divine products.

A Content-Based/Rationalist Approach to Biblical Authority
I have already let the cat out of the bag by describing Schleiermacher’s
perspective as a “third way” to conceive of scripture’s authority. Although one could
make the case that his approach might seem to borrow from or be suggestive of both
content-based/supernaturalist and function-based/rationalist models, I am suggesting that
his understanding of biblical authority will not fit neatly in either category. Why is this
so?
To begin with, we may identify his perspective as more content-based/
supernaturalist than function-based/rationalist, in some respects, since he considers the
New Testament to be authoritative by reason of its being a reliable witness to the
revelation of Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness and the first in a series of presentations of
Christian faith. However, in other respects, his understanding fails to meet the test of a
content-based/supernaturalist model, according to the way I am defining it. Those who
advocate content-based/supernaturalist models also tend to view scripture as authoritative
by virtue of a content that is in some sense divinely disclosed. Further, they tend to
ascribe greater authority to the biblical canon than to the church, asserting that the former
has authority over the latter. As I will demonstrate in later chapters, however,
!24

Schleiermacher does not affirm a direct connection between divine revelation and the
Bible. Moreover, in some respects, he affirms ecclesial over biblical authority. Thus, at
least for these reasons, his understanding seems to exhibit characteristics of functionbased/rationalist models. Hence, his conception of biblical authority is neither absolutely
content-based nor function-based, but borrows from both.
So, how should we label Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority? At the
outset, we may broadly identify his third way as evangelical, since according to his
theology, everything in Christianity is connected in one way or another to redemption
through Christ. His theology revolves around Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness and its
influence upon the community of faith that Jesus founded. Therefore, Schleiermacher’s
approach may be classified as a thoroughly evangelical one.
Before suggesting a more specific label to his approach to biblical authority, I
believe it may be helpful to discuss how some in Schleiermacher’s own day characterized
him and how he characterized himself. To do so will cast some light on how and how not
to classify him. At the same time, it will demonstrate the difficulty of identifying an
appropriate category for his views.
Was he a supernaturalist or a rationalist? Cathie Kelsey suggests in her book,
Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher, that the opponents he primarily had in mind
as he wrote Brief Outline and Christian Faith, for example, were what he called
supernaturalists on the one hand and rationalists on the other. Regarding his
understanding of Christ, Kelsey claims that Schleiermacher “takes a path between super!25

naturalism and rationalism, distinguishing his understanding from both.”38 Although
Kelsey is referring to a doctrine not extensively considered in this study, I am suggesting
here that what she noticed about Schleiermacher’s christology could very well be said of
his approach to scripture.39
Moreover, Schleiermacher discusses this same subject, the conflict in his day
between rationalism and supernaturalism, near the close of a letter to his friend, Friedrich
Lücke. He mentions that many who read his understanding of the supernatural in
Christian revelation and the natural development of the divine plan of salvation in the
Glaubenslehre40 had a difficult time deciding where he stood in regard to the rationalism/
supernaturalism controversy. It surely may have seemed that he shared an interest in both
worlds. And, of course, as a churchman and a post-Enlightenment theologian, he did. He
writes, albeit tongue in cheek:
Quite recently a new type of rationalism has been devised—I would almost like
to think it was done for me especially, but that would be to give me too much
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honor. It seems to me that it is called ‘ideal rationalism,’41 and it refers to the
belief that something natural could at the same time be something supernatural.42
Schleiermacher informs Lücke that he is grateful for the suggestion, but he has a better
idea: he wishes someone would devise a position for him in which what is supernatural
can at the same time be natural. He suggests that whenever he speaks of the supernatural,
he does so with reference to whatever comes first. Afterwards, however, it becomes
something natural. For example, he suggests that “creation is supernatural, but it
afterwards becomes the natural order.” Likewise, he asserts: “[I]n his origin Christ is
supernatural, but he also becomes natural, as a genuine human being.” He suggests that
the Holy Spirit and the Christian church can be treated in the same way.43 He concludes
by labeling himself as a “real supernaturalist”:
If the former view was called rationalism, this view would have to be a
supernaturalism, and why should it not be called real? And so I want to say that I
consider myself to be a real supernaturalist, and I think this label is as good as
any other.44

41 According

to James Duke and Francis Fiorenza, the reference here is a term used by Ferdinand Christian
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To sum up, Schleiermacher self-identified as a “real supernaturalist,” although his
writings indicate that regarding many Christian doctrines, at least, he wanted to steer a
path between supernaturalists and rationalists. In fact, Schleiermacher was neither an
absolute supernaturalist nor an absolute rationalist.
In light of the above, then, how should we classify Schleiermacher’s doctrine of
biblical authority? First, I believe we may identify his perspective as, in the main,
content-based. For Schleiermacher, the New Testament is authoritative because it is a
witness to the revelation of Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness and the first in a series of
presentations of Christian faith. I am proposing that what this means is that since the
New Testament provides a picture of Jesus’ consciousness of God, embodied in his words
and deeds, and since it is a record of the first expression of faith in Christ, one may
conclude that Schleiermacher’s conception of the locus of biblical authority is found in
that particular New Testament content. Granted, one could make the case that his
perspective is neither strictly nor absolutely content-based. However, I am arguing in this
study that because the locus of authority is the record of the Christ event, his
understanding of scripture’s authority is substantially content-based.
This understanding is what separates Schleiermacher’s conception of biblical
authority from Kelsey’s and other function-based models. While Schleiermacher views
the record of the Christ event as the locus of biblical authority, Kelsey asserts that the
actual locus of authority is ecclesial communities who, in their common life, ascribe
authority to scripture. According to Kelsey, communities of faith ascribe authority to
!28

scripture, in part, “because [they believe that] God is self-committed to work through the
communities’ ways of living with these texts to author life for them by forming new
communal and personal identities.”45 That is, Kelsey’s understanding is that ecclesial
communities choose to “live with these texts” because they believe God is active in them.
But, why do ecclesial communities make this choice? Upon what basis do they
believe God is active in the biblical texts? Kelsey’s answer seems to be that the church
recognizes “the constitutive patterns of [biblical] texts.”46 Like Barth, Kelsey seems to
understand that “the patterns in biblical narrative,” to use a Barthian phrase,47 are the
basis for the decision of ecclesial communities to live with these texts, and thus, ascribe
authority to them.48 This represents a fine distinction between Kelsey’s and
Schleiermacher’s understanding of the locus of biblical authority, but a real one,
nonetheless. For Schleiermacher, biblical writings have authority, not because of their
narrative patterns or literary forms, but because of their content: they contain reliable
information about the God-consciousness of Christ and his influence on others. While
Kelsey pushes for a functional usage of scripture in which it is not scripture’s content that
is normative but the “patterns” that are found there, Schleiermacher, in contrast, claims
that it is the actual content of scripture that is authoritative.

45

Kelsey, Ecclesial Existence: A Theological Anthropology, 138. Italics mine.

46

Ibid., 146.

47

See fn. 20 in this chapter.

48

See also Kelsey, Ecclesial Existence, A Theological Anthropology, 153-6 and page 22, fn. 33 of this
study.
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Not only may we identify Schleiermacher’s conception of biblical authority as
content-based, but we may also identify it as rationalist. While he may not have
considered himself to be a rationalist, and while his theology may not qualify as
absolutely rationalistic since it allows space for the supernatural, I firmly believe that his
approach to biblical authority is deserving of the rationalist label. I have identified his
view of biblical authority rationalist primarily on the basis of his denial that the Bible is a
unique deposit of divine revelation. Further, his model of biblical authority demonstrates
a willingness to accept, even welcome, scientific and philosophical advances, a spirit
descriptive of the post-Enlightenment age. Again, he held that the phenomena of the
biblical writings are such that the Holy Spirit must have chosen not to produce scripture
in a “totally miraculous way”; instead “every element must be treated as purely human,
and the action of the Spirit was only to produce the inner impulse.”49 Here,
Schleiermacher sounds as if he is trying to qualify his supernaturalism as natural. To me,
that he believed the biblical writings were human documents guardedly qualifies his
perspective of biblical authority as rationalist, although he would argue that he himself
was not one.
I am proposing, then, that Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority merits
classification in a third category. Neither content-based/supernaturalist, nor functionbased/rationalist, I am identifying it as content-based/rationalist, a label that borrows

49

Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, trans. Jack Forstman and James
O. Duke, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press for the American Academy of Religion,
1977), 104.
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from both of the aforementioned categories. Several advantages accrue to identifying his
doctrine as such, but that discussion must wait for Chapter Seven. Before I highlight
those advantages, I want to dig deeper into Schleiermacher’s conception of biblical
authority. What did he believe about revelation? Inspiration? What is his understanding
of the locus of biblical authority? To what extent did he accept scripture’s normative
character? In the next chapter, I will begin to answer these questions, turning first to
Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation.
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Chapter Three: Schleiermacher and the Doctrine of Revelation
In the introduction to this inquiry I asserted that content-based/supernaturalist and
function-based/rationalist models of biblical authority hold conflicting views of the
concept of “revelation,” as it relates to scripture. The former avers that the Bible is a
unique deposit of divine revelation, which in some way originated with God. The latter
denies that the Bible contains specific revelatory content and tends to see the Bible
primarily as a human document. What was Schleiermacher’s conception of revelation
and its connection to scripture, and why?
My aims in this chapter are threefold. First, inasmuch as the concept of revelation
is often connected, if not foundational, to many models of biblical authority, I want to
compare Schleiermacher’s view of revelation as it relates to scripture with a classic
content-based/supernaturalist model. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, his is neither an
absolutely supernaturalist nor an absolutely rationalist model of the doctrine of divine
revelation. Before identifying Schleiermacher’s understanding of this concept, I want to
briefly describe a representation of the latter, one championed by Carl. F. H. Henry. My
purpose in doing so is to elucidate Schleiermacher’s viewpoint. Second, I want to lay out
the primary criticism of Schleiermacher’s understanding of divine revelation relative to
scripture. To accomplish this, I rely on the oeuvre of several conservative evangelicals,

!32

as well as that of neo-orthodox theologian, Karl Barth.1 Third, I want to trace out what I
believe would be Schleiermacher’s response to his critics and the reasoning behind it.
Therefore, I want to postpone until this part of the chapter a more complete explanation
of his understanding of revelation, as I believe such an explanation provides the best
evidence of how he would respond to his critics. To do so, I rely heavily upon what he
wrote on the subject in Christian Faith and On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured
Despisers. I do not limit my analysis to these primary sources alone, however, as I also
utilize accompanying clarifications from elsewhere. I will make the case that, for
Schleiermacher, God’s revelation may be identified in at least three places: in and
through the whole world in general, in the feeling of absolute dependence, and in Christ.

Carl F. H. Henry’s Doctrine of Revelation Vis-à-vis Scripture
In his book, Models of Revelation, Avery Robert Dulles constructs a typology of
twentieth-century revelation theology according to how and where revelation occurs. He
distinguishes five different models: doctrinal, historical, experiential, dialectical presence,
and new awareness.2 According to the doctrinal model, as the classification suggests, the
Bible is seen primarily as a source of doctrine. Thus, it equates revelation with
propositional statements, that is, with truth claims from and about God and God’s
purposes. Consequently, the doctrinal, or as it may also be identified, the propositional

1

While there are more contemporary critics of Schleiermacher’s theology, in general, and of his
understanding of revelation, in particular, I have found that for the most part they tend to share Barth’s
principal complaint.
2

Robert Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation, 2nd ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), 27-28.
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model3 certainly qualifies as an appropriate representative of a classic content-based/
supernaturalist model of revelation.
Carl F. H. Henry, one of the most prominent theologians of the conservative wing
of American Evangelicalism, is a proponent of this model. When Gabriel Fackre
discusses and draws on Avery Dulles’s typological survey of the concept of revelation, he
too selects Henry to represent the doctrinal model.4 Henry defends that model and
explains the methodological groundwork for neo-evangelical theology in his six-volume
magnum opus, God, Revelation and Authority.5 That primary source provides for us the
pertinent features of Henry’s concept of revelation and its connection to scripture.
What is relevant to this inquiry regarding Henry’s concept of revelation is his
strong affirmation of a direct connection between divine revelation and the Bible. That
is, for Henry and others who subscribe to supernaturalist/content-based models of
revelation, the Bible is an important locus of that revelation. After setting forth the nature
of theology in the first volume of God, Revelation and Authority, Henry turns his
attention in volumes two, three, and four to a delineation of fifteen foundational theses
about divine revelation. These are followed in volumes five and six by a development of

3

Others designate the doctrinal model of revelation as the propositional model. See, e.g., William C.
Placher, “How Do We Know What to Believe? Revelation and Authority,” in Essentials of Christian
Theology, ed. William Placher (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 14-18; Miikka Ruokanen,
Doctrina Divinitus Inspirata: Martin Luther’s Position in the Ecumenical Problem of Biblical Inspiration
(Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1985), 19-23.
4

Gabriel Fackre, The Doctrine of Revelation: A Narrative Interpretation, Edinburgh Studies in
Constructive Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 16.
5

Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 6 vols. (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976-1983). For a
review of Henry’s apologetic theology, cf. Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the Center: Evangelical Theology in
a Post-Theological Era, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 94-110.
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a largely classical orthodox approach to the doctrine of God.6 The eleventh thesis states:
“The Bible is a reservoir and conduit of divine truth.” In Henry’s explanation of this
thesis he asserts that
the Scriptures are the authoritative written record and interpretation of God’s
revelatory deeds, and the ongoing source of reliable objective knowledge
concerning God’s nature and ways. . . . The Scriptures offer a comprehensive and
authoritative overview of God’s revelatory disclosure and publish his purpose in
the past, present and future.7
Clearly, Henry understands the Bible to be a deposit of divine revelation.8
What this means, of course, is that Henry understands the content of revelation to
be information about God and his purposes.9 This is clear when he defines revelation as
that activity of the supernatural God whereby he communicates information
essential for man’s present and future destiny. In revelation God, whose thoughts
are not our thoughts, shares his mind; he communicates not only the truth about
himself and his intentions, but also that concerning man’s present plight and
future prospects.10
One could summarize Henry’s understanding of the content of revelation by stating that
revelation consists in knowledge. For him, the reality of revelation means that God has

6

I believe it is significant that Henry placed his discussion of revelation prior to his discussion of God.
One can make the case that he intended to make it clear that whatever may be said about the being and
attributes of God arises solely out of God’s own self-disclosure as found in the Bible.
7

Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 2:13.

8

Indeed, for him, true theology could be based only on the self-disclosure of God found in the Bible, for
there alone can true knowledge of God be found. Henry lays down the thesis that the Bible is the sole
foundation for theology. See Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 1:181-409. Schleiermacher challenges
the notion that the Bible is the sole foundation for theology and of faith, as well, as I will explain in Chapter
Five.
9

Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 3:170, 269. See also Carl F. H. Henry, “The Priority of Divine
Revelation: A Review Article,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 27, no. 1 (March 1984):
77-78.
10

Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 3:457.
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both acted in history and spoken to humankind.11 However, God’s speaking takes
precedence over God’s acting, for the divine word provides the rationale and meaning of
the divine historical acts.12 According to this perspective then, revelation is a
transcendent disclosure that gives the meaning of revelatory events and provides valid
truths about God’s nature and purposes.
Furthermore, Henry believes that revelation’s content is both objective and
propositional. Indeed, he holds that the content of the Bible is almost exclusively
propositional.13 In God, Revelation and Authority, he develops the thesis that “God’s
revelation is rational communication conveyed in intelligible ideas and meaningful
words, that is, in conceptual-verbal form.”14 For Henry, the reality that God has spoken
means that the intellect plays an integral role in the overall revelatory process.15
By now the essence or nature of revelation according to Henry has become
apparent: revelation is principally, if not strictly, in words with strict propositional
meanings. So, according to the doctrinal model, divine revelation is operative in the
realm of cognition or knowledge. “Revelation in the Bible,” Henry declares, “is
essentially a mental conception: God’s disclosure is rational and intelligible
communication. Issuing from the mind and will of God, revelation is addressed to the

11

Ibid., 3:261-71.
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Carl F. H. Henry, The Protestant Dilemma (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1949), 95-96, 217.
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Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 3:468
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Ibid., 3:467.
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Henry, The Protestant Dilemma, 97.
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mind and will of human beings.”16 His belief is that “God directly and objectively
manifests himself by intelligible words, commands and acts” and that “revelation is given
. . . to the mind and conscience of man universally.17
The reality that God has communicated to human beings and that God has spoken,
according to Henry, means that the intellect plays an integral role in the revelatory
process.18 Moreover, in contrast to what he saw as a fallacy in neo-orthodoxy, Henry
asserted that this revelation is objective and available to human reason. He brought
revelation, reason, and scripture together in what he set forth as his basic epistemological
axiom:
Divine revelation is the source of all truth, the truth of Christianity included;
reason is the instrument for recognizing it; Scripture is its verifying principle;
logical consistency is a negative test for truth and coherence a subordinate test.
The task of Christian theology is to exhibit the content of biblical revelation as an
orderly whole.19

16

Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 3:248. This view of the nature of revelation is, of course,
Thomist. Aquinas believed that revelation was the result of God’s action on the human intellect by which
“God might disclose new ideas or species to the mind of the prophet by direct action upon the senses, the
imagination, or by reordering existing ideas or species in an original way, or by direct action upon the
intellect.” [J. T. Forestell, “Biblical Inspiration,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 7, 2nd ed. (Detroit,
MI: Thomson Gale, 2003), 495.] Aquinas certainly believed, however, in the transcendence and utter
incomprehensibility of God. For an in-depth study on Aquinas’ doctrine of revelation, see Paul Synave and
Pierre Benoit, Prophecy and Inspiration: A Commentary on the Summa Theologica II-II, Questions
171-178,” trans. Avery Dulles (New York: Desclee, 1961).
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Henry, “The Priority of Divine Revelation: A Review Article,” 78. By contrast, Schleiermacher does not
think that he is qualified to say what we discern in God’s acts, or what his “mind” necessarily does, or that
we can immediately understand “the mind” of God whenever we “see” his acts or “hear” of them.
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Henry, The Protestant Dilemma, 97.
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Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, 1:215. If theology is the explication of revelation as disclosed in
the Bible, then in Henry’s estimation, the Bible is the central authority for theology. “Revelation is in fact a
core doctrine of the Bible,” Henry claims. “Without it the entire Scriptural message would lose its
authority.” See Henry, “The Priority of Divine Revelation: A Review Article,” 77. This perspective is
certainly representative of the content-based/supernaturalist model of biblical authority.
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To sum up, Henry believes that divine revelation is given in words with strict
propositional meanings, located in the Bible, a book authored by God. His conception of
revelation is an accurate depiction in general terms of the content-based/supernaturalist
model of revelation and biblical authority.

Schleiermacher’s Understanding of Revelation Vis-à-vis Scripture
How does Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation vis-à-vis scripture
compare with Henry’s? Whereas Henry’s classic representation of the content-based/
supernaturalist understanding of revelation typifies the doctrinal model in Dulles’s
typology of revelation, Schleiermacher’s understanding represents what Dulles identifies
as the experiential model.20 In this model, the Bible is viewed, not as a deposit of
divinely-revealed truths, but as a human document which chronicles and expresses the
experience of God in the lives of believers. According to the experiential model, then,
biblical authors are viewed as writing from their experience of the divine. This is
certainly true of Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation, as will become evident
later in this chapter. For now, I only want to highlight the more general dissimilarity
between Schleiermacher’s view of divine revelation and Henry’s: whereas Henry
conceives of a direct connection between divine revelation and the Bible, Schleiermacher
conceives only of an indirect one.

20

Dulles, Models of Revelation, 68-83, 119. Schleiermacher is also Gabriel Fackre’s and William Placher’s
choice to typify the experiential model. See Fackre, The Doctrine of Revelation, 17; Placher, “How Do We
Know What to Believe? Revelation and Authority,” 16-18.

!38

While Schleiermacher most certainly believes in the reality of divine revelation,
for him, scripture is not the locus of revelation, at least not in the same sense that it is for
Carl F. H. Henry and others who would classify themselves as conservative
evangelicals.21 To attest to this, there is no warrant, according to Schleiermacher, for
people to claim that scripture has a divine origin. This is clear from his discussion of the
doctrine of scripture in Christian Faith.22 Although there is no doctrine of revelation per
se in this or any other section of Christian Faith, Schleiermacher makes, what only seems
to be at first glance, a passing comment regarding the meaning of revelation when he
discusses the concept of “inspiration.” As it turns out, this comment is not insignificant,
but it is rather crucial for his entire doctrine of scripture. He contends that the general
custom of calling sacred scripture (die heilige Schrift) “revelation” leads to a
misconception: that the two concepts, revelation (Offenbarung) and inspiration
(Eingebung), may be used interchangeably. But these terms are not synonymous, he
asserts, and to treat them as such only leads to confusion. He explains:
[I]f one should understand the matter in such a way that by writing down sacred
scripture in a state of inspiration these authors would declare its content in a
special divine fashion, this would be an entirely groundless claim. This is the

21 As

I will show below, that Schleiermacher does not conceive the Bible to be a locus of revelation is an
inaccurate claim, since he believes that divine revelation is ubiquitous. Similarly, to claim that
Schleiermacher does not accept a direct connection between divine revelation and scripture, is not to say
that he rejects an indirect one. In contrast to Henry, however, he does not affirm that the Bible is a deposit
of divinely-disclosed truths.
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Schleiermacher’s discussion of the doctrine of scripture in Christian Faith falls under the rubric of
ecclesiology in the second part. Along with the ministry of the Word of God, the sacraments of Baptism
and the Lord’s Supper, the power of the Keys of the Kingdom, and prayer in the name of Jesus, scripture is
identified as one of the essential and unchanging marks of the Christian church.
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case whether one looks more at the act of composing a sacred book itself or more
at the arousal of thoughts that precede and underlie that act.23
Besides his reasoning that there is no evidence to support the claim that God
somehow revealed scripture’s content to its authors, Schleiermacher adds that because
everything which those authors teach is traceable to Christ, God’s original act of
disclosure (Kundmachung) of whatever is contained in the sacred scriptures must already
be present in Christ himself. Revelation in this case, then, would be manifested “not as a
series of discrete bits of inspired information, but rather as a single and indivisible
revelation that develops organically (that is to say, under the conditions of space and
time).”24 He concludes: “Thus, the speaking and writing of the apostles, moved as they
were by the Spirit, was also a communicating (Mittheilen) of the divine revelation that
existed in Christ (der göttlichen Offenbarung in Christo).”25

The Core Criticism of Schleiermacher’s Theology of Revelation
Before I develop a more complete picture of Schleiermacher’s understanding of
revelation, I want to introduce the core criticism of his position. What objections have
his critics raised regarding his conception of revelation as it relates to scripture? What
follows are a few samples.
23

Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, trans. Terrence N. Tice, Catherine L. Kelsey, and Edwina
Lawler, ed. Terrence N. Tice (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, forthcoming), §130.1. I have
checked translations of Christian Faith against the original, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen
der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, Zweite Auflage (1830/31), ed. Rolf Schäfer
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008).
24

Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.1; See also Dawn DeVries, “Rethinking the Scripture Principle:
Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Role of the Bible in the Church,” 302.
25

Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.1. I will have more to say below about the meaning of this claim.
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This is what conservative evangelical theologian, Millard J. Erickson, writes
about Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation under the heading, “Modern Versions
of Immanentism,” and the sub-heading, “Classical Liberalism”:
The definition of revelation . . . has become more generalized. In an extreme
form, that of Schleiermacher, revelation is any instance of conscious insight.
Thus, the Bible is a book recording God’s revelations to humanity. As such,
however, it is not unique; that is, it is not qualitatively different from other pieces
of religious literature, or even literature that does not claim to be religious.
Isaiah, the Sermon on the Mount, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Carlyle, Goethe, all are
vehicles of divine revelation. Any truth, no matter where you find it, is divine
truth. This position virtually obliterates the traditional distinction between
special and general revelation.26
There is much in the above quotation that is inaccurate and unfair to Schleiermacher’s
conception of revelation. However, Erickson summarizes well, in a general way, the core
criticism of Schleiermacher’s position: it “virtually obliterates the traditional distinction
between special and general revelation.”
Another related and somewhat incorrect explanation and appraisal of
Schleiermacher’s position is that although he
does not deny the out-there existence of God as certain moderns have done . . .
all man receives from God [according to Schleiermacher] is a feeling. Man
cannot, as the result, locate God out there, but all he receives from God is what
he finds within. Revelation therefore has to do neither with propositions nor
events in history, but with a feeling of dependence.27
Olbricht adds that since Schleiermacher withdraws revelation from the category of
knowledge and locates it in feeling, “the theologian cannot pretend to speak about God

26

Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 331-332.
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Thomas H. Olbricht, “The Bible as Revelation,” Restoration Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1965): 215.
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but only about the human feeling of independence [sic] on God.”28 Similarly, Charles
Hodge feels that the logical result of Schleiermacher’s approach to religion with its
feeling of absolute dependence greatly undermined the authority of the Scripture, which
for Hodge robs theology of its factual, objective base for data.29 Likewise, James I.
Packer shares this fundamental criticism, that Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation
removes it from the category of knowledge:
To side-step Kant’s critique of the idea of revealed truth, he [Schleiermacher]
abandoned the notion altogether, and argued that Christianity is essentially not
knowledge but a feeling of dependence on God through Christ. . . . Man’s selfconsciousness is the reference-point of all theological statements; to make them
is simply a way of talking about oneself; they tell us nothing of God, but only
what men feel about God. Theology is thus dogmatically agnostic about God and
his world. As a science, it knows nothing of any events but states of mind. . . .
Schleiermacher’s position made the idea of revelation really superfluous, for it
actually amounted to a denial that anything is revealed.30
Ted Vial makes the claim in Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed that
“[t]he most wholesale criticism of Schleiermacher’s theology comes from Karl Barth.”31
Then Vial identifies the core of Barth’s objection to Schleiermacher: “that theology must
be grounded on the revealed Word of God, it cannot be grounded on the experience of the
community.”32 While it is true that Barth is not technically referring to scripture when he

28
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Charles A. Jones, III, “Charles Hodge, the Keeper of Orthodoxy: The Method, Purpose and Meaning of
His Apologetic” (PhD diss., Drew University, 1989), 211.
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speaks of the “Word of God,” that he does not share the aforementioneds’ view of the
Bible as revelation,33 and that Dulles in his revelation typology classifies Barth, not as a
representative of the doctrinal, but rather, along with Emil Brunner and Rudolf Bultmann,
of the dialectical presence model,34 Schleiermacher’s content-based/supernaturalist critics
would readily agree with the general complaint that Barth articulates. Barth judged that
Schleiermacher’s theology did not allow for God’s speaking to humankind. On one
occasion, for instance, Barth asserted that the “ancestral line” which runs back through
“Kierkegaard to Luther and Calvin, and so to Paul and Jeremiah” does not include
Schleiermacher. “With all due respect to the genius shown in his work,” he explained, “I
cannot consider Schleiermacher a good teacher in the realm of theology because, so far as
I can see . . . one can not speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice.”35
After reviewing Schleiermacher’s conception of revelation in Christian Faith,
Barth claimed that “[n]one of the different definitions of the concept of revelation holds
up.” Why did he feel this way? He explains:

33

For Barth, the Bible and the preaching of the Church bear witness to divine revelation but are not
themselves revelation. In Barth’s well-known terminology, Bible and proclamation as such are not the
word of God, but they can become God’s word and his revelation if and insofar as Jesus Christ, the
revealed Word of God, is pleased to speak to us through these chosen witnesses. See Karl Barth, The
Doctrine of the Word of God, vol. 1/1 of Church Dogmatics, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T & T
Clark, 1936), 131-133.
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Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1928),
195-196. Indeed, to traditionalists, Schleiermacher’s Christian Faith represented a capitulation to the antisupernaturalist spirit of the Enlightenment age. As Barth described Christian Faith, it is “a thinly disguised
attempt to talk about humanity as if it were talk about God.” The same could very well be asserted
specifically of his doctrine of revelation. See also Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, “The
Reconstruction of Transcendence: Immanence in Nineteenth-Century Theology,” in Twentieth-Century
Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 42.
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When he [Schleiermacher] calls revelation a divine impartation and
communication, this has a hopeful ring, but it is only by way of summary.
Greeks, Egyptians, and Indians all claim to have a communication, and the only
thing that seriously remains is the ‘fact’ underlying the religion. A fact, not a
teaching.36
Barth explains: “Divine communication as a fact sounds adequate, but what follows
shows that it is no real communication but part of a series of facts already present, that is,
of the world.”37 Another way of describing Barth’s appraisal of Schleiermacher’s
theology is to consider the way he saw his theology compared with Schleiermacher’s: he
considered his to be “from above” and Schleiermacher’s, “from below.”38
Barth asserts that when Schleiermacher thinks of revelation, he is not thinking
about the encounter between God and humans, but the encounter between those who
teach and those who are taught. Barth feels that according to Schleiermacher’s theory,
then, revelation “can only be a matter of direct (personal) impact and not of the
communication of thoughts and words.”39 Hence, Barth does not believe that
Schleiermacher subscribes to “true revelation.” His conclusion is that if everything is
revelation, nothing is revelation.40
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Karl Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher: Lectures at Göttingen, Winter Semester of 1923/24, ed.
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That Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation obliterates the traditional
distinction between special and general revelation, that if one accepts his understanding
one cannot pretend to speak about God, that his conception is basically a denial that
anything is revealed, that his understanding allows no communication of thoughts and
words—all of these objections are generally articulating the same core criticism of
Schleiermacher’s theology of revelation, at least of his asseveration that the connection
between divine revelation and scripture is only indirect.41 That principal criticism is this:
Schleiermacher’s viewpoint robs Christianity of its content because it does not allow for
a knowledge of God.

41

In this section, it should be clear that I focus primarily on the criticisms of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of
revelation vis-à-vis scripture, and only secondarily on the criticisms of his understanding of revelation in
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Schleiermacher’s Response
How would Schleiermacher respond to the criticism that his doctrine of revelation
does not allow for a knowledge of God? How would he respond to the charge that his
understanding of the connection between divine revelation and scripture, in effect, robs
Christianity of its content? In this section I want to answer these questions. Accordingly,
I will need to offer a more complete explanation of his conception of revelation in order
to do so. As we will see, Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation is interconnected
with his soteriology and christology. In general, I believe Schleiermacher’s response to
his critics would be twofold: 1) He would disagree with them, to this extent: Inasmuch as
God is revealed in and through the world and inasmuch as scripture is a part of the world,
he would argue that his understanding of revelation does allow for “knowledge of
God,”42 albeit knowledge that is limited and based only on an indirect connection
between revelation and scripture. 2) He would argue that their criticism is moot, since his
claim is that communion with God is not knowledge-based. Rather, it is the experience
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Christians have of Christ as the mediator of a relationship to God that is salvific. Vial
well summarizes this point when he writes:
The essence of Christianity, for Schleiermacher, is . . . [the] experience of
redemption. It is not a set of intellectual propositions about the world to which
one must subscribe. . . . [R]eligion for Schleiermacher is not thinking or doing,
not metaphysics or morality, but feeling. The Christian religion is an experience
of redemption linked to the person Jesus.43

The Revelation of God in and through the World
Upon what basis would Schleiermacher disagree with his critics? First, he would
do so upon the basis that God is revealed in and through the world. What is the
significance of this understanding of revelation? If God is revealed in and through the
world, that would include scripture, even though it is a human document. Furthermore,
for Schleiermacher, scripture is witness to Jesus of Nazareth. Thus, there remains a
special, not just a general quality to his understanding of revelation. Both scripture and
creation allow for a knowledge of God in Schleiermacher’s theology.
According to him, to given observers who had conscious insight, revelation is
found in and through the world, in the whole of finite and temporal reality. Over and
over again in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher makes this clear:
[T]he world is the most abundant revelation of God that we can possibly imagine.
. . . [T]he world is a complete manifestation [Offenbarung] of the attributes of
God. . . . [E]verything in the world, precisely insofar as it is ascribed to divine
wisdom, must also be referred to God’s redemptive or newly creating
revelation. . . . Divine wisdom is the ground by virtue of which the world, viewed
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as the theater of redemption, is also the absolute revelation of Supreme Being,
and, consequently, the world is good.44
He conveys the same understanding of revelation—that the infinite is revealed in
and through the finite—in On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. In the
second Speech, an artistic discursus on the nature of true religion, Schleiermacher asserts
that religion’s essence “is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling.”45 Then,
he entreats his readers to become familiar with this concept, which he identifies as the
hinge of his whole speech: “intuition of the universe.”46 This is what he asserts about the
universe:
[It] exists in uninterrupted activity and reveals itself to us in every moment.
Every form that it brings forth, every being to which it gives separate existence
according to the fullness of life, every occurrence that spills forth from its rich,
ever-fruitful womb, is an action of the same upon us. Thus to accept everything
individual as a part of the whole and everything limited as a representation of the
infinite is religion.47
Again, he writes this about revelation:
What we feel and perceive in the stirrings of religion is not the nature of things
but their operation upon us. . . . The universe is ceaselessly active. It is revealing
itself to us every instant of our lives. . . . Religion is the process of receiving all
these influences and of adopting their effects within us; and it is the process of
letting them move us . . . as a representation of the infinite in our lives.48
44

Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §164.2, §92.3, §168.2, §169.

45

Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (1799), trans. and ed. Richard
Crouter, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996):
22. Hereafter, I will abbreviate this source as On Religion, (Crouter).
46

Ibid., 24.

47

Ibid., 25.

48

Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics (1821), trans. and
ed. Terrence N. Tice (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1969), 93. From this point, I will abbreviate this source
as On Religion, (Tice).

!48

As Schleiermacher nears the end of the second Speech, he reflects upon some of
the concepts—“miracles,” “inspirations,” “revelations,” “supernatural experiences”—
which underlie the propositions that are created to explain or reflect upon the essence of
religion. He asserts that these concepts are not necessary for religion itself, but that
reflection needs and therefore creates them. He also acknowledges that there is often
controversy over the meaning of these concepts. What is a “miracle”? he asks. His
answer once again hints at his belief in the everywhereness of the infinite: a miracle is a
sign, and “every finite entity is a sign of the infinite.”49 Then, he adds:
The more religious you become the more of the miraculous you are likely to see
all around you. Accordingly all disputing over whether certain events deserve to
be called miracles or not—no matter where it occurs—simply gives me a painful
impression of how poor and paltry the religious sense of the combatants is. . . . In
this way, they simply indicate that they do not wish to see anything of that
immediate relation to the infinite, and thus to the deity, which exists in the
world.50
Then, he asks: “What is “revelation”? Here is his well-known and classic answer: “Every
new and original intuition of the universe.”51 He concludes with this zinger:
What can we say of the person who does not see miracles for himself, from his
own standpoint of viewing the world, of the person whose soul yearns to draw in
the world’s beauty and to be permeated by its Spirit but for whom no revelation
49
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seems to arise deep within . . . what can we say of the person who is not at least
conscious of his feelings as immediate influences of the universe upon him . . .
[w]hat can we say but that such a person has no religion?52
In a handful of his sermons, Schleiermacher affirms this same understanding that
God is revealed in and through the world. For instance, he speaks of how God is
revealed in a family and wherever else love is present:
Just as God is love and God is most clearly revealed to human beings in all that
love is, so it is especially true of any human love worthy of the name that it can
attach itself to our feeling for the Supreme Being in our innermost selves and
thereby sanctify us.53
In a sermon entitled, “From a Sermon in a Time of Trouble,” he seems to implore his
listeners to measure the worth of events, not in terms of pleasure or sensual well-being
but “whether they contain revelations of the divine will and illuminations toward selfknowledge that make us wiser and better.”54 He notes that love is the most common
revelation of the eternal essence (vernehmlichste Offenbarung des ewigen Wesens ist).55
Schleiermacher’s acceptance of an indirect connection between divine revelation
and scripture must be subsumed under his conviction that divine revelation is ubiquitous
in and through the whole world. Because of this, I believe he would deny that scripture
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did not provide information about God, although he would deny that God had provided
the exact words to scripture’s authors.56

Communion with God Is Not Knowledge-Based
The second response that I believe Schleiermacher would make to those who
claim that his understanding of revelation does not allow for a knowledge of God is this:
one’s theology is flawed if it is based on the assertion, as is often the case, that
knowledge of God precedes communion with God. In other words, Schleiermacher
would argue that a relationship with God is not knowledge-based. It is not the product of
accepting a set of intellectual propositions about the world or assenting to an assortment
of doctrines and dogmas about God and religion.57
Upon what basis would Schleiermacher argue the above? First, he would assert
that the essence of religion is not a knowledge of God. Rather, it is piety, and piety is not
based upon knowledge. The title page to Christian Faith itself provides an early clue to
Schleiermacher’s understanding of religion’s essence. There, Schleiermacher includes
this quote from Anselm: “I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in
order to understand. . . . For those who do not believe will not experience, and those who
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have not experienced will not understand.”58 In On Religion, Schleiermacher identifies
the essence of religion and the “contemplation of pious men” as
the immediate consciousness of the universal being of all finite things in and
through the infinite, of all temporal things in and through the eternal. To seek
and to find this infinite and eternal factor in all that lives and moves, in all
growth and change, in all action and passion, and to have and to know life itself
only in immediate feeling—this is religion. . . . [R]eligion is, indeed, a life in the
infinite nature of the whole, in the one and all, in God—a having and possessing
of all in God and of God in all. Knowledge and knowing, however, it is not,
either of the world or of God; it only acknowledges these things without being
either.59
Again, he claims:
[At base] religion could not and would not ever originate as pure knowledge. It
does not arise from the sheer drive to know. What we feel and perceive in the
stirrings of religion is not the nature of things but their operation upon us. What
you may know or believe about the nature of things, therefore, lies far outside the
sphere of religion.60
Under the propositions borrowed from Ethics in the Introduction of Christian Faith,
Schleiermacher claims: “The piety that constitutes the basis of all ecclesial communities,
regarded purely in and of itself, is neither a knowing nor a doing but a distinct formation
of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness.”61 He does not deny the connection of
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piety to knowing and doing, but asserts that “neither of these constitutes the essence of
piety.”62
Naturally, Schleiermacher was criticized in his day for holding this position. For
example, among those who held a different view of the relation of knowledge to piety
was Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider (1776-1848), a German theologian who evaluated the
Glaubenslehre in two essays and in an Appendix to his theological textbook.63 He held
that
the essence of piety is not feeling, but a combination of knowledge, action, and
feeling. Sense objects are to be distinguished from ideas or religious objects.
The former make impressions that produce either pleasure or pain. Prior to this
impression upon us, no knowledge of the object is required. An idea, however,
must first be apprehended before it can influence the feeling. Otherwise, one
would have a feeling only of something obscure or indefinite rather than a feeling
of God. Therefore, a knowledge of God rather than a feeling is essential to
piety.64
Schleiermacher writes a rebuttal to Bretschneider’s critique and a defense of his
own understanding of the relation between knowledge and piety in his first letter to Dr.
Lücke. His rebuttal seems to be founded upon what sensible people would conclude after
thoughtful reflection upon their own experience. He writes that when there are so many
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thousands of people whose representations of God are highly imperfect, yet whose piety
is simple and pure, “may I then not believe that piety as the determination of the selfconsciousness could be present even before one has come to a concept of the idea of
God?”65 Then, he imagines the possibility of
a group of intellectuals who have conceived of the idea of God and who, as they
do with every other important idea, have worked it out intellectually and drawn
the consequences from it, but whose feeling for the idea never emerges and never
makes any impact on their lives, should I nevertheless not be allowed to say that
the conception of the idea of God, considered in and by itself, is not part of piety
and is not necessarily the first element in piety?66
A second reason Schleiermacher holds that communion with God must not be
knowledge-based is his strong conviction that saving faith must be accessible to all,
which it would not be, he claims, if the acquisition of knowledge necessarily precedes
relationship with God.67 We could legitimately infer that Schleiermacher’s claim here is
due to his strong belief in spiritual egalitarianism. Because he believes saving faith is
equally accessible to all, he is convinced that it cannot come by knowing. He feels
strongly about this: “I could never confess that my faith in Christ is derived from
knowledge or philosophy,” he adamantly acknowledges to Dr. Lücke.68
Rejecting the notion that “religion is the daughter of theology,” he powerfully
claims that this assertion must be rejected by those who have experienced piety in their
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youth before they even had any thought of their future vocation and who, therefore, know
from their own particular history that “piety is independent of every insight into any
system of comprehended ideas.”69 “Do we not have every reason to thank God,” he asks,
“that he has revealed piety to the immature especially, that is, to those whose piety would
not amount to much at all if it were to be based upon a complexus of ideas?”70 Again, he
probes:
[H]ow would our evangelical church fare if living evangelical Christianity had
not struck such deep roots in unspeculative and unphilosophical persons whose
piety is so far from being based on thought and grounded in an insight into a
system of ideas that by and large they came only gradually to think about their
piety? Thanks be to God, many others now share my conviction that our piety is
not really that different from that of such persons after all.71
Schleiermacher reasons that the position that an idea of God must precede an
experience of God presupposes that those who are unable to be affected inwardly first by
an object of thought and to grasp a set of ideas other than those related to their own
concerns either have no piety at all or have only a piety derived from that of the
theologians rather than from their own personal lives. If this were the case, he argues,
there would then emerge “a hierarchy of intellectual cultured, a priesthood of speculation,
which for my part cannot find to be very Protestant and which, whenever I had the fate to
encounter it, has never appeared without a certain popish tinge.”72 Then, he adds, that
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such a position naturally entails a different view of the ministry of the Word: it makes
every Christian sermon into an instruction. Schleiermacher saw the task of ministry as
that of giving “a clear and enlivening description of a common inner experience.”73 He
explains:
[W]hat emerges as doctrinal teaching is really only a preparation and a means to
this end [to the end of giving a “clear and enlivening description of a common
inner experience”]. We do not fancy that we are introducing into our church
communities something completely new, as though in the first course of study we
communicate the ideas to them and then in a second course we base piety on the
ideas. Rather, what is possessed is shared in common, and we serve our brothers
only by explaining more clearly to them what it is and so awaken in them the joy
in it as well as concern for it.74
If communion with God, saving faith, and a relationship to God is not preceded
by knowledge, upon what does Schleiermacher believe it is based? The answer to this
question represents a third reason why Schleiermacher argues against a content/
knowledge-based piety. His answer is this: what is redemptive is the experience
Christians have of Christ as the mediator of a relationship to God.75 For him, experience,
rather than knowledge, is the locus of revelation.

The Revelation of God in the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
I have demonstrated that, in general, Schleiermacher believes that the revelation
of God may be found in and through the whole world. Now, I want to explain his
understanding of a second and more specific locus of revelation: the feeling of absolute
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dependence. Under the Propositions borrowed from Ethics in the Introduction of
Christian Faith, Schleiermacher writes:
God is given to us in feeling in an original way; and if we speak of an original
revelation (Offenbarung) of God to man or in man, the meaning will always be
just this, that, along with the absolute dependence which characterizes not only
man but all temporal existence, there is given to man also the immediate selfconsciousness of it, which becomes a consciousness of God.76
What is the content of this “original revelation”? Schleiermacher’s answer is that it is
nothing less than a consciousness of God. How is this consciousness of God manifested?
His answer is that the consciousness of God is embodied or expressed in the feeling of
absolute dependence. He writes: “[T]o feel oneself absolutely dependent and to be
conscious of being in relation with God are one and the same thing.”77
One may wonder upon what basis Schleiermacher can call the feeling of absolute
dependence an original revelation of God. His explanation is grounded in the way he
perceives the psychological makeup of human beings. He asserts that in every selfconsciousness there are two elements, which we might call, respectively, a self-caused
element (ein Sichselbstsetzen) and a non-self-caused element (ein
Sichselbstnichtsogesetzthaben).78 These two elements correspond, respectively, to
activity and receptivity in every person. That is, human beings are aware that in every
subject there is an element that acts upon the world and another element upon which the
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world acts. In brief, there is a part that is active and a part that is passive in every selfconsciousness.
The element which expresses movement and activity is the feeling of freedom.
According to Schleiermacher, however, humans do not have a feeling of absolute
freedom.79 This is evident, he claims, because even when we are exercising freedom we
know that our existence is not due to our own spontaneous activity alone. Rather, our
existence is given to us. Alternatively, the element in the self-consciousness which
expresses a receptivity from some outside quarter is the feeling of dependence. And,
contrary to the fact that humans do not have a feeling of absolute freedom, they do have a
feeling of absolute dependence. Here is Schleiermacher’s argument:
[T]he self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity, and therefore, since
that is never zero, accompanies our whole existence, and negatives absolute
freedom, is itself precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence; for it is the
consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source
outside of us in just the same sense in which anything towards which we should
have a feeling of absolute freedom must have proceeded entirely from
ourselves.80
Schleiermacher grounds his understanding of the equivalence of the feeling of
absolute dependence and a feeling of being related to God on the meaning of “God.” He
explains that “God” is the term we use to designate the “Whence of our receptive and
active existence.” He adds: “[T]his is for us the really original signification of that
word.”81 This “whence,” however, cannot be the world or any single part of the world
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because “we have a feeling of freedom (though, indeed, a limited one) in relation to the
world.” Furthermore, we are parts of the world and we exercise an influence on parts of
the world. Schleiermacher points out that “God signifies for us simply that which is the
co-determinant in this feeling,” the feeling of absolute dependence. According to this
line of reasoning, original revelation is “a disclosure of the ‘whence’ of the feeling of
absolute dependence.”82 In other words, the feeling of absolute dependence is to be
identified with consciousness of God.
There seems to be an exact structural parallel between the argument in proposition
4 and the argument of the second Speech in On Religion.83 Schleiermacher’s aim in the
second Speech is to explain the essence, or basic nature, of piety. He says that the nature
of real religion “is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition (Anschauung) and feeling
(Gefühl).”84 Then, near the end of that Speech he asks: “What is revelation?” His answer
is, “Every original and new intuition of the universe is one.”85
What did Schleiermacher mean by the term, Anschauung? Vial believes that
Schleiermacher defined and used the term as Kant had.86 For Kant, “[A]n intuition is
82
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such a representation as immediately depends upon the presence of the object.”87 One
could say that “impression” could be another synonym for what Schleiermacher believes
Anschauung means.88 This is so because Schleiermacher speaks of the influence of the
object upon the subject in revelation. He says: “All intuition proceeds from an influence
of the intuited on the one who intuits, from an original and independent activity of the
former, which is then grasped, apprehended, and conceived by the latter according to
one’s own nature.”89 Again, he says: “[W]hat you thus intuit and perceive is not the
nature of things, but their action upon you. What you know or believe about the nature of
things lies far beyond the realm of intuition.”90
What does Schleiermacher mean when he writes that revelation is an intuition of
the universe? He seems to mean that the universe is that object—in this case the whole
of finite and temporal reality—which presents itself or is presented to a subject. He
writes:
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The universe exists in uninterrupted activity and reveals itself to us in every
moment. Every form that it brings forth, every being to which it gives separate
existence according to the fullness of life, every occurrence that spills forth from
its rich, every-fruitful womb, is an action of the same upon us. Thus to accept
everything individual as a part of the whole and everything limited as a
representation of the infinite is religion.91
Elsewhere, he explains further:
What we feel and perceive in the stirrings of religion is not the nature of things
but their operation upon us. . . . The universe is ceaselessly active. It is revealing
itself to us every instant of our lives. . . . Religion is the process of receiving all
these influences and of adopting their effects within us; and it is the process of
letting them move us . . . as a representation of the infinite in our lives.92
Anschauung and Gefühl are certainly key terms in Schleiermacher’s lexicon.
Schleiermacher clearly makes a distinction between the two, though they reside at the
same level of mental functioning and can add components as they extend to thinking,
willing, and acting. He writes:
[R]ecall that every intuition (Anschauung) is, by its very nature, connected with a
feeling (Gefühl). Your senses mediate the connection between the object and
yourselves; the same influence of the object, which reveals its existence to you,
must stimulate them in various ways and produce a change in your inner
consciousness. . . . The same actions of the universe through which it reveals
itself to you in the finite also bring it into a new relationship to your mind and
your condition; in the act of intuiting it, you must necessarily be seized by
various feelings.93
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Vial understands Anschauung and Gefühl to be “two sides of the same coin of
experience.”94 He writes: “One can understand intuition, for Schleiermacher, as the
objective side of experience (the action on us of something outside us). ‘Feeling’ he
defines not primarily as emotion but as the subjective side of experience.”95

The Revelation of God in Christ
A third locus of revelation, and the principal one for Schleiermacher, is Christ.
He describes Christ as “the supreme divine revelation” (die höchste göttliche
Offenbarung).96 In his second letter to Lücke, and just after wondering what challenges
will be posed to Christianity by natural science, he encourages Lücke to see if he can
dismiss, in light of the modern worldview,
what has been until now essential to Christianity: belief in a divine revelation in
the person of Jesus (des Glaubens an eine göttliche Offenbarung in der Person
Jesu) from whom everyone can and should derive a new, powerful heavenly
life.97
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Several times in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher refers to “the revelation of God
in Christ (die Offenbarung Gottes in Christo).”98 What is his understanding of this
concept? First, he believes it is Christ’s God-consciousness that is the revelation of God
in him. Christ’s God-consciousness is his awareness that arises from God; it is the
presence of God in him.99 It is the level of that God-consciousness that makes Christ’s
experience of God unique. Schleiermacher explains:
[T]he Redeemer100 is the same as all human beings by virtue of the selfsame
character of human nature, but he is distinguished from all other human beings
by the steady strength (stetige Kräftigkeit) of his God-consciousness, a strength
that was an actual being of God in him.101
Not wanting his readers to misunderstand what he means by this, he adds that “to
attribute an absolutely strong God-consciousness to Christ and to ascribe to him a being
of God in him are entirely one and the same thing.”102 According to Schleiermacher’s
understanding, this God-consciousness was “co-posited” (mitgesezten) in Christ’s selfconsciousness.103 Furthermore, it exists uniquely in him alone. After explaining that
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God’s being can be conceived only as “pure activity” and that there is “no being of God
in any individual thing, but only a being of God in the world,” Schleiermacher asserts
that
Christ is deemed to be the sole and original locus for the being of God in human
nature, and he alone is the “other” in whom there is an actual being of God—that
is, he does so inasmuch as we posit God-consciousness in his self-consciousness
as determining every element of his life steadily and exclusively. In
consequence, he has this status inasmuch as we also posit this complete
indwelling of Supreme Being as his distinctive nature and his innermost self.104
Second, Schleiermacher believes that this revelation, the appearance in history of
this perfect God-consciousness is, indeed, due to divine causality.105 When
Schleiermacher discusses revelation under the propositions borrowed from the
Philosophy of Religion in the Introduction to Christian Faith,106 he asserts that all will
agree that the term “revealed” is never applied either to what is uncovered by one person
and passed on to others or to what one person works out for himself and passes on to
others. It “presupposes a divine communication (Mittheilung) and declaration
104
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(Kundmachung).”107 In this sense, he adds, the word is generally applied to the origin of
religious communions. Then, he provides a definition of historical revelation that is not
only applicable to Christianity but also to all positive religions. He claims that “the
concept ‘revelation’ designates the originative character of the fact that underlies a given
religious community.”108 Thus, he defines revelation as that which explains the starting
point from which any religion can be traced.
Schleiermacher adds that the “original fact” which shapes the life of any new
community cannot be explained by historical antecedents. In the Christian community, of
course, this original fact is Jesus Christ and the redemption accomplished in and through
him. According to Schleiermacher, this original fact, which is the foundation of the
community’s life, cannot be explained wholly in terms of the natural forces and causes
that precede it. Appeal must therefore be made to divine causality as its ultimate
source.109
In fact, Schleiermacher calls the appearance of the Redeemer in history “that one
great miracle”110 and “the miracle of miracles.”111 He writes that the redemption
accomplished by Christ is through his influence, through the communication of his

107

Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §10, p.s.

108

Ibid.

109

Ibid. For Schleiermacher, this also explains why the content of revelation cannot be information. He
reasons that if revelation is equated with doctrine and propositions, “then nothing supernatural was required
for their production” (Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §10, p.s.). Naturally, Schleiermacher also traces to
the divine causality “our consciousness of fellowship with God.” See Christian Faith, §164.
110

Ibid., §47.1

111

Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, 64.

!65

sinless perfection, and because of the potency of his God-consciousness. So, he explains
the warrant for believing that the appearance of Jesus was “supernatural”:
This God-consciousness, manifesting itself in this potency, can have come into
existence only outside the sinful corporate life. And since the whole human race
is included in this sinful corporate life, we must believe that this Godconsciousness had a supernatural origin, though only in the sense which has been
postulated above.112
In what sense does Schleiermacher believe that the appearance of an archetypal
God-consciousness in history had a supernatural origin? He elaborates in the
Glaubenslehre, §13. At first glance, the proposition may sound like a denial that
Christian revelation is “outside the human and natural order.”113 The proposition states:
“As divine revelation, the appearance of the Redeemer in history is neither something
absolutely supernatural nor something absolutely superrational.”114 Although
Schleiermacher begins his discussion of this proposition by asserting again that the origin
of any religious communion can never be explained by “the condition of the circle in
which it arose and progressed,” he quickly suggests that there is nothing to prevent us
from assuming “that the emergence of such a life would be the effect of the force for
development that indwells our nature as a species.”115 He claims that founders of
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religious communions are specially-endowed individuals, who “are made fruitful from
the general wellspring of life (Lebensquell).”116 Then, he adds, that we have to regard the
fact that such individuals do appear from time to time to be a natural occurrence
(Gesetzmäßiges).
For Schleiermacher, there is no real comparison between Christ and the founders
of other religions, even though it may be said that all have special endowments. Christ
and Christianity are distinctively different. Schleiermacher reasons that the contributions
of other founders of religious societies are limited to particular times and places and are
destined to be submerged in Christ. Too, only Christ is in a position to enliven the entire
human race to its higher state. He asserts that a person who does not accept Christ as
providing divine revelation in this generally extended sense cannot intend Christianity to
be a permanent phenomenon.117
Notwithstanding this claim that there is a distinction between Christ and all other
human beings, Schleiermacher insists that there is nothing to prohibit one from saying
that Christ’s appearance, “even as the becoming human (Menschwerden) of the Son of
God, would be something natural.”118 This is true for two reasons, according to
Schleiermacher. First, it must be possible for there to be a natural explanation for
Christ’s appearance or for an accompanying Christian revelation since it has been proven
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possible for human beings to “take up what is divine into oneself (das göttliche . . . in
sich aufzunehmen).”119 Christ was and he did; he was a human being who received, and
thus, took up the divine into himself. Second, if one rules out the possibility of a natural
explanation for the appearance of Christ, one would have to say that what is restoratively
divine made its appearance in Jesus and in no other because of an arbitrary act of God.
Schleiermacher cannot accept this explanation. To do so would necessitate an
anthropathic (anthropopathische) view of God, which, he asserts, even scripture does not
support. Rather, Schleiermacher refers to Galatians 4:4 and claims that scripture views
the appearance of Christ as a conditional event, that is, as an action of human nature and
one that developed naturally.120
Schleiermacher explains that he subscribes to the notion that the appearance of
Christ was due to “an initiating divine activity” which is supernatural, but that, at the
same time, what was supernatural became historically natural.121 He adds:
[T]he appearance of the Redeemer in the midst of this natural development is no
longer a supernatural emergence of a new state of development, but simply one
conditioned by that which precedes—though certainly its connection with the
former is to be found only in the unity of the divine thought.122
Again, Schleiermacher asserts the supernatural origin of Christ, but in a natural way:
Now this second Adam is placed within the historical interconnectedness of
human nature, and indeed simply as an individual human being, though not from
119
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within this earlier interconnectedness of human nature but in relation to it as a
supernatural phenomenon. This being the case, he, as well as his entire
efficacious action, stands under the law of historical development, and that
development is completed through its gradual spread outward from the point of
his appearance over the whole of humanity.123
Schleiermacher views the appearance of Christ and the new corporate life made possible
by him as the completion of the creation of human nature.124
Although he asserts that the appearance of Christ in history is not absolutely
supernatural, he claims that it is, nonetheless, supernatural. For Schleiermacher, Christ
is the Redeemer. Because he believes that no one else is able to accomplish redemption,
he reasons that the state of God-consciousness by which the Redeemer accomplishes
redemption is inexplicable on the basis of “reason that uniformly indwells all other
human beings.”125 If it were otherwise, then others could effect redemption, which, of
course, he believes they cannot do. Moreover, he asserts that in redeemed people there
are states of mind which are caused solely by Christ’s communication or influence. How
shall these mental states be explained? Schleiermacher here asserts that these states
cannot be explained solely by the reason which has dwelled within them from birth. Tice
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summarizes it well: “The appearance of the Redeemer in history is indeed supernatural,
but not as if the possibility for assimilating it did not already exist in human nature.”126
When Schleiermacher discusses the prophetic office of Christ and his teaching
activity in Christian Faith he asserts that the source of Jesus’s teaching was not the law,
as it was for the prophets of Israel, nor was it a development of the ethics current among
the people. It did not spring from universal human reason. Rather, the source of his
teaching was “the absolutely original revelation of God in him.”127 Schleiermacher adds
that Christ’s self-determination to teach was the task of satisfying fully the powerful Godconsciousness in him.
This is one additional reason why Schleiermacher does not see a direct connection
of identity between revelation and Scripture. All that the writers of the New Testament
scriptures taught, Schleiermacher believed, must have derived from Christ. For, “the
original divine declaration of whatever is contained in the sacred scriptures also has to be
present in Christ himself.”128 Schleiermacher’s conclusion is that “the speaking and
writing of the apostles moved as they were by the Spirit, was also a communicating of the
divine revelation that existed in Christ.”129
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It should be obvious by now, that Schleiermacher’s understanding of the nature or
essence of revelation is in stark contrast to the content-based/supernaturalist model of
revelation, generally, or to Carl F. H. Henry’s doctrinal model, specifically. One of the
chief differences is that for Schleiermacher, revelation does not operate in the activity of
knowing, but in the activity of feeling.130 Therefore, we might say that, for him, the
nature of revelation is not cognitive, but experiential. This partially explains his
disinclination to equate revelation to dogma, doctrine, facts, or information. For him,
revelation does not occur on the level of knowing. After granting in the Introduction to
Christian Faith that “there is a divine causality” to revelation and that revelation is “an
activity which aims at and furthers the salvation of human beings,” Schleiermacher
states: “But I am unwilling to accept . . . that it operates upon any human being as a
knowing being. For that would make the revelation to be originally and essentially
doctrine; and I do not believe that we can adopt that position.”131
In discussing Schleiermacher’s understanding of the relationship of divine
revelation to scripture—that there is only an indirect connection of identity between the
two—I have compared his understanding of this concept to the content-based/
supernaturalist model of revelation. The latter tends to affirm a direct connection
between revelation and scripture and asserts that divine revelation is given in words with
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strict propositional meanings, which are authored by God. Schleiermacher does not share
this perspective. His understanding of divine revelation is that it is located in the
experience of God in the world, in the feeling of absolute dependence, and in Christ, the
appearance of the archetypal God-consciousness in history. I have shown that the chief
criticism of Schleiermacher’s understanding of revelation, that it does not allow for a
knowledge of God, is an unfair one. Moreover, I have demonstrated that this criticism,
according to Schleiermacher, arises from what seems to be a flawed understanding of
how relationship with God is achieved. In the next chapter, I turn to a discussion of
Schleiermacher’s understanding of “inspiration” and the identity and influence of the
Spirit.
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Chapter Four: Schleiermacher and the Meaning of Inspiration
In the previous chapter I showed that it is erroneous to claim that Schleiermacher
did not believe in the reality of divine revelation. He believed that God is revealed in and
through the world, in the experience of God in the world, in the feeling of absolute
dependence, and in Christ. I also demonstrated that while he accepted an indirect
connection between scripture and divine revelation, since scripture is a part of the world
in which God is revealed, he did not believe that scripture is its locus. For him, there is
no warrant to support the claim of a direct connection between divine revelation and the
New Testament.
Similarly, I will argue in this chapter that it is erroneous to claim that
Schleiermacher did not believe in divine inspiration. As I did in Chapter Three, I will
begin by comparing his view of inspiration as it relates to scripture with a standard
content-based/supernaturalist one. In doing so, I will also be describing the basic features
of his conception of this doctrine. I will then point out some of the primary criticisms of
his understanding, in particular the complaints that his interpretation renders God to be
relatively inactive in the process of writing down scripture and that it over exaggerates
the immanence of God. Finally, I want to trace out what I believe would be his response
to his critics and the reasoning that underlies it.
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Before moving into the body of this chapter, I want to preface my remarks with
something of a disclaimer. While the subject of divine inspiration vis-à-vis scripture is
important to many content-based/supernaturalists for whom it is foundational,
Schleiermacher seems to treat it as a subordinate concern in his writings. It just does not
seem to be very important or crucial to him.1 As proof of this, we might consider
something he wrote in his Second Letter to Dr. Lücke:
The belief in a special inspiration or revelation of God that continued up to a
certain point of time in the Jewish nation is one that contemporary studies of
Jewish history do little to corroborate. Nor do I think it very likely that the
results of these studies will lend that belief much more support. Consequently, it
seems to me to be essential that I state as clearly as possible my view and strong
feeling that faith in God’s revelation in Christ is not dependent upon such belief.
If our doctrine of faith were a collection or system of decisions about all the true
or alleged facts of revelation, then of course a decision would have to be made
about this point, too. But, since it is only an account of Christian faith as such,
we ought not place this additional burden on ourselves.2
I believe Schleiermacher would also apply to New Testament scripture what he wrote
above regarding the possible special inspiration of Jewish scripture: having to prove the
legitimacy of biblical inspiration is an additional burden that we need not place on
ourselves. As I will lay out in later chapters, for Schleiermacher, Christian faith (and
biblical authority) is not based on establishing an understanding of the Christian doctrine
of biblical inspiration with certainty. Having offered this disclaimer, what, then, is
Schleiermacher’s conception of inspiration?
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Henry’s Doctrine of Inspiration Vis-à-vis Scripture
For the purpose of clarifying Schleiermacher’s understanding of a key doctrine
that tends to be closely related to biblical authority by comparing this doctrine to a classic
content-based/supernaturalist model, I began the last chapter with a brief description of
Carl F. H. Henry’s understanding of revelation. Similarly, and for the same purpose, I
want to begin this chapter with a description of Henry’s conception of inspiration.3
I noted in Chapter Three that the eleventh thesis of Henry’s magnum opus God,
Revelation and Authority states: “The Bible is a reservoir and conduit of divine truth.”4
Henry’s twelfth thesis must surely be intended to provide justification for the claims of
thesis number eleven. It asserts: “The Holy Spirit superintends the communication of
divine revelation, first as the inspirer and then as the illuminator and interpreter of the
scripturally given Word of God.”5 For Henry, the Bible is a reservoir of divine truth
because it is divine revelation, which revelation is inspired by the Holy Spirit. What,
however, does Henry mean by the phrase “inspired by the Holy Spirit”? What is his
understanding of “inspiration”?
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To provide a framework for unpacking Henry’s conception of inspiration, as well
as to provide points of comparison with Schleiermacher’s understanding, I will now
discuss some of the key features of their viewpoints by addressing these two questions:
What is the essence of inspiration? and What is its locus?
First, Henry believes that, essentially, inspiration is the connection that occurs
between God’s power and knowledge and the literary capabilities of select human beings
for the sake of producing a written account of divine revelation. “Inspiration is a
supernatural influence upon divinely chosen prophets and apostles,” he asserts, “whereby
the Spirit of God assures the truth and trustworthiness of the oral and written
proclamation.”6 Attendant to this definition, he adds that historic evangelical Christianity
considers the Bible to be the essential textbook because, in view of the aforementioned
quality, it inscripturates divinely revealed truth in verbal form.
Henry finds justification for defining inspiration as a “supernatural influence” of
the Holy Spirit in two biblical texts. The first is 2 Timothy 3:16, which states: “All
scripture is inspired by God.”7 The Greek word that is translated “inspired” is
theopnuestos. The literal meaning of the word is “God-breathed.” Commenting on this
term and scripture, Henry writes: “The Scriptures in their written form are a product of
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divine spiration, that is, are divinely ‘breathed out’ and therefore owe their unique reality
to the life-giving breath of God.”8 The second text is 2 Peter 1:19-21:
So we have the prophetic message more fully confirmed. You will do well to be
attentive to this as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the
morning star rises in your hearts. First of all you must understand this, that no
prophecy of scripture is a matter of one’s own interpretation, because no
prophecy ever came by human will, but men and women moved by the Holy
Spirit spoke from God.
Regarding this passage, Henry writes that, first of all, the apostle “disavows its human
derivation,” then he affirms the origin of scripture to be divine by the phrase “men spoke
from God.”9 His conclusion is that both passages “unqualifiedly assert the divine origin
of Scripture.”10 He insists, therefore, that “God is the ultimate author of Scripture” and
that “[t]he Holy Spirit is the communicator of the prophetic-apostolic writings.”11 One
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Church is the doctrine held and taught by the Biblical writers themselves; 2) There is evidence—“internal
and external, objective and subjective, historical and philosophical, human and divine—which goes to
show that the Biblical writers are trustworthy as doctrinal guides (Ibid., 174). He held that “[i]f criticism is
to assail this doctrine . . . [i]t must either show that this doctrine is not the doctrine of the Biblical writers,
or else it must show that the Biblical writers are not trustworthy as doctrinal guides” (Ibid.). This is surely
a circular argument at best.
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may conclude, then, that Henry sees somewhat of an equivalence between divine
revelation and inspiration.
A second characteristic of Henry’s conception of inspiration lies in his belief that
the locus of inspiration is the content, rather than the authors, of scripture.12 He writes:
“But when the Scripture speaks of inspiration, it does not stop short with the inspiration
of only the person; rather, it affirms something specific also about the written texts.”13
Additionally, Henry does not understand the content of inspiration to be merely the
thoughts of the authors, but rather, their actual words. He believed it frustrated the goal
of inspiration to confine it to “mental concepts in distinction from words, since
improperly phrased ideas fall short of being a communication of truth.” He continues:
“The biblical emphasis falls not on revealed concepts and ideas but on inspired
Scripture.”14 Thus, he affirms that

12

One of the key questions related to the doctrine of inspiration is the locus of that inspiration. Is it the
writers or the words that are inspired? James Orr is an example of those who believe that the locus of
inspiration is the authors of the biblical texts. He argues that inspiration “belongs primarily to the person,”
and only derivatively to the book “only as it is the product of the inspired person.” He writes: “There is no
inspiration inhering literally in the paper, ink, or type, of the sacred volume. The inspiration was in the soul
of the writer; the qualities that are communicated to the writing had their seat first in the mind or heart of
the man who wrote” [James Orr, Revelation and Inspiration (1910; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952),
162-163]. Others, including Henry, assert that it is the words that those authors wrote which are inspired.
They wonder how one can be sure that what the inspired author wrote is a true reflection of that inspiration
if one cannot also say that the very words the author wrote were also inspired. For a fine discussion of
these alternative ways of understanding inspiration, cf. John Kelman Sutherland Reid, The Authority of
Scripture (London: Methuen, 1957), 156ff. and Paul J. Achetemeier, Inspiration and Authority: Nature and
Function of Christian Scripture, 9-22. Reid certainly sees a connection between the inspiration of the
authors and their words when he writes: “If the words of Scripture are inspired, since they are admittedly
written if not composed by human agents, these human agents must have been moved to their writing in
some unusual way, and this can mean only inspiration. On the other hand, the view that the writers are
inspired need not involve the inspiration of the words. Hence inspiration of the words seems to be
inclusive of but not coincident with that of the writer’s inspiration.” (Reid, The Authority of Scripture, 157).
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the text of Scripture is divinely inspired as an objective deposit of language. . . .
The biblical and evangelical view does not limit divine inspiration as an activity
internal to the psyche of the writers, but recognizes its importance beyond the
subjective psychology of the chosen prophets and apostles. The non biblical
notions of inspiration obscure the nature of biblical inspiration by asserting the
inspiration of only the writers, and not of the written truths they enunciate. The
biblical doctrine of inspiration, on the other hand, connects God’s activity with
the express truths and words of Scripture.15
A third feature of Henry’s understanding of inspiration is that it is reserved for
only a select group of individuals. He holds that “divine inspiration is limited to a small
company of messengers who were divinely chosen to authoritatively communicate the
Word of God to mankind.”16 He writes, “This inspiration is no universal phenomenon,
nor is it necessarily or actually shared by all or most spiritually devout and obedient men
of God.”17 He may possibly have had Schleiermacher in mind as he wrote these very
words, for in contrast to Henry, Schleiermacher did affirm that inspiration was a
“universal phenomenon,” as we will see later in this chapter.

Schleiermacher’s Understanding of Inspiration
Now, I want to lay out Schliermacher’s conception of inspiration and compare it
to the content-based/supernaturalist model. The primary characteristics of
Schleiermacher’s understanding of “inspiration” may be found in Christian Faith, §130.
Naturally, that this proposition is located in his discussion of the broader doctrine of
scripture in §§128-132, is not surprising. What may surprise many is that he absolutely
15

Ibid., 4:144.
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did believe in this doctrine. Proof of this is the heading he gave to §130: “The individual
books of the New Testament18 are inspired by the Holy Spirit, and their collection has
arisen under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.” What can we learn about his conception of
this doctrine from this proposition?
After stating the proposition and offering evidence that it reflects the confessional
tradition of the Protestant church by citing several of her creedal statements,19
Schleiermacher acknowledges the difficulty of assigning exact limits of meaning to what
he calls an “ecclesial expression.” He notes that the term is not, strictly speaking, a
scriptural one, and it is figurative besides.20 He does admit, however, that two passages
in the New Testament are commonly mentioned in connection with it. (Incidentally,
those two passages, as discussed above, are the same ones mentioned as part of Carl F. H.
Henry’s rationale for affirming his understanding of biblical inspiration.) The first of
these is 2 Timothy 3:16, and Schleiermacher correctly notes, I think, that this text refers
to Old Testament writings. He admits that this expression could lead very easily to the

18

In an addendum to his discussion of the doctrine of scripture in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher sets out
his argument that the books of the Old Testament cannot be seen as possessing the same normative worth or
inspiration as the New Testament books (Christian Faith, §132). For now, I will set aside a discussion of
this viewpoint until Chapter Six and my response to it in Chapter Seven.
19

Specifically, he cites selections from the First Helvetic Confession (1536), Gallican Confession (1559),
Scots Confession (1560), Belgic Confession (1561), and Declaratio Toruniensus (1645). Interestingly,
Schleiermacher very frequently cites creedal statements rather than scripture in the notes of Christian
Faith. Vial offers an explanation for this when he writes: “[A]ll Christians share Scripture, but
Schleiermacher is articulating the experience of faith in a particular Christian community (the evangelical
community), who have defined themselves as a particular community in large part through creeds” (Vial,
Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed, 84-85). For Schleiermacher’s use of creedal statements in
Christian Faith rather than scripture, see Christian Faith, §27. For an analysis of Schleiermacher’s use of
creeds in Christian Faith see Walter Wyman, “The Role of the Protestant Confessions in Schleiermacher’s
The Christian Faith,” Journal of Religion 87, no. 3 (July 2007): 355-85.
20
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idea that in the act of writing the Holy Spirit had a special relationship with the writer
that was otherwise nonexistent. But, such an interpretation does not follow so easily
from 2 Peter 1:21, he claims. That passage speaks of persons “moved by the Holy Spirit”
who “spoke from God.” From this passage Schleiermacher asserts that the interpretation
that these persons “were already constantly moved by the Holy Spirit and in this state
then also spoke and wrote” is as legitimate an interpretation as the interpretation that
“they were first moved to spoken discourse and writing.”21 Here, Schleiermacher seems
to be indicating in advance what he will discuss later in this proposition in more detail
regarding the locus of inspiration.
Since the term is ambiguous, he suggests that the best way to come to an adequate
understanding of the meaning of “inspiration” is to compare it with other, cognate
expressions that describe the ways in which persons arrive at ideas.22 He contrasts what
is inspired (das Eingegebene) and what is learned (das Erlernte) with what is excogitated
or thought out (das Ersonnene). What is thought out, he explains, is the product of the
self’s own mental activity, whereas what is inspired and learned are the products of
outside influences. Schleiermacher affirms, however, that at other times, usage
distinguishes what is inspired from what is learned. When used in this way, what is
inspired is understood to be original and “depends for its emergence solely on inward

21
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In the introductory address of On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics,
Schleiermacher uses the terms “inspiration,” “idea,” and “insight,” interchangeably. See Schleiermacher,
On Religion, (Tice), 58, 64.
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[internal] communication.”23 On the other hand, what is learned is derived from
“external communication.” Thus, in contrast to what may approximate the more
mechanical processes of learning, what emerges by inspiration can be seen as due to “the
complete freedom of a person’s own productivity.”24
According to Schleiermacher’s thinking, then, it follows that there is a sense in
which inspired thoughts are the result of the self’s own mental activity.25 However, what
is inspired is not like what is excogitated, purely the product of one’s own ruminations.
What seems fair to say, is that for Schleiermacher, what is inspired is to some degree the
product of outside influences. In fact, in his lexicon an acceptable synonym for
“inspiration” is “influence.” So, when he stands by the claim that “the individual books
of the New Testament are inspired by the Holy Spirit,” he is only claiming that these
books are influenced by the Holy Spirit.
This definition, of course, does not go far enough for Henry and Evangelical
Christians who share his absolutely supernaturalist/content-based perspective. As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Henry equates inspiration with revelation, the very
thing Schleiermacher does not want to do. He does not believe these terms can be used
interchangeably. In other words, he does not believe that inspiration means that God
made known to the authors of scripture in detail what they were to write.
23
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the individual books [of the New Testament canon] . . . we regard the composition of a book as the
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A second distinction between Henry’s and Schleiermacher’s conception of
inspiration is its locus. For Schleiermacher, it is not the words of scripture which are
inspired, but the authors themselves.26, 27 That is, the meaning of inspiration is not that it
refers to an exact wording or quality of the New Testament writings themselves. The
inspiration is in the authors, and only derivatively in their writings. Notwithstanding this
observation, there is also a sense in which Schleiermacher shares the conviction that the
words of the New Testament books are “inspired” by the Holy Spirit, or can be unless
they are in error. How so? Since the Holy Spirit is the source of all spiritual gifts and
good works, he reasons, all thinking about the kingdom of God must be traced back to
and inspired by the Spirit.28 He presumes that this holds true both of the apocryphal and
of the canonical elements of the thinking of the apostolic age. Nevertheless, he claims, it
is also true that the work of the Spirit is most profound and concentrated within the circle
26

James Orr explained Schleiermacher’s perspective well when he wrote: “Scripture is spoken of as ‘Godinspired’; but it is important to notice that inspiration belongs primarily to the person, and to the book only
as it is the product of the inspired person. There is no inspiration inhering literally in the paper, ink, or
type, of the sacred volume. The inspiration was in the soul of the writer; the qualities that are
communicated to the writing had their seat first in the mind or heart of the man who wrote.” Orr,
Revelation and Inspiration, 162-163.
27 Actually,

Schleiermacher’s understanding that the authors, rather than the words, of scripture are inspired
is more nuanced than this. According to him, inspiration refers to a divine influence on the writing of
scripture, but the locus wherein such activity is recognized switches from the individual to the social level.
Accordingly, inspiration would work, not exclusively on the individual writers, but rather on the entire
community that historically conditions the contents of emotions, knowledge, and words utilized by these
writers. This “social” view of inspiration, however, does not change the fact that the epistemological origin
of scripture is human. See Christian Faith, §130.
28Schleiermacher,

Christian Faith, §130.2. For Schleiermacher the Holy Spirit not only inspired the books
of the New Testament but also guided the entire process of collecting them into the canon. Since, however,
this process is “the result of a complex process of collaboration and counteraction in the church,” not
everything that has been achieved by it can be attributed to the Holy Spirit to the same degree as it can in
the process of the inspiration transmitted by particular authors. For this reason, some refer to the collection
of the canonical scriptures not as a case of inspiration but as a product of guidance (Leitung) by the Holy
Spirit (Christian Faith, §130.1). See also Jeffrey Hensley, “Friedrich Schleiermacher,” in Christian
Theologies of Scripture: A Comparative Introduction, ed. Justin S. Holcomb (New York: New York
University Press, 2006), 174.
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of those singled out by Peter (Acts 1:21ff.) with the assent of the entire community at that
time, that is, among those who had walked with Christ from shortly after the start of his
public ministry. But, more than this, he asserts that inspiration, in the case of these
individuals, extends beyond the writing of scripture to include “the whole of the official
apostolic activity.”29 Thus, inspiration is not simply a quality of the sacred writings;
rather, these texts share in the wider movement of the Spirit in the shared experience of
the Christian community. To think that the apostles were “less animated and moved by
the Holy Spirit in other aspects of their apostolic office than in the acts of writing,” for
Schleiermacher, “would destroy the unity of life among these apostolic men in the most
hazardous fashion.”30 For him, the apostles’ lives, not just their writings, were generally
guided by inspiration, or the influence of the Spirit.
As a result, this perspective forestalls many difficult questions. For example, it
allows dogmatics to ignore a whole set of questions about the extent of inspiration in the
production of the text, a claim in which Schleiermacher seems to exult. When did the
moment of inspiration begin? How did the impulse come? To what extent did the Holy
Spirit “inspire” the authors of scripture? Did the Spirit provide the very words the
authors wrote, or only their thoughts? For Schleiermacher, questions like these are
irrelevant. In fact, he asserts that only a dead scholasticism would try to draw lines of
distinction “along the way from the initial impulse to write . . . to the word actually put

29

Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.2.

30

Ibid.

!84

down or even want to present the latter in its external form (Äusserlichkeit) . . . as a
special product of inspiration.”31
The perspective that the locus of inspiration is the authors of scripture, and not
their words alone, and that inspiration means that the Holy Spirit influences their actions
as well as their words, leads to another, related distinction between Schleiermacher’s and
Henry’s understanding of this concept. It is this: for Schleiermacher, inspiration is not
limited to a select few. Whereas Henry believes that divine inspiration is limited to those
who were “divinely chosen to communicate the Word of God to mankind,”32
Schleiermacher believes that every person can be inspired. He holds to the potential of
universal inspiration.
Schleiermacher’s On Religion verifies this position. In the first Speech, in order
to understand the nature of piety, Schleiermacher encourages his readers to transport
themselves “into the interior depths of a pious soul, so as to try to understand its
inspiration.” This is what it takes, he claims, “to apprehend that effusion of insight and
ardor” which issues from such pious souls. And who are these pious souls? According to
31

Ibid. Regarding the mechanics of inspiration, and as a side note, Schleiermacher argues that the most
suitable analogy is provided by christology. The divine essence unites with the human nature of Jesus in a
person-forming way, but it does not, thereby, destroy the true humanity of the Redeemer. So, too, the
divine Spirit indwells the Christian church, inspiring the thoughts and actions of the apostles, but in a way
that does not obliterate their full humanity. This is why Schleiermacher rejects a special hermeneutics for
the New Testament. Scripture texts, while they are assuredly disclosures of God’s self-communication in
Christ, are also completely human compositions. That is, they are “fully human,” and thus they are open to
being understood in the same way as any other text written by humans (See Christian Faith, §130.2).
Regarding this text, Dawn DeVries adds an explanatory comment: “[T]he difference between God’s
incarnation in Christ and in the church should not be overlooked: only in Christ was the God-consciousness
absolutely powerful; in the church, given its struggle with sin within the whole process of history, the
permeation of the Holy Spirit is never complete. Thus, even the church’s witness to the revelation of God
in Jesus Christ can be tinged with sin and error. (DeVries, Rethinking the Scripture Principle, 303.)
32
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Schleiermacher, they are people whose spirits are “truly surrendered to the universe.”33
Schleiermacher comments on this very passage in his own supplementary notes, added in
1821. There he clarifies that he was
talking about how insight and ardor are produced in such a spirit—that is, about the
actual emergence of such stirrings of piety as pass over immediately into religious
views and ideas (insight) or into an attitude of surrender toward God (ardor). It
should have been clear to them that this is why I wanted to draw attention to the
way in which such inner stirrings arise. They arise when a man surrenders himself
to the universe. . . . This can be seen in the fact that we are enabled as each
occasion arises to take notice of God and of his eternal power and divinity through
the works of his creation.34
One may conclude from this reference that Schleiermacher surely believed that insight
and ardor could emerge in any person who allowed herself or himself to be stirred by the
universe. These stirrings, he asserts, are inspired by God when one takes notice of God
“through the works of his creation.”
In the second Speech, Schleiermacher once again expresses his conviction that
inspiration may be universal when he refers to notions conjured up by the words
“influence,” “inspiration,” and “a divine Spirit” in an oft-cited and beautifully-written
paragraph:
What can we say of the person who does not feel in the most important moments
of his life, with the most vital conviction, that a divine Spirit impels him and that
he speaks and acts from sacred inspiration? Again, what can we say of the person
who is not at least conscious of his feelings as immediate influences of the
33
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universe upon him . . . and who does not recognize something distinctive within
these influences either, something that cannot be merely imitated but that
guarantees the purity of their origin deep within him? What can we say but that
such a person has no religion?35
Later, when he explains the concepts of “revelation” and “inspiration,” he writes:
“Decidedly pious people are always characterized by both.”36

Schleiermacher’s Conception of “Holy Spirit”
Finally, there is a distinction between Schleiermacher and the majority of contentbased/supernaturalists regarding the agent of inspiration. Both would agree that the Holy
Spirit inspired the books of the New Testament, but their understanding of “Holy Spirit”
is far from identical.37 What does Schleiermacher mean by “Holy Spirit”? An
introduction to his understanding of “Holy Spirit” in Christian Faith, found in §116 and
§§121-126, is located within his discussion of the emergence of the church. It
immediately precedes his treatment of the doctrine of scripture (§§127-133), an
arrangement that assuredly cannot be accidental. What this ordering implies, of course, is
that Schleiermacher understands there to be a close relationship between “Holy Spirit”
and scripture.
A suitable place to begin to unpack his understanding of the agent of inspiration is
Christian Faith, §116.3. This section serves as a fine introduction to and survey of what
35
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and since, therefore, a detailed analysis of this entire doctrine itself is rather extraneous to this study, I have
chosen not to compare Schleiermacher’s understanding of “Holy Spirit” with Henry’s. I believe it is
sufficient simply to assert that they are different.
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Schleiermacher explains in more detail in §§121-133. That subdivision of §116 begins
with this claim:
[T]he term ‘Holy Spirit’38 is understood to mean the unity of life that is inherent
in Christian community, viewed as a moral person. Moreover, since everything
that is actually law-bound is already excluded from it, we would be able to
designate this presence in terms of the ‘common spirit’ (Gemeingeist) of that
community.39
I imagine that Schleiermacher knew that some would surely question his orthodoxy by
use of the phrase “common spirit” for “Holy Spirit,” for he quickly affirms to his readers
that by this phrase he is referring to what “in scripture is called the Holy Spirit and the
Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ, and in our church doctrine is also presented as the
third Person in the Godhead.”40
What is behind his assertion that “common spirit” is a sufficient designation for
“Holy Spirit”? What is he trying to convey by the use of this phrase? Let me permit
Schleiermacher to answer these questions in his own words, after which I will draw some
conclusions. First, here is his heading for Christian Faith, §121, which contains a fairly
succinct description of this designation:
All who are living in the state of sanctification are conscious of an inner drive to
become increasingly at one in a common cooperative and mutually interactive
38

Tice makes this point in the Tice, Kelsey, and Lawler edition of Christian Faith that capitalizing ‘Holy
Spirit’ does not imply that Schleiermacher attributed personhood to the divine and holy Spirit. He states:
“It emphatically does not bear this implication for Schleiermacher. For him . . . writing ‘Holy’ simply
indicated that he was referring to this specific, divine spirit” (Christian Faith, §116.1, fn. 1.) Thus, the
Spirit is “holy” in the sense that the divine Spirit is active in Jesus, not as the name of a “person” in the
godhead. Rather, this Spirit is “holy” because it is God’s way in Christ of being continually in relationship
with the community of faith, though it certainly is, for him, an integral part of the triune God’s redemptive
activity in relation to the world.
39Schleiermacher,
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existence, this driving force being viewed as the common spirit of the new
collective life founded by Christ.41
What is noteworthy in this heading is what Schleiermacher claims about this
“common spirit.” First, he describes this shared spirit as intrinsic to “the new corporate
life founded by Christ.” He makes this plain in a sermon he preached before 1829,
entitled “Christ in the Temple.” After making reference in that message to the biblical
promise that no longer will anyone need to be taught by others, for all will be taught of
God (Jer. 31:33; Jn. 6:45), he writes:
We cannot say that every soul can be taught by God in solitude, nor does each
person stand as a separate work of the Holy Spirit. Rather, it comes about only
through the interchange of insight and feeling with others in that living fellowship
in which Christ united us all. For it is this fellowship first of all, and not
individual souls, that the Holy Spirit chooses for his temple, and he will illumine
and sanctify individuals only through fellowship. How could it be otherwise?42
Second, while it is possible that the heading of §121 may only indicate
Schleiermacher’s belief that this common spirit is responsible for producing the “inner
drive” (innern Antriebes) and “driving force” in the Christian church of which he writes, I
believe it is more accurate to deduce that for him these terms are coextensive. That is, the
inner drive to unite and cooperate with one another in the collective life is a driving force,
41

Ibid., §121. See also Schleiermacher’s sermon on “The Relationship of Evangelical Faith to the Law,” in
Reformed But Every Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing Over of the
Augsburg Confession (1830), ed. and trans. Iain G. Nicol, Schleiermacher Studies and Translations 8
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 59.
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on, “On the Goal toward Which the Effort of the Evangelical Church Is Directed,” in Reformed But Every
Reforming: Sermons in Relation to the Celebration of the Handing Over of the Augsburg Confession
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which Schleiermacher views not as a product of the common spirit but as equivalent to it.
To confirm this interpretation one need only consider Schleiermacher’s descriptions of
the Holy Spirit elsewhere: it is “a shared tendency to advance the whole, a tendency that
in each individual is, at the same time, a distinctive love for every individual”;43 it is “the
innermost life force of the Christian church as a whole”;44 it is communal activity, which
is also “shared self-initiated activity — which indwells everyone [in the church]”;45 it is
that which “animates the collective life of faithful persons”;46 and it is the power of the
new life which proceeds from Christ himself.47
The following comparison from Christian Faith, §121.2 clarifies
Schleiermacher’s understanding of “common spirit.” He reports: “Now, when we
designate this endeavor by the term ‘common spirit,’ we essentially understand by it what
is meant in worldly governance.”48 For Schleiermacher, then, analogous to this common
spirit in the church, is what is found in any system of government. What is that? He
explains: “[I]n all who together form a moral person there exists a shared tendency to
advance the whole, a tendency that in each individual is, at the same time, a distinctive
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love for every individual.”49 In other words, the common spirit is, in one sense,
impersonal: it is a temperament, a quality, or a disposition that permeates and
characterizes an organization.50
Consistent with this interpretation is a statement Schleiermacher made in a
sermon he preached on July 4, 1830 on the relationship of Evangelical faith to the law [of
Moses]. The sermon text for this message is Galatians 2:16-18. Writing about what it
means to be governed by the Spirit and to bear the fruits [sic] of the Spirit,
Schleiermacher notes how true it is that God’s Spirit is poured out on us through the
proclamation of faith and how this very faith is alive in us and active through love. Then,
he discusses two groups of people in the church: those who follow after the Spirit by faith
and those who continue to bind on others the works of the law. Following this
explanation, he mentions the possibility that the influence of the latter group will
interrupt, hold back, and corrupt the common spirit.51 It surely seems that in this context,
the “common spirit” is not a reference to God per se or in se, but to the pure, invisible
influences of God’s gracious activity, to the resultant cooperative relationships of God to
persons within communities of faith, and to the quality of new life in the church.
In light of the above considerations, I conclude that Schleiermacher certainly
conceives of the Holy Spirit/common spirit to be a force or impulse that is shared
49
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between persons in the Christian church. According to him, this force which indwells
and animates the church is, in fact, the person of Jesus.
Does Schleiermacher understand the Holy Spirit to be a divine being? To answer
this question, let us return to Christian Faith, §116.3, where he briefly explains the
necessary function and purpose of the Holy Spirit.
First, he concedes the simple truth that individual influences no longer proceed
directly from Christ. Since that is the case, he claims that something divine must exist in
the Christian church, and this something we call the “Being of God.” This Being
continues the communication of the perfection and blessedness of Christ, which, he
claims, is an absolute and continuous desire for the Kingdom, or Reign, of God. This is
the desire or innermost impulse of individuals within the church. But more, it is the
common spirit of the whole. Schleiermacher identifies this common spirit as the “divine
Spirit that indwells it [the whole],” and that “has been taken up into the selfconsciousness of every invigorated member [of the whole].”52 Then, he concludes:
This will for the Kingdom of God is the vital unity of the whole, and its common
spirit in each individual; in virtue of its inwardness, it is in the whole an
absolutely powerful God-consciousness, and thus the being of God therein, but
conditioned by the being of God in Christ.53
In short, I infer that for Schleiermacher, the Holy Spirit is the being of God in the
church. Cathie Kelsey makes plain Schleiermacher’s understanding when she explains:

52
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[T]he being of God is in the Christian church. . . . [It] works in the church through
its influence on the regenerate. In other words, the life of Christ is in us as a
common spirit. A third way to say the same thing is that the Holy Spirit is leading
us as a community of faith ([Christian Faith,] §124.1, §124.2). Any one of those
ways of speaking is acceptable in the church. However, we clearly cannot do
without Christ or go beyond Christ, nor can we do without the community of
faith. After Christ physically left the earth following his resurrection, the
effectiveness of Christ came to be and is manifest through the community of faith,
the church. The effectiveness of Christ is the being of God in him, so his
effectiveness in the church must be the being of God in it as the common Spirit of
Christ. The Spirit of Christ and the Holy Spirit are two ways of referring to the
same reality in the church (§121.2). Thus, being taken up into the life of Christ
and participating in the Holy Spirit are the same thing.54
This brings us to a dilemma, which is only apparent, and to an important
distinction in Schleiermacher’s understanding of the Holy Spirit. I have concluded that
he conceives the Holy Spirit to be both the common spirit, that is a force or impulse held
in common by those in the church, as well as a divine activity of God’s being in the
world. The question arises, however: Is it possible for the Spirit to be both? First, I
reiterate that while Schleiermacher believes that the Holy Spirit is an expression, or
extension, of divine being, he does not believe the Holy Spirit is a person with separate
being and activity.55 He suggests that “Holy Spirit” is simply the name we give to the
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being of God present in and influencing the community of faith.56 This corresponds, as
Kelsey notes, in the same way we attach the name “Christ” to the being of God in a
human being who is perfectly open to the being of God and whose person is completely
formed by the presence of the being of God in him.57
But note, secondly, how Schleiermacher seems to anticipate the question of
whether or not the Holy Spirit is a divine being and his answer in Christian Faith, §123.
The heading of that proposition is as follows: “The Holy Spirit is the uniting of the divine
being with human nature in the form of the common spirit that animates the collective
life of faithful persons.”58 In short, Schleiermacher believes the Holy Spirit is both an
activity of divine being and the common spirit, that is, a force, in the church. How does
he arrive at this seemingly incongruous conviction?
To explain this, Schleiermacher asks his readers to consider the relation between a
Supreme Being and human nature insofar as this relation is present in a Christian selfconsciousness.59 He then asserts that in the church’s experience, and indeed, in the New
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Testament scriptures, all powers that are efficacious in the Christian church have been
traced back to the Holy Spirit. This must be true, he claims, for otherwise Christ would
have been superfluous. Furthermore, it must be the case, he reasons, that the Holy Spirit
exists in and works from within Christians rather than from outside them. From these
considerations Schleiermacher concludes that those who first possessed the Holy Spirit
presented this Spirit as a divine action in persons of faith, yet one not to be separated
from recognition of the being of God in Christ. However, if the Holy Spirit is a spiritual
power in persons of faith, it must be represented as united in them with their human
nature, or else “we must abrogate the unity of their existence.”60 This “total split in
human life” is unimaginable, Schleiermacher asserts.
The union, then, of the Holy Spirit in human nature must persist in the form of the
common spirit. And since each person attains to the new life only in and through the
community, so also each person shares in the Holy Spirit, not in one’s personal selfconsciousness, but only as one is conscious of one’s being in this whole—that is, as a
consciousness held in common. Therefore, the union of the divine with human nature in
persons of faith is not a person-forming union, because otherwise it would not be
distinguishable from the union that is in Christ, and the distinction between Redeemer
and redeemed would be abrogated.
To summarize, the Holy Spirit is an agency and activity of divine being, but its
presence in the Christian church is something that works naturally in community-forming
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experiences among persons of faith, experience that may be regarded as the life force of
the church.61 Steven R. Jungkeit vouches for this perspective when he writes that the
church “hums to life through the activity of the Spirit, which thereafter is characterized as
a power located within the system itself.”62 One could say, then, that what once had a
supernaturally-effected advent and has continued via the influence of Christ, now has a
natural explanation or extension, as well. In other words, as in Jesus Christ himself,
Schliermacher’s conception of the activity of Holy Spirit is both supernatural and natural,
referring to both a divine being and a life force experienced between persons in the
community of faith.63 This is what he identifies as the common or shared spirit of the
collective life of the church.

Criticism of Schleiermacher’s Theology of Inspiration
The core and general criticism of Schleiermacher’s understanding of inspiration is
that, for him, God is relatively inactive in the process. More specifically, his critics chide
him for maintaining that the process of writing down scripture is essentially an
exclusively human activity. Since this is the case, one could argue that the overarching
criticism of Schleiermacher’s perspective has to do with the relationship between the
61
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supernatural and the natural.64 (This is not surprising, as this relationship has remained at
the center of theological debate throughout the modern period.) Even though this is a
false distinction for Schleiermacher, for his critics the crux of the issue is the extent to
which God and human beings are active in the process of inspiration. For them, the point
in question is this: Is scripture primarily a divine or a human product?
For his critics, Schleiermacher’s supposed unwillingness to grant the supernatural
an active role in the process of inspiration is a slippery slope. For example, according to
one critic, to disallow divine activity leaves Christianity without objective foundations. If
Christianity is without such foundations, either scripture is rendered practically irrelevant
as a source of theology or the Christian religion is driven to draw the contents for its
doctrines more from science, philosophy, experience, and tradition than from scripture.
Ultimately, scripture loses its authority as a source of theology.65
According to those who disapprove of Schleiermacher’s stance on inspiration, the
slippery slope begins with his alleged view of God. Consider what Carl F. H. Henry
claims is the problem with Schleiermacher’s theology, in general, which also pertains,
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specifically, to his understanding of inspiration: it over exaggerates the immanence of
God:
What made it possible for modernism to elevate man to the level of prophet and
apostle was its philosophy of exaggerated divine immanence; first, it put all men
and history on the same plane, then, by exalting empirical methodology and
evolutionary dogma, it raised the modernist to superior religious insight.
Schleiermacher’s deference to pantheism was already evident in his On Religion:
Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, in which he sought to give religion universal
significance but did so by trivializing God’s special initiative and activity.66
Breaking down Henry’s criticism, but leaving aside the oft-repeated and spurious charge
that Schleiermacher was a pantheist, a criticism unwarranted by his exposition in
Christian Faith, Henry’s problem with Schleiermacher’s viewpoint, is that it makes
“God’s special initiative and activity” seem less important. How is this minimization of
God’s activity in the process of inspiration demonstrable? By the elevation of “man to
the level of prophet and apostle.” What made it possible for theologians to do such a
thing? Henry’s answer: modernism’s philosophy of exaggerated divine immanence. That
Henry is disapproving of Schleiermacher’s belief in universal inspiration is evident when
he writes that “inspiration is no universal phenomenon, nor is it necessarily or actually
shared by all or most spiritually devout and obedient men of God.”67
Another Evangelical, Donald Bloesch, agrees with Henry’s assessment. Bloesch
is referring to “a modernist view of revelation and inspiration,” as well as to
Schleiermacher’s theology when he writes:
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[I]t stresses the inseparability of the infinite and the finite and sees the infinite as
residing in the finite as its ground and depth. . . . It’s orientation is
anthropological and psychological rather than theological in that its primary
concern is the effect of the divine on humanity rather than the nature of divinity
as such.68
Critics not only disapprove of what they suppose to be Schleiermacher’s view of
God and God’s lack of involvement in the inspiration process, but also with his
understanding of inspiration’s locus. They reject that it is found primarily in scripture’s
authors. Henry asserts: “Inspiration is primarily a statement about God’s relationship to
Scripture, and only secondarily about the relationship of God to the writers.”69 Again,
they believe that Schleiermacher’s perspective leads to a slippery slope. For example,
defenders of verbal inspiration wonder: How can we be sure that what the inspired author
wrote was a true reflection of that inspiration if we cannot also say that the very words he
or she put down were also inspired?70 They assert that if God inspired authors rather than
the text itself, there is nothing to make the text itself special. Furthermore, if only the
authors are inspired, how can one assign more spiritual authority to biblical books than to
any other books written under the power of some great religious experience?71
A third criticism sometimes leveled against Schleiermacher’s doctrine of
inspiration is that since biblical words and meanings are wholly human, biblical exegesis
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is to be undertaken with the same tools and procedures utilized by the historical and
literary sciences.72 Many are not happy with this possibility.

A Response to Schleiermacher’s Critics
How does or how would Schleiermacher respond to the above criticisms?
First, he would certainly agree that the process of scripture creation and collection
was essentially a human activity. He believes the words of scripture are human words.
No special divine charism is claimed by him to have assisted biblical writers. However,
Schleiermacher would not agree that his conception of inspiration makes God virtually
inactive in the process. While it is surely a challenge to articulate the co-presence and coactivity of the supernatural and the natural in this or any other process, he does believe
that God was part of the process.
There is a way in which Schleiermacher’s model traces religious discourse back
to God. First, as noted above, he does believe that the Holy Spirit, which he identified as
the common spirit of the church, influenced the writers of the New Testament. Second,
the inner felt encounter of absolute dependence is considered to be the ultimate cause that
motivates the origination of all genuinely Christian religious discourse, including, of
course, scripture.73 Schleiermacher connects the feeling of absolute dependence with the
origin of biblical and dogmatic writings by claiming that human self-consciousness
includes two inseparable, interconnected levels, one sensible and the other absolute. He
72
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speaks of an absolute and a sensible self-consciousness of feeling.74 Absolute selfconsciousness is able “to manifest itself in time, by entering into relation with the
sensible self-consciousness so as to constitute a moment.”75 Thus, since within human
self-consciousness the feeling of absolute dependence (originated by a timeless God)
always occurs with feelings of pleasure and pain (originated by sensory temporal
experiences), the feeling of absolute dependence is always linked to the content of the
sensible self-consciousness through which it expresses itself. In the very instant of its
origination, this content becomes the content of its external historical manifestation, and
when the feeling of absolute dependence is linked to it, the result is emotion.76 It is true
that emotions, even when they express the feeling of absolute dependence, are not
knowledge. But, the writing down of religious literature becomes “the attempt to
translate the inward emotions into thoughts.”77 Biblical teachings and Christian doctrines
as well, are “nothing but the expressions given to the Christian self-consciousness and its
connections.”78 Consequently, it is not accurate to say that God is inactive in
Schleiermacher’s conception of inspiration. God’s mode of activity in Schleiermacher’s
model of inspiration may not be the way in which God is thought to be active in the
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content-based/supernaturalist model, but Schleiermacher certainly believes that God is
active in the process.
One of the reasons Schleiermacher is unwilling to attribute more activity to God
in the process of inspiration must surely be that he proposes a pious modesty and
speculative restraint regarding what can be known about God. In keeping with this
position, his acceptance of some key elements in Kant’s epistemology is welldocumented.79 According to Kant, pure reason is limited to the realm of objects of sense
experience, so that what lies beyond sense experience is simply not knowable by human
reason. Accepting the limitation Kant placed on reason, Schleiermacher follows Kant in
restricting knowledge of God to what can be experienced and in eschewing speculation
about God in se.80
Consistent with this, Schleiermacher reconstructed the doctrine of God.81
According to him, the attributes of God are not to be taken as actually describing God, for
to “describe” is to limit and divide, thereby taking away from God’s infinity and implying
a dependence of God upon the world. He writes: “None of the attributes that we ascribe
to God is to designate something particular in God; rather, they are to designate only
79
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something particular in the way in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be
referred to God.”82 In other words, talk about God is always talk about human
experience of God. Such statements describe not God-in-God’s-self but a certain mode
of experiencing God.
What this means, of course, is that one response to the criticism that
Schleiermacher’s conception of inspiration overly exaggerates the immanence of God,
lies in the belief that God in se cannot be known.83 The irony of this is that many of
Schleiermacher’s critics believe that an infinite and wholly transcendent God can be
known in se by finite human beings. So, if God is knowable on any level, it makes more
sense to emphasize God’s immanent activity over God’s transcendence.
How would Schleiermacher respond to the charge that his viewpoint does not
limit inspiration to a select few, but that it has the potential to be universal in scope? To
respond to this question I will quote what Schleiermacher writes regarding a philosopher
whom he highly respected:
Respectfully offer up with me a lock of hair to the manes of the holy rejected
Spinoza! The high world spirit permeated him, the infinite was his beginning
and end, the universe his only and eternal love; in holy innocence and deep
humility he was reflected in the eternal world and saw how he too was its most
lovable mirror; he was full of religion and full of holy spirit.84
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Later, in the supplementary notes affixed to the 1821 edition of On Religion,
Schleiermacher praises Spinoza again, indicating that “the mind and heart of this great
man seemed to be permeated with piety, even though it was not Christian piety.”85 But,
wait. Did not Schleiermacher write in the 1799 edition that Spinoza was full of holy
spirit? How is it that one who is full of holy spirit does not possess Christian piety?
Schleiermacher goes on to explain that “[n]othing I said should have led one to suppose
that I was ascribing the Holy Spirit to Spinoza in the distinctively Christian sense of the
word.”86 Immediately following his praise of Spinoza, he pens this famous passage:
I entreat you to become familiar with this concept: intuition of the universe. It is
the hinge of my whole speech; it is the highest and most universal formula of
religion on the basis of which you should be able to find every place in religion
from which you may determine its essence and its limits. All intuition proceeds
from an influence of the intuited on the one who intuits, from an original and
independent action of the former, which is then grasped, apprehended, and
conceived by the latter according to one’s own nature.87
What are we to make of these intriguing references to Spinoza? What may we
reasonably surmise about Schleiermacher’s understanding of the Holy Spirit in the world
from his remark that Spinoza was full of holy spirit, yet not “in the distinctively Christian
sense of the word”? And what may we reasonably infer about Schleiermacher’s
understanding of inspiration from his phrase “influence of the intuited on the one who
intuits,” which is found in the very same context in which he praises Spinoza and
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Novalis? First, it seems to me that Schleiermacher at least entertains the notion that the
Holy Spirit is active at various levels and to various degrees in the world. For example,
he believes that there is a sense in which the spirit of God is active in the lives of
philosophers and poets, like Spinoza and Novalis, and there is a sense in which the spirit
of God is active in the lives of disciples of Christ. The level of engagement may be
different, as well as the degree of activity. But, Schleiermacher affirms the possibility
that God or God’s spirit is active in some sense in the lives of all people.
We might easily call this activity of the spirit of God “influence.” Schleiermacher
does not use the word Eingebung or “inspiration” in the aforementioned passage, but he
is surely referring to the influence of God in this context. Therefore, I believe we can
reasonably infer from this and other passages in Schleiermacher’s works that he believes
in various levels of inspiration. To express this claim another way, Schleiermacher
understands “inspiration” to have several layers of meaning. The word “inspiration” can
refer to prophets and apostles as they are influenced by the spirit of God to compose
religious literature, and it can also refer to the influence of God’s holy Spirit in the lives
of those who may not even be characterized as possessing Christian piety.
Finally, how would Schleiermacher respond to the criticism that if the locus of
inspiration is the authors, rather than the words of scripture, there is no way to be certain
that what the inspired author wrote was a true reflection of that inspiration? Surely, his
answer would be: “Correct! There is no absolute certainty regarding such things! The
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affirmation that scripture is inspired is a matter of faith. ‘All scripture is inspired of God’
is a proposition that cannot be proven. It can only be accepted on the basis of faith.”
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, Schleiermacher’s understanding of the
meaning of inspiration fits neither in the content-based/supernaturalist category, nor the
function-based/rationalist category of the doctrine of biblical authority. Because he
believes the authors of New Testament were influenced by divine spirit and because he
believes the Holy Spirit played a role in both the writing and the collection of the books
of the New Testament, one could say that his understanding borrows from the
supernaturalists. However, since he does not believe scripture is a deposit of divinelyrevealed truths, his position may be said to borrow from the rationalist category. Hence,
it is more accurate to place his understanding in a third category, one which I have
identified as content-based and rationalist.
The question to be discussed in the next chapter is this: How would
Schleiermacher respond to the charge that if only the authors are inspired, the text cannot
serve as a norm, authority, or source of theology? His answer would be that the text is
authoritative on other grounds. If the biblical text is neither exclusively divine revelation
nor an exclusively divine product, and if the authority of scripture does not lie in some
property of the text itself, the question arises: Upon what basis can it be authoritative?
This is the subject to which we turn in the next chapter: Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of
Biblical Authority.
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Chapter Five: Schleiermacher and the Authority of Scripture
As I demonstrated in Chapters Three and Four, although Schleiermacher believed
in the reality of divine revelation and held a concept of divine inspiration, he did not view
the Bible as a deposit of divinely-revealed truths. Rather, he understood it to be a human
document, which expresses the experience of God in the lives of believers. As a result,
his critics suggest that such a position robs scripture of its ability to serve as any kind of
authority in the Christian religion. Schleiermacher begs to differ. He believed in biblical
authority.
In Chapters Five and Six, I go into more detail regarding the three-fold schema
that I introduced in Chatper Two. That is, in these two chapters, I explain more fully how
Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical authority is neither content-based/
supernaturalist nor function-based/rationalist, but content-based/rationalist.
I have three aims in this chapter. First, I want to lay out Schleiermacher’s
understanding of biblical authority.1 Therefore, in this section I will discuss his
conception of scripture as an expression of Christian faith and as “Word of God,” a
phrase often found in his sermons, and one which, I believe, he identified on occasion
with scripture. Second, I want to lay out what I consider to be the core criticism of his
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understanding of biblical authority from those who regard scripture as divinely-inspired
revelation: it rejects scripture as the foundation of Christian faith. Third, I want to trace
out Schleiermacher’s response to this criticism and the reasoning which underlies it. To
effect this, I will scrutinize Christian Faith, §128 and examine in some detail one of his
sermons. Schleiermacher was almost universally hailed in his own day as a great
preacher. He filled the pulpit weekly for most of his life, and perhaps there we learn most
about his view of the Bible—that it is a book that still speaks. Dawn DeVries makes this
discriminating and factual comment regarding Schleiermacher, the preacher:
As a historical critic and philologist, Schleiermacher could be very skeptical. As
a dogmatician, he stayed away from what he perceived to be the imprecision of
biblical language. But as a preacher, he lived in the text in much the same way as
the great Reformation exegetes and theologians had. Biblical allusions saturate
his sermons, texts interpret other texts, and that fusion of horizons occurs that
allows an ancient book to become a living voice.2

Schleiermacher’s Conception of Biblical Authority
To the surprise of many, that Schleiermacher believed in the authority of scripture
in the Christian church is undeniably true. To confirm this, a study of Schleiermacher,
the preacher, is an appropriate starting point. During his lifetime, Schleiermacher
published seven collections of sermons. These Sammlungen, together with separately
published sermons, represent in full about one-third of his collected works. Almost all of
these published sermons are based upon a biblical text, which is explicitly set forth just
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below the sermon title.3 Moreover, references to and citations of scripture in his sermons
are plentiful. For example, the editors of Reformed But Ever Reforming, count over 380
references to scripture in this ten-sermon collection.4 Additionally, Schleiermacher felt
that preachers should conform their language to two norms, the most important of which,
is the norm of scripture.5 He writes: “It is really quite impossible to imagine a proper
Christian ministry without diligent occupation with the Bible. . . . It must become the
center of all combinations of thought.”6
Further confirmation of Schleiermacher’s acceptance of scripture’s authority is
found in Christian Faith. There, he acknowledges the authority of scripture in the
heading of §128: “The authority of holy scripture cannot be the basis of faith in Christ;
rather, in order to accord special authority to holy scripture, this fact already must be
presupposed.” Then, he explains the basis of that authority in §129: “On the one hand,
the holy scriptures of the New Testament are the first member in the whole series of
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presentations of Christian faith, continued ever since. On the other hand, they comprise
the norm for all succeeding presentations.”7
The basis of biblical authority for Schleiermacher, therefore, is that the New
Testament is the first recorded expression of Christian faith. Working under the
assumption that scripture is an authentic expression of faith, as he does, the New
Testament serves as a kind of touchstone or check on later generations. For
Schleiermacher, then, later expressions of faith must accord with what we know to be the
authentic expression of faith in the New Testament. If they do not, either one is not
articulating her or his faith correctly, or the later expression of faith is not Christian faith.
This is what he means when he claims that scripture is normative.8 Kelsey clearly and
succinctly explains Schleiermacher’s understanding:
Scripture has a premier place in Christianity because it is the earliest written
testimony of Christians to the influence of Christ. Scripture is the record of early
faith through Christ, and for this reason we check our own testimony to Christ
against it.9
Certainly, the principal reason that scripture has authority for Schleiermacher is
that he regards it as an expression of faith in Christ, the first in a series of such
expressions, but normative in a way that later presentations of faith are not.10 In addition,
7
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I believe there is another reason, one that is closely related to the aforementioned. It has
to do with Schleiermacher’s use of the phrase, “Word of God.” What is the meaning of
this phrase, in what sense or senses did Schleiermacher use it, and what is the relevance
of this discussion to the subject of biblical authority? These are the questions to which I
now turn.
In common parlance, “Word of God” is used as a synonym for revelation or for
the Bible. In the technical vocabulary of theology, the “Word of God” may refer to
Christ. Sometimes, the Word of God is also used to describe a contemporary divine
communication—particularly in the act of preaching.
Schleiermacher himself uses the phrase “Word of God” in several senses.11 First
and foremost, in Schleiermacher’s preaching, the phrase often corresponds to Christ. For
example, this seems apparent in a sermon he preached, entitled, “On the Public Ministry
of the Word of God.” His message is based on this scripture text: “And his gifts were that
some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, to
equip the saints for the work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ” (Ephesians
4:11-12). Upon close examination, one may discover that the function of this sermon is
to explain the rationale for and benefits of the “ministry of the Word of God,” a ministry
that refers to the teaching office of pastors and teachers.12 In this sermon, Schleiermacher
11
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equates “the divine Word” with Christ: “[Christians] are united in a blessed community
under the protection and guidance of the divine Word, which has become active in all of
them to bring about a true spiritual life.”13 Of people who are not called to the office of
pastor and teacher, he asserts that they should not “interpret the Word of God in public or
dispense the holy pledges of his promise.”14 In another sermon, titled, “Sermon at
Nathanael’s Grave,” after writing that this world “is glorified through the life of the
Redeemer and hallowed through the efficacy of his Spirit,” Schleiermacher confesses that
his highest goal was “to be nothing but a servant of this divine Word.”15 Tice agrees with
this identification:
The word is whatever God proclaims in Christ. Schleiermacher uses this term of
scripture only insofar as it represents and serves this purpose. “Ministry of the
Word” refers precisely to this word. The word become flesh is God’s word
spoken and enacted in Christ, not a preexistent part of the Godhead become
incarnate. “The word became flesh” is God’s word proclaimed by word and deed
by and through the Redeemer.16
DeVries agrees. She claims that “Word of God” is a reference to Christ in the preached
word:
For present-day Christians, this powerful influence of the Redeemer is no longer
exerted by his corporeal presence, but by the “picture” of him that is present
within the church. And the sermon is the location of that picture. Carrying on
the prophetic and priestly work of the Redeemer, preachers, by presenting their
13
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own Christian consciousness, almost seductively “assume” their hearers into the
power of their own experience of Christ and exert a powerful influence over
them, just as Christ influenced his disciples. And since any success they have in
affecting their hearers is due to the presence of the Holy Spirit in their
proclamation, it is certain that their congregations are encountering the Redeemer
himself in the sermon. Thus for Schleiermacher, the sermon was the “Word of
God,” but not in the sense of a new declaration from God the Father. Rather, the
sermon is the transparent medium through which we encounter the Redeemer,
who is himself God’s incarnate Word.17
Second, Schleiermacher’s use of the phrase seems to correspond to scripture in
some of his sermons. For instance, in the aforecited sermon, “On the Public Ministry of
the Word of God,” he asks: “Why apostles and prophets if the divine Word is already
alive in all of us? Why evangelists if we can everywhere call to mind the life of the
Redeemer and the fullness of his holy image from the written Word of God?”18 Clearly,
the first usage of the phrase in this quotation is a reference to Christ, while the second
reference—“the written Word of God”—is a reference to scripture.19 Also, he writes that
one of the responsibilities of pastors is
to place the Word of God in the hands of young Christians, urging them to
observe it so that they themselves may derive from it the standards that will
govern their lives and should test and understand themselves in the light from
Christ that everywhere shines forth from it.20
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In this passage, we may reasonably conclude that Schleiermacher is alluding to scripture
as that from which the light of Christ shines.
There seems to be a similar correlation of scripture and “word of God” in a
sermon Schleiermacher preached in 1817, which celebrated the three hundredth
anniversary of the Reformation. It was entitled, “Teaching the Reformation Faith to Our
Children.” Emphasizing the blessings that came to the church via the Reformation, he
writes that these blessings can be traced chiefly
to the recovery of the free use of God’s Word and to the reaffirmation of the great
Christian doctrine concerning the futility of all outward works—the doctrine of
justification by faith alone. Accordingly, today’s meditation requires two
resolutions of us: first, that we must assist our children in the free use of God’s
Word, and second, that we must teach them the righteousness that comes from
faith.21
He adds that during the festival days of 1817 each one “sought to recall the stories from
which we know how deeply the Word of God was buried in darkness for ages before the
Reformation of the church.” Is this a reference to Christ or to scripture? At the very
least, Schleiermacher demonstrates in the very next sentence the close association of the
two: “In its original language, scripture was seldom sufficiently available even to biblical
scholars, and it was as good as unavailable to the common people in their native tongue.”
Schleiermacher is rejoicing in the fact that the Reformation restored the faded picture of
the Redeemer. How so? By making scripture available to common people. Also, noting
that stories of Jesus make an impression upon children as well, he encourages parents to
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lead their children to “the treasures of God’s Word.”22 For it is the duty of parents, he
charges, to expose their children to scripture:
We have persuaded ourselves . . . that our children can only understand holy
scripture rather late in childhood. We are afraid that if we offered it to them too
early they would be robbed of the desire and love for scripture later on; we fear
that the holy reverence and awe with which they ought one day to approach
God’s Word would be undermined in advance.23
He concludes the sermon with this plea: “[W]e must solemnly pledge to educate young
people in the fear and knowledge of the Lord as much as we can, and to give them early
in life his Word as a light on their way.”24
In yet another sermon entitled “The Effects of Scripture and of the Redeemer,”
Schleiermacher clearly identifies the “Word of God” with scripture:
The Word contains above all the original testimony about the life and existence
of the Redeemer, and it is by this testimony alone that we must judge whether
something is taken from what is his. . . . If someone wants to remain within this
fellowship but still boasts much or little about what the Lord has effected
immediately in his soul . . . he must prove this for his congregation from God’s
Word.25
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What did Schleiermacher intend to convey when he referred to scripture as “word
of God”? Assuredly, he did not mean that scripture is of God in the sense that it is from
God. As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, although he had a concept of revelation, he did
not accept that scripture was a deposit of divinely and supernaturally revealed truths.
Does German grammar provide some clarity on the meaning of this phrase? I do not
believe it does. “Word of God,” or “divine word” (göttlichen Wort) is in the genitive
case, which is commonly used to indicate possession.26 Also, the genitive case can take
the preposition “regarding” or “concerning.”27 According to the German construction of
this phrase, then, the meaning of “word of God” could be the word or message that
belongs to God (Possessive Genitive) or the word or message regarding or concerning
God (Objective Genitive).
One thing is certain: one cannot read Schleiermacher’s sermons without coming
to the conclusion that here was a theologian and preacher who held a high view of
scripture. The fact that he correlates “Word of God” and scripture is ample evidence of
his belief that scripture is special, indeed, authoritative.
His contributions to exegetical studies only confirm this.28 From the beginning of
his teaching career in 1804, he lectured almost continuously in New Testament studies.
At Halle he offered courses on Galatians, Thessalonians, Corinthians, Romans,
26 April
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Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, Timothy, Titus, and Hebrews. At the
University of Berlin, from 1810 to 1834, he lectured at least once each academic year
(except in 1827) on some theme in New Testament studies. He offered eleven semesterlong courses on the Gospels, six on Acts, nineteen on the Pauline, Pastoral and Catholic
Epistles and Hebrews, four on the life of Jesus, and two on introduction to the New
Testament.

The Core Criticism of Schleiermacher’s Conception of Biblical Authority
As I did in the last two chapters, I want to identify and address the criticisms of
those who tend to align with the content-based/supernaturalist approach to biblical
authority. Generally, their chief criticism of Schleiermacher’s view of scripture and its
authority is that it severely limits the role of the Bible in theology and church.29 More
specifically, they argue that his position does not grant to scripture its fundamental and
essential role as the foundation of Christian faith. This is key to understanding the
viewpoint of Schleiermacher’s critics. For content-based supernaturalists like Henry and
many others who are critical of Schleiermacher’s theology, scripture is the starting point
of faith.
Now, to be clear, both content-based supernaturalists and function-based
rationalists acknowledge the authority of scripture, at least to some degree.
Schleiermacher himself, as noted above in this chapter, believed in the authority of the
New Testament. Indeed, one could make the case that all evangelicals believe in biblical
29
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authority.30 The central issue and point of controversy, of course, is the locus of that
authority.
Stanley Grenz helps us to understand one of the chief criticisms of
Schleiermacher, in his essay in Evangelicals and Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and
Hermeneutics. There, he argues that two approaches to the role of scripture have
prevailed among evangelicals since the Reformation. On the one hand, some have held
that the Bible is a “source of correct doctrine.”31 Others, characterized more by Pietism
and Puritanism, see the Bible as a “source of spiritual sustenance.”32 This typology may
be overly simplistic, but I believe there is value in it. In general, I would say that it
typifies models of biblical authority advocated by content-based supernaturalists and
function-based rationalists.
The criticism of Schleiermacher’s position is that since, for him, the New
Testament is authoritative because it is an expression, indeed, the first expression, of the
faith of the early Christian community, the locus of biblical authority is found in the
community of believers, rather than in the text of scripture. In other words,
Schleiermacher is often presented as a theologian who radically subordinated the
authority of scripture to that of experience. As one critic asserts: “Scripture is not
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ultimately about us, but about God and his redemptive work to rescue human beings from
their lost condition.”33 Schleiermacher’s critics wonder: If scripture is not a divinely
revealed deposit of correct doctrine then how can it serve as the foundation of faith?
How can it function as the ground of theology and life? This is the reasoning behind this
chief criticism.34

Schleiermacher’s Response
How would Schleiermacher respond to this criticism? First, although he would
certainly deny that his position diminishes the role of the Bible in the church, he would
wholeheartedly agree with his critics that his position does not grant scripture the role
that they think it must. Schleiermacher rejects the notion that scripture is the starting
point or foundation of faith. Much of what makes him unique in theological history, as
well as the one who ushered in the distinctively modern phase of Protestant theology, is
his formulation of an alternative starting point: the shared faith experience of Christians
in community understood and communicated through the “apostolic witness” in the New
Testament. Schleiermacher roots his accounts of Christian faith and life in an “immediate
existential relationship” with God, experienced distinctively by each individual within a
distinct religious community.35
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Scripture Is Not the Foundation of Faith
For Schleiermacher, scripture36 cannot be the foundation of Christian faith.37 He
declared this explicitly in §128 of Christian Faith: “The authority of holy scripture
cannot be the basis of faith in Christ; rather, in order to accord special authority to holy
scripture, this fact already must be presupposed.”38 Why was Schleiermacher unwilling
to grant scripture this role?
First, he believed that if it were foundational to faith, it would be necessary to
prove scripture’s authority on the ground of reason.39 For him, this was unacceptable in
the first place, because he felt it would make scripture inaccessible to some. To establish
biblical authority on the ground of reason would presuppose a “critical and scientific use
of the intellect, of which not all persons are capable.”40 One of the problems of this
approach to scripture for Schleiermacher is that “only persons who are competent in these
skills could have faith handed down to them in an original and authentic fashion.”41 He
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felt this approach would force people to rely upon the authority of experts and, thus,
could generate only a second-hand faith.
This over-reliance on “the experts,” he asserts, is incongruous with the
Evangelical Church’s belief in the equality of all Christians. It would demand from the
laity an unqualified and submissive trust in those who alone would have access to the
ground of faith due to their ability to apply their rational faculties to biblical
interpretation. This was unacceptable to Schleiermacher, who believed that scripture
should be accessible to all. He writes:
[T]he right of access to the divine word that we afford to all Christians and the
zeal with which we seek to keep it in vital circulation in no way relate to a
supposition that everyone is supposed to be able to offer proof that these books
contain a divine revelation.42
Schleiermacher’s second objection to proving the authority of scripture on the
ground of reason is based on his contention that if such proof could be given and if faith
could be established in this fashion, then faith could be implanted by argument. The
problem with this scenario, he argues, is that it would mean that faith could exist in those
who felt no need of redemption.43 The need of redemption, repentance, a change of mind
and heart—these are things that accompany a genuine faith, according to Schleiermacher.
Consequently, and in other words, he believed that “faith,” which could be implanted by
argument, would not be a genuine faith at all.
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But upon what basis does he make this claim? What norm informed his
understanding of “genuine faith”? From his study of the Gospels in the Reformed
tradition, Schleiermacher came to believe that the earliest disciples of Jesus had genuine
faith. Because their faith was real, Schleiermacher was sure that the “ground of faith
must be the same among us as among the first Christians.”44 This meant, then, that faith
must be generated, not by the New Testament, since the earliest disciples did not have the
New Testament, but by the personal influences of Christ.45
But some might argue, Schleiermacher writes, that the faith of the earliest
Christians was grounded on scripture, Old Testament scripture.46 “Didn’t the Apostles
describe Jesus as the figure whom the prophets foretold?” some must have argued.
Schleiermacher’s response is that it is impossible to take this as meaning that the earliest
Christians had been led to faith in Jesus by the study of those prophecies and by the
comparison of their contents with what they saw and heard in Jesus. On the contrary, he
asserts, it was a direct impression that awakened faith in those who had been prepared by
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the testimony of John the Baptist. Moreover, their description of Jesus was only an
expression of this faith combined with their faith in the prophets.47
Is it not possible, some might claim, that today faith begins from the acceptance
of the doctrine that the preaching of Christ by the “inspired” Apostles is “revealed by
God” in the writings of the New Testament? Schleiermacher’s reply is that such faith
does not spring from the acceptance of a special doctrine about these writings, as if these
writings had their origin in special divine revelation or inspiration. In Christian Faith,
§14, he writes:
[R]egarding inspiration, in Christianity this concept bears a thoroughly
subordinate meaning. This is the case, for reference of the concept to Christ
finds no place in Christianity at all, in that divine revelation through him,
however it might be conceived, is always taken to be identical with his entire
existence, not as appearing in a fragmentary manner in scattered instances. What
the Spirit gave to the apostles, however, Christ himself spoke of as derived
entirely from his own instruction. Moreover, those who became persons of faith
through the apostolic witness did not become so because this witness had arisen
through inspiration, for they knew nothing of that.48
As further proof that faith does not come from believing in the inspiration of the
New Testament authors, Schleiermacher notes that “[a]s for the New Testament . . . faith
had been communicated over the length of two centuries before any agreement was set
forth as to its distinctive currency.”49 In fact, he argues that one must have faith before
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reading scripture as containing and conveying divine revelation as a generally
trustworthy witness to Christ. He makes this point in one of his sermons:
It is not altogether true to say, as we often enough put it, that scripture is the first
witness to faith to have come down to us. Faith in Christ arose through Christ
himself, in response to how he lived, spoke, and acted. It was only afterward that
scripture arose, as it proceeded from faith. Thus, it is Christ who ever remains
the source of faith, even still today, and to this we must hold firm.50
Moreover a doctrine of the divine inspiration of scripture, he claimed, can be credible
only to those who are already believers.51

Schleiermacher’s Understanding of the Foundation of Faith
Another reason Schleiermacher refused to view scripture as the faith-forming
foundation is that he had the strong conviction that something else and something better
had to be that foundation. For him, that “something better” is the experience of
redemption. To explain this point of view, I want to examine in some detail a sermon
Schleiermacher preached before 1826, entitled, “The Effects of Scripture and the
Immediate Effects of the Redeemer.” Based upon Luke 24:30-32, a text which describes
Jesus’ post-resurrection appearance to a couple of disciples on the road to Emmaus, the
sermon clearly articulates Schleiermacher’s understanding of the foundation of faith.
He begins the sermon by highlighting two elements in the story. First, he notes
that Jesus deliberately took special care to make clear to his disciples the scripture that
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bore witness to him. However, second, Schleiermacher asserts that there was something
else which neither the scripture in itself nor even Christ’s explanation of it could bring
about. He writes:
Despite the fact that the disciples’ hearts had burned along the way when he
opened the scripture to them, they still did not recognize him. That happened
only when he sat at table with them, broke the bread with the customary
thanksgiving, and divided it among them. Only then did they recognize him.52
From this, Schleiermacher infers that the disciples did not attribute even the
burning of their hearts within them to the scripture, but rather to Christ’s way of using it
and expounding it. Then, he articulates his thesis: “We see here, then, two things: the
effects of scripture and the immediate effects of the Lord, which radiate purely from his
person in the company of his own.”53 Schleiermacher devotes the remainder of the
sermon to an explanation of these two effects and the relationship between them.
How does he explain or describe the effects of scripture? He praises scripture as
“a treasure shared by us all.”54 He affirms its value when he asserts:
[T]he right way of contending for the truth and integrity of our evangelical
Christianity is and always will be what it was when our church began: to prove
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from this Word because they know that it is the well that never runs dry, the well that holds the Water of
Life” (DeVries, Servant of the Word, 114.).
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our good cause from scripture, just as Paul, and Stephen before him, did for the
cause of Christianity.55
He explicitly states his conviction that scripture is authoritative and again expresses the
function of scripture when he asserts that “the holy authority of the Word must provide a
firm rule for all that happens in the hearts of Christians.”56
How does Schleiermacher describe the effects of the Redeemer? First, he asserts
that they are impressions, independent of scripture, made by Christ’s personality. He
notes that while Christ walked the earth, “his distinctive nature however it might express
itself, never failed to create such impressions.”57 Again, Schleiermacher draws the
conclusion that this is how the disciples’ faith first arose: through the impression of
Christ. He makes this interesting distinction in this beautiful passage:
Now if this impression came to them [the first disciples] as the Lord spoke words
of doctrine and admonition to them which afterward became the source of their
own instruction to Christians, then this is something that in essence belongs for
us entirely to the effects of scripture. Yet, the reason why their hearts burned
within them was precisely because of the immediacy of his impression: the way
in which the loving movements of the divine disposition were reflected in Jesus’
outward bearing, the strength of conviction expressed in his heavenly, clear eyes,
and everything else we could mention by which the glory of the only-begotten
Son of God, full of grace and truth, was to be beheld in him (John 1:14).58
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Elsewhere in this sermon, he describes these immediate and personal effects of
the Redeemer as a light that sparks “immediately in the human soul by the Son of God,”59
as something that stirs the depths of the soul,60 as “immediate inner experiences of the
heart,”61 and as “pious impulses of the soul.”62 He equates these effects with that which
“arises through the inner working of the Redeemer in the soul.”63 Schleiermacher’s
understanding of the effects of the Redeemer is nothing less than “the immediate spiritual
presence of the Lord in the soul.”64
At one point in the sermon, he seems to anticipate an objection, or at the very
least, a question, which he surely understands must be materializing in the minds of his
hearers. He wonders if these impressions, connected as they were with Christ’s personal
appearance, are available to those who did not live during the period of his earthly life.
His initial response, likely rhetorical in nature, is that it seems they are not. But, did not
Christ promise that “Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst
of them” (Matt. 18:20) and that “I am with you always, to the close of the age” (Matt.
28:20)? Schleiermacher asks. Then, he challenges the skeptics:
Could Christ have meant by these words nothing but the effects that the Word
portraying him in the New Testament (and before that was written, the reports of
those who had lived with him and under him) must bring about in the hearts of
59
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those who longed for salvation but had not been able to enjoy his personal
acquaintance and influence? And is this all he has left for us? We can scarcely
think so!65
One reason he trusts that the personal influence of the Redeemer is available since
the period Christ walked the earth is because he feels that if it is unavailable, it would be
unfair to all who have lived since that time.66 But, he also realizes that there are some in
every church who want to abandon the hope that immediate experiences of the Lord are
possible. They want to listen exclusively to the word of the Lord67 because “they are
rightly concerned that many things totally alien to the spirit and intention of the
Redeemer could insinuate themselves into the faith and life of Christians through such
imagined or alleged influences of Christ.”68 Schleiermacher notes that these same people
argue that every Christian must be fully satisfied with scripture alone.
At this point in the sermon, he accepts the challenge to prove that the availability
of these effects is reasonable and that they are unconnected to words. He begins with a
reference to the Eucharist. He asks:
65
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[D]oes not this narrative [Luke 24:30-32] remind us particularly of the Holy
Supper that was connected with just such a meal? And does not the special effect
that many believers (not to say all of them) credit to this sacrament have a strong
resemblance to the experience of the disciples? Is it not a true recognition after
the eyes had long been held shut? A lively representation that all at once renews
a host of earlier moments when our hearts burned within us? . . . [W]hat else can
we say than that these are continuations and consequences of the immediate,
personal influence of Christ?69
His second illustration comes from the days of the resurrection when the Lord
approached his disciples several times and called out to them: “Peace be with you” (John
20:19; 21:26). He said, “My peace I give to you” (John 14:27). After citing these
passages, Schleiermacher concludes that the peace that came over the disciples was the
immediate effect of the Lord himself. Then he asks, “[M]ust this effect be tied to his
bodily, personal presence? Or should we not all be capable of having this experience in
special moments? . . . All devout Christians have surely had such experiences!”70 Here is
his conclusion of the matter:
[B]eside the immediate effects of the Word there are also distinctive effects of the
Redeemer that issue, so to say, from his whole and undivided being. And this is
not dependent on his bodily appearance for its efficacy. The original spiritual
efficacy of his existence is, of course, mediated only through the Word; but it is
maintained in its characteristic nature within the communion of the faithful.
Thus the original impression constantly takes shape anew in individual hearts,
and on particular occasions it becomes efficacious in them in a wonderful way.71
The final illustration in his apologetic comes from the domain of ordinary, human
life. He argues that people often feel the effects of distant loved ones, even without the

69

Ibid., 106-107.

70

Ibid., 107.

71

Ibid., 108.

!129

written word and even of those who are no longer alive. Regarding these, he asserts:
“They warn, encourage, correct, and illumine us, so that we are compelled to say, ‘This
comes to me because of my union with this friend; this is his word and work in my inner
self.’”72 Moreover, he adds, people encounter the same thing in connection with those
whom they know only through their influence in the world, people who are set up as
heroes and examples. Then, Schleiermacher drives home his point:
If we count among the marks of human greatness the fact that the total being of
one individual can affect the inner lives of many others decisively and to an
extraordinary degree, how can we fail to include the same mark in the greatness
of One who is exalted above all others? How can we fail to expect similar effects
from him, who should be the hero and model for us all, the One whom we may
all most rightly call the friend of our soul in a sense and measure we accord to no
other?73
Why was it so important for one who acknowledged the authority and value of
scripture and who often wrote of “the glorious treasure we have in God’s Word”74 to feel
the need to defend the continued availability of the personal and immediate effects of the
Redeemer? The answer is that he believed faith springs from the effects of the Redeemer,
rather than from scripture.75
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For Schleiermacher, true and vital Christianity is based on the experience of
redemption in Christ. He asks: “If this [proving the cause of evangelical Christianity
from scripture] were all, would we be certain that we had and held true and vital
Christianity among us?”76 At this point one might ask: How would Schleiermacher
define “true and vital Christianity”? As if to anticipate the question, he continues:
[D]oes not each of us admit that there are many people who share this good fight
with us; many who, like us, strive against all works-righteousness and all power
of human authority, and do so from the scripture, but of whom we cannot say that
the love of Christ constrains them (2 Cor. 5:14).77
He imagines people who “when they behold from a distance the commandments Christ
gave to his own, the ordinances he established in the early church, the exemplary nature
of his life, and the characteristic features of the way he acted as a person” feel that
something special is there, “so that their heart likewise burns within them.” But, he adds,
their eyes remain closed, and “they do not come to that joyous, immediate recognition
that this is the Lord.”78 Is it important that people come to such a recognition? Here is
his answer:
True and vital Christianity rests on this recognition alone; we must admit that
Christianity cannot be preserved or spread among us unless the effects that come
from the living memory and spiritual presence of Christ and are based upon the
whole of his nature and manifestation are added to what is, in the narrowest and
most particular sense, the effect of Word and doctrine.79
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Schleiermacher claims that he does not mean to argue that if one takes Christ’s
teachings from scripture but separates them from his personal influence, scripture must
necessarily degenerate into “a dead letter.”80 But, he recognizes that this has indeed
happened. From personal experience, he asserts that “in our own church we have been—
perhaps still are—content with the mere letter of orthodox doctrine, without giving
effective evidence of a true Christian disposition.”81 Then, he adds: “But we do not
usually find this problem in those who are susceptible to the personal influences of
Christ.”82
Not only in this sermon, but elsewhere, Schleiermacher expresses his firm
conviction that scripture is unable to produce piety. In On Religion, he excoriates those
“who get their so-called religion from an external source or who depend on some dead
writing, swearing on it and using it for proof texts.”83 In one of his more famous
quotations, he both praises scripture while also noting its inability to equal the influence
of the original spirit that inspired it:
Every sacred scripture is in itself a glorious production, a monument in speech
from the heroic ages of religion. Servile devotion, however, makes a mausoleum
out of it—a monument to a great spirit formerly present but there no longer. If
that spirit still has its vital effect, surely it is rather by inspiring a sense of fond
objectivity toward that written work from earlier times, for that work can never
be more than a weak impress of the spirit that initially produced it.84
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Why did Schleiermacher feel that scripture is so limited? A partial answer is that
he thought “[t]oo much of the pure impression contained in the original experience is lost
in books.”85 He utilizes an interesting metaphor to explain this concept:
We know how dark material absorbs most of the light rays striking it. Written
signs are like that. Everything having to do with the pious stirring of the spirit is
swallowed up by them. Because the medium is insufficient to embrace the
experience, the expected reflection does not occur.86
One of the problems with written communications of piety, Schleiermacher avers, is that
“everything has to be repeated two and three times removed from the original
experience.”87 This means that, essentially, the initial “reflection” is refracted too many
times, leading Schleiermacher to ask: “Must religion inevitably lose its abundant life in
the dead letter, then?” Naturally, his answer is, “Not at all,” since his conviction is that
true religion is produced, not by words on a page, but by the immediate and personal
effects of the Redeemer.88
He further explains why he believes it is necessary “that scripture be
complemented by something from the inside” in his sermon, “The Effects of Scripture
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and the Immediate Effects of the Redeemer.” He asks his hearers to consider how many
difficulties one finds in interpreting the Word of scripture:
It comes from a remote time, deals with strange customs, and was written in a
language only slightly related to our own. What risky scope for human caprice
opens up there! How many sad examples do we see in which caprice actually
has been exerted on scripture to make dead and dull what reflects the true essence
of Christianity most brightly, or to read into scripture something not in accord
with the original spirit of Christian faith. But every attempt, however wellintentioned, to restrain this caprice by external means has proved to be in vain!89
His presumption is that only the personal, immediate, and continuing effects of the
Redeemer on individual souls is able to counteract the possibility of such human caprice.
Again, Schleiermacher is convinced that faith begins when “a light is sparked
immediately in the human soul by the Son of God.”90 Moreover, he believes that
regardless of when or how this illumination happens, if it happens, one may easily
dispense with God’s Word.91 Why so? To reiterate, he believes that “this is how Christ
glorifies and reveals himself immediately in the soul with greater clarity and certainty.”92
Kelsey summarizes well Schleiermacher’s firm conviction:
Scripture cannot be the foundation for Christian faith; faith in Christ must exist
before someone gives Scripture special authority ([Christian Faith], §128). The
experience of redemption is the ground of our faith. . . . That experience of
redemption is the same for us as it was for Christ’s first followers. They received
the experience through personal encounter, seeing in the words and the actions of
Jesus what the fulfillment of human life is like. . . . Faith passes from person to
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person and generation to generation, because God-consciousness is articulated
and otherwise made visible in the lives of faithful people.93
Just here, I want to say a brief word concerning Schleiermacher’s christology. As
Kelsey observed, for Schleiermacher, the experience of redemption for all Christians
since Jesus’ day must be the same as it was for his first disciples. What was the
experience of the first Christians? As I have demonstrated, they experienced the strength
and drawing power of Jesus’ personality. They saw something in him that was so
compelling and attractive. That something, that critical aspect of his personality,
according to Schleiermacher, was Christ’s perfect God-consciousness. Thus, Jesus
expressed his experience of God to others, and the impression of this experience was
redemptive. As Vial summarizes: “What was redemptive for the disciples who were faceto-face with Jesus was his personality and the power of his God-consciousness.”94
So, since Christ is gone, how can people since then experience redemption in the
same way as the first disciples? No, according to Schleiermacher’s christology, Christ is
not gone; he is present in the community that he founded. Vial writes:
The Christian community, formed by Jesus . . . continues to embody his ways of
speaking, gesturing, experiencing. The Christian community carries in it the
picture (Bild) of Jesus. And so, when latter day people enter into that community
they are confronted, in just the way the disciples were, by the redemptive
personality of Jesus.95
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In short, Schleiermacher’s christology allows him to think about the ongoing presence of
Jesus and the redeeming effects of that presence.
Schleiermacher closes his sermon on “The Effects of Scripture and the Immediate
Effects of the Redeemer” with a plea for unity. First, he asserts his belief that it is
optimal for both effects to be present in the church:
We should thank God, then, if both effects are always together in the Christian
church and are always reacting upon each other. The immediate testimony of the
Lord’s efficacy in the soul must continually animate the effects of the Word; the
holy authority of the Word must provide a firm rule for all that happens in the
hearts of Christians, so that all may be held together in the unity of faith and each
may submit to the consensus of the community. So may we all remain in the
truth that makes us free.96
Then he poses one final provocative question: “[H]ow should each individual
relate to these two effects that our spiritual life rests upon?” Surely he is being strategic
when he first answers the question by referring to scripture: “The body is one and has
many members” (1 Cor. 12:12). In other words, he believes that both the person who is
scripture-centered and the one who focuses upon the immediate effects of Christ are
needed. He urges: “In the Christian church, both effects must be united: the clear,
intelligible, and easily communicable efficacy of the Word, and the more mysterious but
immediate truth of the Redeemer that stirs the depths of the soul.”97
Even as he pleads for unity and for Christians to value those among them who
“cling to God’s Word,” he simultaneously removes any doubt as to which effects he
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prefers. Is it those that come from scripture or those that come from the Redeemer
himself? He affirms that he considers the immediate effects of the Redeemer to have
greater value. He acknowledges that perhaps those who are more scripture-oriented in
their outlook are too suspicious of immediate inner experiences of the heart. His hope is
that they will continue to “nourish themselves with the Word, so that the Word of
scripture that bears witness to Christ may become clear in their innermost being.”98 As
for those who have never experienced the personal effects of Christ, he asks: “How could
we despise them for lacking something that others have attained, when they are striving
for the same goal as the others? How could they not be valuable to us as the most
zealous guardians of the great and common treasure we all possess in the written Word of
the Lord?”99 Schleiermacher is content to conclude that “the blessing that can arise only
through this inner working of the Redeemer in the soul is dispersed on these fellow
Christians as well, at least indirectly, by means of the many contacts they have in
Christian fellowship.”100
Finally, he appeals to the practice of Christian love in the church. He instructs
that love requires that both groups—those who experience more abundantly the blessing
of the Word and those who experience the immediate spiritual presence of the Lord—
remain open to the special gift of the other.101
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To recapitulate, Schleiermacher most certainly accepts the authority of scripture,
one, because it is the first expression of Christian faith, and two, because it is in some
sense the “word of God,” a message regarding redemption in Christ. Although his
understanding of the authority of scripture may not be robust enough for some, since he
denies that it is the foundation of faith, he certainly held God’s word in high regard. For
him, however, the ground of faith is the experience of redemption in Christ.
But if scripture is not the foundation of Christian faith, what is its role in the
church? In what sense is it authoritative in Schleiermacher’s theology? He believed it is
normative, but what is the nature and extent of its normative character, according to him?
Why did he accept the authority of the New Testament, but not of the Old? These are
some of the questions which I hope to answer in the next chapter.
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Chapter Six: Schleiermacher and the Normative Character of Scripture
Thusfar in my explication of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority I
have demonstrated that although he held doctrines of both inspiration and revelation, he
did not hold the supernaturalist/content-based view that scripture is a deposit of divinelyrevealed truths. Nevertheless, I have also shown that he most certainly believed in the
authority of scripture on the basis that it is a record of the experience of God in the lives
of believers. Indeed, Schleiermacher understood scripture to possess normative authority,
as I introduced in the previous chapter.
In this chapter, I want to unpack his understanding of the normative character of
scripture. In order to accomplish this objective, I will attend to three lines of inquiry.
First, what is Schleiermacher’s conception of “canon”? I believe it is necessary and
helpful to lay out his understanding of “canon” as the essence or primary subject matter
of Christianity and the relation of this essence to the biblical text. This explanation will
lay the foundation for understanding why he ascribed normative authority to some parts
of Christian scripture over other parts. Second, to which parts of scripture does
Schleiermacher ascribe normative authority? Since he did not grant it to all of scripture, I
want to identify what qualified, for him, as an authoritative, biblical norm for Christian
faith. This will require an examination of his controversial opinion that the Old
Testament should not have canonical standing in the Christian Bible as well as an
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identification of the subject matter in the New Testament, which, I believe, became his
“canon within the canon.” Third, what kind of authority does scripture exert? I want to
explain how scripture functions as a norm for the church and in what sense it is
authoritative in Schleiermacher’s theology. I will begin with an examination of his
notion of “canon.”

Schleiermacher’s Understanding of “Canon”
An appropriate starting point from which to unpack Schleiermacher’s concept of
“canon” is his discussion of philosophical theology in Brief Outline of Theology as a
Field of Study.1 There, he identifies “canon” as an idea, identified by philosophical
theology, which ensures the unity of a religious tradition over time. He acknowledges
that the Christian church, like every historical phenomenon, is necessarily subject to
change. What will ensure that the unity of any religious tradition, including Christianity,
will remain intact in a changing world? What will safeguard its authenticity and integrity
in the face of certain change? For Schleiermacher, it is the identification of the idea that
accounts for the essence of Christianity.2 Helmer summarizes this perspective when she
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writes that “canon,” for Schleiermacher, is a “philosophical-theological concept derived
from a theory of religion in order to account for the transhistorical essence of a religion.”3
That Schleiermacher begins his discussion of “canon” in this way must be
significant. After all, one might have expected him to begin his discourse with reference
to the biblical text itself. Eventually, he will address the notion of “canon” as it relates to
the biblical text, but first he identifies philosophical theology’s determination of “canon”
as concept. What is the significance of this?
At the very least, this shows that Schleiermacher differentiates between the
subject matter and the text in which it is fixed. Helmer confirms this following her study
of this section of Brief Outline:
It must be stressed from the onset that Schleiermacher does not identify the
canon with the Bible. The Christian Bible is understood in pragmatic-ecclesial
terms as the literary text composed of both Old and New Testaments and used by
the church since its early history [Brief Outline, §115]. The canon, however, is
an idea concerned with the unity of the Christian tradition as the identity of an
experience that is expressed in a variety of ways and subsequently fixed in
literature.4
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But why the differentiation?5 Schleiermacher is once again demonstrating that which
occupies his focus: the experience of redemption. Were we to ask him what he considers
the main idea that accounts for Christianity and distinguishes it from all other historical
religions, undoubtedly, this would be his answer. The experiential identity of the
Christian tradition is related to the historical appearance of Jesus of Nazareth.6 It is that
appearance in history and the experience of redemption that followed as a consequence,
which “ensures the unity of Christianity.” He plainly asserts this conviction in Christian
Faith: “Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion,
and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is
related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.”7 Furthermore,
Schleiermacher is making a statement about the value of this singular idea, even when
compared to and over against the biblical text. He seems always to prefer the experience
of Christ over the record of it.8
5
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After his discussion in Brief Outline of “canon” as the idea which explains the
essence of an historical religion, he turns to the sub-discipline of exegetical theology and
the task of determining the canon in its relation to a text.9 (Of course, the text he has in
mind is the New Testament. He writes that it is the canon of the Christian church because
it is the collection of writings “which contain the normative presentation of
Christianity.”10) Regarding the content of the literary canon, Schleiermacher notes:
Within the New Testament canon belong essentially both those normative
documents which concern the action and effect of Christ both on and with his
disciples and also those which concern the common actions and effect of his
disciples toward the establishing of Christianity.11
Here, he indicates that he agrees with the early church’s canonical distinction between the
New Testament Gospels (evangellion) and the apostolic epistles (apostolos). Also, what
he makes plain here is his belief that the writings of the New Testament are a record of
the experience of Christ, fixed in literary form. For him, the text chronicles the
experience of redemption through the Redeemer and the subsequent creation of the
church.
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In addition, Schleiermacher suggests that there must necessarily be a lack of
certainty regarding the books that are accepted as canonical.12 He recognizes that the
canon has obtained its present form through the decision of the church, and that,
therefore, the decision as to what belongs in the canon is not immutable or sacrosanct.
Consequently, he asserts that the church is justified in starting fresh investigations into
it.13 For instance, he asserts that an uncanonical book may contain canonical passages,
just as most of what has been interpolated by a later hand within a canonical book will be
uncanonical.14
One of the reasons he believes that what belongs in the canon is and will always
be an open question is his conviction that “the sense for what is truly apostolic is, as
history teaches us, a gift of the Spirit that gradually ascends within the church.”15 For, he
writes, “much can have slipped into the sacred books through people’s oversight or
blunders, things which, in turn, can be recognized and definitely proved to be
uncanonical only at a later time.”16 Thus, it would be a mistake, he claims, to try to

12

See Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §130.4. Schleiermacher held that what belongs in the canon is and
will always be an open question. First, he insists that since its determination was made after the age of the
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prevent further unrestricted research into the matter, even though several of the
confessional standards represent the canon as closed. It can only contribute to the wellbeing of the church if what does not truly belong to Holy Scripture is distinguished
clearly from it.17
At the same time, Schleiermacher attributed the determination of the canon to the
Holy Spirit.18 This may appear surprising in the face of his repeated rejection of a
supernaturalistic understanding of the biblical text. And yet, he refers to the Holy Spirit
as the unifying principle behind the canon as a collection. He writes: “[S]cripture—both
each individual book in and of itself as well as the collection, a treasure laid up for all
subsequent generations of the church—is always the work of the Holy Spirit as the
common spirit of the church.”19
He claims that this common spirit is that which enlivens the New Testament
authors and all subsequent believers in the church’s history and that, therefore, the canon
17

He seems to hint at what he believes should go into the canon when he writes that placing scripture under
careful scrutiny does not hurt the church. Such an investigation, he writes, will ensure that “nothing
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normative authority, is the contribution that scripture makes to the preservation and well-being of the
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must be attributed to a power that continues to render Christ to every generation of
believers. His position is that the relation of the canon as idea (subject matter) to canon
as text is just this: the New Testament canon communicates an experience that remains
the same through the centuries.20
While Schleiermacher is convinced of the Holy Spirit’s involvement in the
collection of the canon, he simultaneously understands that the church had a role in
deciding those writings which merited canonical standing and those which did not. He is
well aware that the process of canon collection must be understood as a thoroughly
human and historical one. While he admits that “no tidy apostolic limit regarding what is
canonical and normative can have been transmitted to us,”21 he accepts the role of the
church in establishing what is canonical and normative. For example, he asserts that the
church in some regions might consider some biblical books to be disposable, in
comparison with other books that were acceptable among isolated congregations and that
were effective for them alone. The collection of the books came into being only
gradually and persisted in the careful adjusting of the various degrees of normative worth
that people would assign to particular components of scripture. So, it is true that in
Schleiermacher’s estimation, the church decided which books had canonical standing and
which parts of scripture possessed normative value.
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Schleiermacher’s “Canon within the Canon”
Now that some groundwork has been laid concerning Schleiermacher’s concept of
“canon,” I believe we are in a better position to explain his understanding of what, for
him, has normative authority in the Christian church. Many Christians grant normative
authority to all sixty-six books of the Protestant Christian Bible, some adding the
Apocrypha.22 Schleiermacher does not. He not only clearly asserts that not all scripture
has the same normative worth,23 he also demonstrates a greater reliance on some parts of
the Christian Bible than on other parts. That is, he has a “canon within the canon.” To
which parts of scripture does he attribute normative authority in the Christian church?

Normative Authority: The New Testament, Not the Old
First, Schleiermacher asserts that the New Testament is authoritative. This is his
claim in Christian Faith, §129: “On the one hand, the holy scriptures of the New
Testament are the first member in the whole series of Christian faith, continued ever
since. On the other hand, they comprise the norm for all succeeding presentations.”24
Hence, Schleiermacher argues that the Old Testament does not share the normative status
22

For representative sources that advocate this position, see Hermeneutics, Authority, and Canon, ed. D. A.
Carson and John D. Woodbridge, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1995); Wayne Grudem,
Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
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of the New. He does so on the grounds that the Old Testament expresses Jewish, not
Christian, religion.25 He understands Christianity not as a development of Judaism, but
as a genuinely new faith.26 The Old Testament, therefore, cannot provide the scriptural
basis for peculiarly Christian doctrines, though it could be a help to understanding them.
Moreover, he thinks that treating Jewish scripture as an authoritative source for Christian
doctrines necessarily required dishonesty on the part of the interpreter, who would try to
read Christian themes into pre-Christian texts and thus obscure their genuine historical
and linguistic sense.27
In a postscript to the doctrine of scripture in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher sets
out his view against the canonical standing of the Old Testament. After acknowledging
that the Old Testament writings owe their place in our Bible in part to New Testament
references to them and in part to the historical connection between Jewish and Christian
worship, he makes the controversial claim that the Old Testament writings on that
account do not share the normative worth or the inspiration of the New. Although he was

25

For a discussion of Schleiermacher’s view of the Old Testament, see Paul E. Capetz, “Friedrich
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well aware that this view was not yet generally recognized by church theologians, he felt
sure that it was destined in some future time to be widely shared.
His argument against the authority of the Old Testament in Christian Faith rests
on three grounds. First, he asserts that the inspiration of the Old Testament texts, with the
possible exception of messianic prophecies,28 was not the activity of the same Spirit of
Christ at work in the church. He bases his case on a reading of Paul’s treatment of the
Law in Galatians and Romans. If we suppose, he argues, that Paul is right to claim that
the Law lacks the power of the Spirit from which the Christian life must spring,29 then it
cannot be claimed that the Law is inspired by the same Spirit. Rather, it reflects the
common spirit of the people of Israel who wrote it, and, thus, not the Christian common
spirit. Also, he notes that Paul writes that God sends the Spirit into our hearts by virtue of
our joining with Christ. Moreover, he notes that Christ himself never represents the
sending of the Spirit “as the return of something that was already present before and then
afterward disappeared for a time.”30
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Schleiermacher “was convinced that the Christian effort to prove Jesus’ messianic status on the basis of
Old Testament prophecy was a mistake and that the New Testament’s appeal to it was strictly an intraJewish affair of the first century” (Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Old Testament,” 300). He
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Second, the Old Testament cannot, strictly speaking, serve as a productive or
language-forming norm for Christian piety. That is, the Old Testament cannot function as
a constitutive norm, one which constitutes or forms the language and thought of Christian
faith. According to Schleiermacher, ideas are present there that Christians cannot
appropriate as pure expressions of their piety, even in the noblest Psalms. Consequently,
only after deluding oneself through unconscious additions and subtractions could one
construct a Christian doctrine of God from the Prophets and the Psalms, he claims.
Third, in addition to not being a constitutive norm for Christian faith, the Old
Testament is ill-suited to function as a critical norm. In other words, the Old Testament
is in no position to evaluate or measure religious thinking that intends to be Christian.
Schleiermacher grants that there are few Christian doctrines that people throughout the
history of the church have not attempted to prove from the Old Testament. But, he asks,
why should we use the less clear premonitions of the prophets alongside the clear
proclamations of Christ himself or his disciples? He suggests that the history of Christian
theology shows plainly enough how much these efforts to find Christian faith in the Old
Testament has actually hindered honest exegesis and raised a myriad of complex
problems that Christian theology had no need to address. The best course of action, then,
would be to give up Old Testament proofs for specifically Christian doctrines, and to
wholly set aside whatever chiefly relies on such proofs for support.31
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Why, then, is the Old Testament in the Christian canon at all? Schleiermacher
cites two historical reasons for its inclusion. First, the preaching of Christ himself and of
the apostles was based on portions of the Old Testament read aloud, and this practice
continued in the early Christian community before the formation of the New Testament
canon. He argues, however, that it does not follow from this fact, that the same
homiletical use of the Old Testament should persist or “that we have to consider it a
corruption of the church if our own generation of Christians is not just as conversant with
the Old Testament as with the New Testament.”32 On the contrary, precisely because the
relationship between the Old Testament and the New is historical, it is natural to expect
that “the gradual, every broadening subsidence of the Old Testament lies in the nature of
the matter.” Because the connection between the apostolic proclamation and the Old
Testament writings is an historical one, it could be expected that gradually the need for
references to the Old Testament would diminish, and accordingly it would retreat behind
the New Testament in the church’s usage. Least of all, Schleiermacher asserts, is this
connection able to guarantee the normative worth and inspiration of the Old Testament
books.33
Another reason he claims that the Old Testament is in the Christian Bible is that
Christ himself and the apostles refer to the Old Testament books as divine authorities
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favorable to Christianity. Again, however, he suggests that it does not follow “that we
still have need of these preliminary intimations [of Christian piety], since we have the
experience [of that piety in the New Testament].” Again, he demonstrates his preference
for the experience of Christian faith when he writes: “one ceases to have faith on account
of such testimonies if one has gained immediate certitude based on one’s own perception
(Anschauung).”34
Although Schleiermacher did not recommend the removal of the Old Testament
from the Christian Bible, he thought it would perhaps be better to include it as an
appendix after the New. Then, he opines, it would be clear that it is in no way necessary
first to work through all of the Old Testament “in order to get onto the right path to the
New Testament.”35 So, in the first place, Schleiermacher attributes normative authority to
the New Testament, and not to the Old.

Normative Authority: Reports of the Words and Deeds of Christ
Second, he attributes greater normative worth to the sections of the New
Testament that report the words and deeds of Christ. This is not surprising after an
examination of his concept of “canon” earlier in this chapter. His strong conviction is
that one is able to establish what is normative in the New Testament by comparing it to

34
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the essence of Christianity identified by philosophical theology. That essence, that core
of Christian faith, is his standard for what is normative.36 Again, the essence of
Christianity for Schleiermacher, is what God did in Christ the Redeemer as reported in
the four Gospels.37
I noted earlier in this chapter that Schleiermacher agrees with the early church’s
canonical distinction between the New Testament Gospels and the apostolic epistles. In
Brief Outline, he ascribes normative authority to both the Gospels and the epistles when
he asserts that there is no inherent reason for stipulating any difference in canonical
standing between these two constituent parts of the New Testament canon. Yet, he can
imagine the possibility of doing so “if one were able to deny normative standing to the
action and effect of the disciples when left to themselves.”38 What the disciples do/effect/
write when left to themselves may or may not be normative, Schleiermacher asserts. If
we ask what he means by the phrase, “when left to themselves,” we might well assume
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See the discussion on pp. 134-36 in this chapter and Kelsey, Thinking about Christ with Schleiermacher,
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from the immediate context that he is referring to what the disciples might do/effect/write
after Jesus was no longer in their midst.
In fact, when Schleiermacher considers which canonical writings have authority,
he places great value on proximity to Jesus. He admits that the concept of normative
standing cannot be reduced to fixed, immutable formulas. However, he asserts that
[i]f we figure that the normative character of particular propositions includes
perfect purity, on the one hand, and the fullness of inferences and applications
that may develop from them, on the other, we have no reason to suppose that the
first attribute will exist, absolutely, anywhere but in Christ alone.39
What he seems to suggest here is that the purest expressions of what is normative in the
canon are related to Christ. Here, “pure” means the most immediate expressions at a site
historically proximate to Christ with as little intervening material as possible.40 “Pure”
does not mean canonical in the sense of the text’s dignity. Rather, it refers to the text’s
transparency to the experience behind it that motivates the text’s production.41
Clearly, he regards “the holy scriptures of the New Testament” as normative,42 but
he would not claim that this is true of everything written in the New Testament, even
though he identifies these writings as canonical. For although he can assert that the
canonical writings bear “a normative value for all times,” he writes that “we do not
ascribe this [normative] value to every aspect of our holy scriptures equally but only to
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the degree that the authors are found to be in the situation just described.”43 To what
situation does he refer? The context indicates that he is referring to authors of the
apostolic age, authors who enjoyed spatiotemporal proximity to Christ and his teachings.
That is, Schleiermacher is making the claim that the canonical writings of those who
lived in the apostolic age, who had firsthand exposure to Christ and his teachings, are
ascribed greater normative value than other New Testament writings.
After plainly suggesting that the normative value (normale Würde) granted to the
canon44 does not extend to every word of the New Testament, he seems to require another
criterion of literature that merits the normative stamp. He writes: “[O]ccasional
utterances (gelegentliche Äusserungen) and purely incidental thoughts (bloße
Nebengedanken) do not accrue the same degree of normative value as what belongs to the
main subject in each instance.”45 Here, Schleiermacher seems to open the door to an
interpretation of this text which allows greater normative worth to “the main subject” of
the New Testament scriptures.46
Schleiermacher’s instructions to those entrusted with the ministry of the word of
God confirms this theory of his standard of normativity. He advises them to focus on the
43
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gospel of Jesus in their teaching and preaching. Regarding the content of their ministry,
he writes: “Everything must be referred to the conception of Christ that comes from
scripture.”47 Apparently, Christ’s words have the utmost normative worth for
Schleiermacher:
The scripture that presents the Lord to us in his life and works on earth, that
preserves for us the precious words of his mouth—the scripture of the New
Testament—is greater and far more important for us than the Old Testament.
These apostolic scriptures are for us the firm prophetic word on which we depend
and the foundation of our faith.48

Normative Authority: Writings Related to the Concept of Love
I have demonstrated that the New Testament and the words and deeds of Christ
that are recorded there function as norms for Schleiermacher. Finally, I want to show that
he attributes greater normative authority to other parts of the New Testament, specifically,
writings that are related to the concept of “love,” both divine and human. The New
Testament writings that discuss the subjects of Christian love for each other and the
world, the love that God has for the world, and the love that Christians have for God, for
example, seem to carry added normative weight, for Schleiermacher.
His focus on love may be found throughout On Religion, Schleiermacher’s
Soliloquies, and many of his sermons. I have discovered in my study of these sources that
for him, “love” is a central topic. Others, too, have noticed that it is one of his key
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emphases. For example, besides the fact that Steven Jungkeit puts forward the interesting
and controversial theory that Schleiermacher’s theological contribution is more
pneumatocentric than christocentric, Jungkeit highlights Schleiermacher’s focus on love
in his writings. He draws the following conclusion from his study of Christian Faith:
When read carefully, Schleiermacher’s doctrine of the Spirit runs throughout the
final third of The Christian Faith, such that pneumatology and ecclesiology
dominate the book. This suggests that Schleiermacher’s theological contribution
is far more pneumatocentric than christocentric or anthropocentric. As we recall,
the Spirit for Schleiermacher binds human beings into a common project, a
network of love. . . . Being bound in such a fashion gives rise to a universal love
of humanity.49
Near the end of his On Religion: Addresses in Response to Its Cultured Critics,
Schleiermacher sums up the essence of Christianity and Christian feeling. Among the
attributes that he claims are dominant in Christians and were dominant in its founder is
love.50 Elaborating in the supplementary notes added in 1821, he plainly asserts:
“Love is the mark of the Christian.”51 His emphasis on love, of course, is unsurprising
since he believes that love is one of the principal, divine attributes:
Within the divine government of the world the divine causality presents itself as
love and as wisdom. . . . Love is the orientation of wanting to unite with others
and wanting to be in the other. Hence, if the pivotal point of the divine
government of the world is redemption and the establishment of God’s reign,
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whereby union of divine being with human nature is what is occurring, the
underlying disposition in that process can be represented only as love.52
Certainly, one of the types of love he believes is core to Christianity is love for, or
openness to, God. In fact, he submits that “the aim of all religion is to love the World
Spirit.”53 Earlier in On Religion, Schleiermacher asserts the need of men and women for
a deity-sent mediator, one who “can show to their flittery anxious self-love another love
—a love by which man loves the highest and eternal in the very midst of earthly life.”54
One of the callings of such a mediator, he writes, “is to awaken the slumbering seed of a
better humanity, to kindle love for higher things.”55
Another type of love which he believes is central to the Christian faith is love for
people. He alludes to this in a reference to the Old Testament story of Adam and Eve:
The story of us all is related in this sacred saga. One gets nowhere by trying to
stand alone. To receive the life of the World Spirit within oneself and thus to
have religion, a man must first have discovered humanity, and this he can do only
in love and through love.56
Indeed, he asserts that it is the longing for love that brings one inevitably to religion.57
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A brief perusal of Schleiermacher’s Soliloquies also demonstrates the importance
of love in his theology. Tice provides somewhat of an introduction to Soliloquies in his
Introduction to On Religion. There, he suggests that the Soliloquies present the case that
sense (or, sensitivity) and love are the cardinal conditions of moral perfection.58 Sense is
receptive, the quality which at its deepest Schleiermacher describes in On Religion as
“sense and taste for the infinite.”59 Love is predominantly active and out-going, the basis
of true association, and must balance sensitivity.
In Soliloquies, Schleiermacher writes that without love, self-formation is
problematic: “Love, thou force of gravitation in the spiritual world, no individual life and
no development is possible without thee!”60 He describes love as “sacred,” and for
Christians, “the alpha and the omega.”61 Upon self-reflection, he writes of the place he
has cleared in his own soul for genuine love and friendship:
Wherever I notice an aptitude for individuality, inasmuch as love and
sensitiveness, its highest guarantees, are present, there I also find an object for
my love. I would have my love embrace every unique self, from the
unsophisticated youth, in whom freedom is but beginning to germinate, to the
ripest and most finished type of man. Whenever I see such a one, I give him the
salutation of the love within me, even if our brief meeting and parting permit no
more than this gesture of spiritual greeting.62
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Schleiermacher writes that whether he to whom he would be a friend is already receptive
to the infinite or not, or whether he is or is not far advanced in his development, or
whether he has many achievements to his credit or not, none of these things determine his
attitude toward him. “I love him in the measure that I find,” he writes. For
Schleiermacher, then, love focuses on one’s relationship with other people. It is one’s
embrace of all people.
Finally, Schleiermacher makes it plain in several of his sermons that love is a
central tenet in Christianity, and that he attaches normative value to scripture that
suggests as much. For example, in his 1830 sermon entitled “Evangelical Faith and the
Law,” a sermon based on Galatians 2:16-18, Schleiermacher’s focus of the message is
that Christians are not justified before God by law-keeping. In the conclusion of this
sermon that warns against the making of laws which Christians are expected to obey, he
adds this: “Christ established only one commandment: that we should love one another
with the love with which he loved us (John 13:34).”63 Then, he asks: How can followers
of Christ obey this one commandment? He answers: “When the love for him in whom
we see the Father constrains and impels us (2 Cor. 5:14), we will also be effective in that
love,” adding that faith reveals itself in love.64 From another most touching message, an
1829 eulogy entitled “Sermon at Nathanael’s Grave,” Schleiermacher concludes with this
benediction:
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Now, thou God who art love, let me not only resign myself to thy omnipotence,
not only submit to thy impenetrable wisdom, but also know thy fatherly love!
Make even this grievous trial a new blessing for me in my vocation! For me and
all of mine let this communal pain become wherever possible a new bond of still
more intimate love, and let it issue in a new apprehension of thy Spirit in all my
household! Grant that even this grave hour may become a blessing for all who
are gathered here. Let us all more and more mature to that wisdom which,
looking beyond the void, sees and loves only the eternal in all things earthly and
perishable, and in all thy decrees finds thy peace as well, and eternal life, to
which through faith we are delivered out of death. Amen.65
Permit me to offer one last example of the emphasis that Schleiermacher places
upon the subject of “love” in his writings, as well as the New Testament texts that address
this subject. As the following example demonstrates, he considered this subject to be one
of the Redeemer’s central teachings.66 In 1833, Schleiermacher preached a sermon
entitled, “Our Community: Founded and Preserved through the Redeemer’s Love.” The
sermon is based upon the text of John 13:34: “A new commandment I give to you, that
you love one another; even as I have loved you, that you also love one another.” He
begins this message by explaining how it happened that he selected this particular biblical
text from which to preach. He explains that he wanted to preach on the virtues of the
community, the church that Christ founded. Once he had settled on this subject, and
65
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asked himself how he could join “such an exalted concept to a single text of scripture, as
is the customary practice in our public sermons,”67 he searched until “these words of the
Lord came to my heart, and it seemed that this one text sums up the whole mystery of the
Christian church.”68 Here are some of the many statements regarding the significance of
Christian love from this sermon:
“In the words of our text, he [the Redeemer] says: “A new commandment I give
to you,” and adds that they should love one another. We are all well aware that
he had often impressed this point on them before. . . . So what could he have
meant by this expression, other than to sum up the essence of Christian
community?”69
Since the Redeemer had in mind here . . . this new spiritual Kingdom of God that
was to be established through him, he must have compared it almost instinctively
to the earlier covenant between God and his people. . . . [T]he Old Covenant
rested upon a law and was made up of a mass of individual commandments,
whereas the Redeemer’s Kingdom was to rest only upon this one commandment
to love.70
“We may be taken by surprise at first when we hear the Redeemer’s command
that we should love one another with the love with which he loved us. . . . Yet it
is certain that we can only be members of this Kingdom in this way, and that his
Kingdom consists in this love alone. . . . [D]ear friends in Christ, it is certain that
a spiritual community cannot exist without love.”71
And so he [the Redeemer] tells them [referring to John 6:67-68]: Now that I am
going away, now that I will be with you a little while only, if your community is
to endure, you must love one another with the love with which I have loved you. .
67
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. . This is the love that was the bond between the Redeemer and his own, and it is
also the love that maintains the community he founded.72
“He [the Redeemer] had come to seek what was lost—yes, actually to seek it, not
waiting to see whether people would first turn to him. . . . It is this seeking love
that is essential if we are to be united as Christians by our love for one
another.”73
He [the Redeemer] gives us another description of his love, and only when our
love for one another has this other element does Christian community arise from
his love. He says that the Son of Man did not come into the world to rule, but to
serve (Matt. 20:28). . . . What does it mean to serve? In this context, the word
cannot be taken to mean anything else but to note the need of an individual to
whom we are directed, and to satisfy this need, once noticed, with every effort in
our power. . . . We find so many beautiful examples in the Gospels of how the
Redeemer turned to individuals to serve them in their spiritual life. . . . [T]his
serving love of the Redeemer has not ceased and will never cease. . . . Without
this serving love . . . the community of believers could not exist either, and even
less could it become what it should be.74
But we must not forget one more thing that is an essential component of the
Redeemer’s love. He says to his disciples: I have placed you here and chosen you
so that you will bring forth much fruit, and so your fruit will abide (John 15:16). .
. . The Redeemer’s love could—indeed had to—turn affectionately to individuals.
. . . His eyes were directed to something further; his vision—and it was always
the vision of love—took in the whole human race. . . . The individual vanishes
and must vanish, when the Lord’s gaze is directed to the totality of the human
race.75
What I have tried to show in this long discussion of “love” is that this subject is a
central focus in Schleiermacher’s writings and sermons. Not only is the subject itself
somewhat of a theological nucleus, for him, but so are also the writings of the New
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Testament that discuss this pivotal topic. The logical corollary to this is that because of
his affinity for the subject of “love,” Schleiermacher seems to attach greater normative
worth to passages that discuss this subject. In this case, of course, he views these
writings as an authority, not for Christian faith, per se, but for Christian life. Just how
scripture functions as a norming authority for faith and life in the Christian church in
Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority is the subject of the next section.

What Kind of Authority?
I have explained Schleiermacher’s notion of “canon” and have established what I
consider to be his “canon within the canon.” But what is the nature of the normative
authority that he ascribes to the New Testament, to the words and deeds of Christ, and to
the passages that discuss the principle of love found there? Many, if not most, would
agree with Schleiermacher that the Bible has authority. The question is: What kind of
authority does scripture possess? How does scripture function as a norm for Christian
faith and life in the Christian church? To answer these questions, I will first take a look at
two relevant propositions in Christian Faith. After unpacking them, I will draw some
conclusions regarding Schleiermacher’s understanding of how scripture is normative for
the church. The first proposition is one I referred to earlier in Chapter Five: “On the one
hand, the holy scriptures of the New Testament are the first member in the whole series of
presentations of Christian faith, continued ever since. On the other hand, they comprise
the norm for all succeeding presentations.”76
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What is the meaning of this proposition? To begin with, the New Testament is an
expression of faith in Christ, in fact, the first in a series of such presentations. That it is
the first presentation of the experience of Christian faith is part of the reason
Schleiermacher perceives it as unparalleled. For although it is succeeded by other
presentations of the same kind (gleichartig), he contends that it is not superseded by
them. Why is this so? It is because he considers the likelihood that religious
presentations during the apostolic age could have arisen very easily that came more from
Jewish or Gentile thought than from Christianity itself. Consequently, he views these
latter presentations, when regarded as Christian presentations, as “imperfect to the
highest degree.”77
Alongside these imperfect/incomplete presentations—imperfect because they
were not properly “Christian,” but rather were hybrid presentations, particular
modifications of Jewish or Hellenistic religious ideas—the teaching and preaching of
Christ’s immediate disciples stood as a corrective, Schleiermacher argues. This provides
a partial clue as to Schleiermacher’s understanding of the normative nature of scripture: it
is grounded in the proximity of the New Testament authors to Christ and his teachings.
His argument is that this nearness to Christ purified the early disciples’ presentation of
Christianity from “the danger of an unconscious, contaminating influence from their
previous Jewish forms of thought and life.”78
77
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Schleiermacher recognizes, then, that from the earliest times within the Christian
religion there have been different, and sometimes competing, presentations of Christian
faith. These presentations came to be distinguished from one another and designated as
canonical and apocryphal texts. Those that were classified as canonical were viewed as
preserving the most complete elements of the original witness to Christ. Apocryphal
texts were seen as preserving the most incomplete elements of that testimony. The spirit
of Christ as a living presence in the fellowship of the Christian community, he affirms, is
ultimately the source of sorting out the canonical from the apocryphal works.
Furthermore, that same spirit remains the ground for a continuous determination
of the normative character of the various contents of these works. But this ongoing
process of determination is not exactly the same as distinguishing between canonical and
apocryphal texts. For, he argues, the tendency toward apocryphal corruption of that
witness to Christ from “foreign” or non-Christian elements decreases in proportion to the
number of Christians who are born and raised in the church. Further, he suggests, it is
impossible for later Christians to generate truly canonical materials “because the living
perception of Christ could no longer ward off contaminating influences in the same
immediate way” as was true in the apostolic age.79
Interestingly, although Schleiermacher values the “original” presentation of
Christian faith, he believes that the normative authority of scripture does not imply that
every later presentation of Christ must be derived from the canon in the same way. What
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is his reasoning? Since the Spirit has been poured out on all flesh, no age can be without
its own peculiar originality in Christian thought, he contends.
Still, Schleiermacher asserts that scripture norms all subsequent accounts of the
faith in two ways:
[First] nothing is to be regarded as a pure product of the Christian spirit unless it
is possible to demonstrate that it is in accord with those original products . . .
[and second] no later product accrues an authority equal to those original writings
if the aim is to ensure the Christian character of a given presentation or to point
out the non-Christian character of one.80
That is, later presentations of Christian faith must harmonize with the canonical
presentation. The original presentation guarantees the Christian character of later
presentations or exposes what is non-Christian in them with a degree of certainty granted
to no later presentation.
The idea that the New Testament presentation of Christian faith is the standard by
which all other presentations are judged is also echoed in Schleiermacher’s sermons. For
example, in a sermon he preached before 1826, one that was discussed in the last chapter,
he warns of the danger of leaning solely on the immediate influences of the Redeemer
without paying attention to the biblical record. His concern is that alleged immediate
influences of the Redeemer match those of the biblical record. For, he admits, that “from
time immemorial much that betrays the unruliness, fanaticism, and excesses of the human
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heart has often crept into what is supposed to be the Lord’s immediate effects of the
soul.”81
His yardstick for measuring the “immediate effects of the soul,” that they are of
divine rather than human origin, is scripture. He warns:
God’s Word must ever remain the standard for measuring and judging everything
else if we are to avoid deceiving ourselves into unintentionally confusing the
human and the divine, or falling into the danger of becoming prey to those who
intentionally substitute or pass off the human for the divine.82
Schleiermacher is adamant that for any experience of Christ to be authentic, it must
mimic the experience of Christ in the New Testament record. He writes: “The Lord
cannot be different in his effects in believers’ souls than he reveals himself to be in his
Word.”83 In fact, he bluntly asserts that if a person wanted to claim as Christ’s work
anything that is in conflict with “this rule of God’s Word,” that person would be a liar.
Nothing that contradicts “the divine Word of scripture,” he adds, can be thought to
come from God. Why is this the case if Schleiermacher does not believe scripture is
inspired revelation? He believes that scripture is a reliable witness to the words and
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deeds of the Redeemer. For Schleiermacher, one of the functions of scripture is to judge
the validity of any purported effects of the Redeemer.84
He makes the point in Brief Outline that the Christian writings which come from
the age of primitive Christianity are the proper subject-matter of exegetical theology
“only insofar as they are held capable of contributing to the original, consequently for all
times normative presentation of Christianity.”85 Thus, as pointed out above, what makes
some of the writings of the New Testament normative is that they are a record of the
original expression of Christian faith. Why does Schleiermacher value the original or
first presentation of faith in Christ? He supplies an answer in Brief Outline, §83: in order
to preserve the inner unity of Christianity as it expands over time one must apperceive
“the purest perception of its distinctive nature, [which] can come only in relation to its
earliest expression.”86 That is, to apprehend the original presentation of Christian faith is
the first step to ensuring that all subsequent presentations are authentic.
The second relevant proposition in Christian Faith, which clarifies
Schleiermacher’s understanding of the normative authority of scripture reads: “The
Scriptures of the New Testament are authentic in their origination and sufficient as norm
for Christian doctrine.”87 It is the second half of the proposition that is relevant to this
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study. What does Schleiermacher mean when he asserts that the New Testament writings
are sufficient as a norm for Christian doctrine?
First, he is obviously equating the normative authority of scripture and its
influence upon Christians. That is, when scripture influences God’s people, it functions
as an authoritative norm. What kind of influence do these writings exert?
Schleiermacher suggests that the doctrinal books88 or “books of teachings” of the New
Testament are “to be grasped in terms of the life circumstances of Christians at that time,
and in such a way that the apostles’ expressions bore influence upon the formation of the
guiding thoughts as well as of the practical purposes of Christians.”89 The historical
books on the other hand, are intended to rehearse the similarly influential words and
deeds of Christ and the Apostles.
Second, Schleiermacher asserts that what makes the writings sufficient is that
through our use of sacred scripture “the Holy Spirit can guide us into all truth . . . just as
the Holy Spirit did the apostles themselves and all others who were gladdened by the
direct instructions of Christ.”90 When this thought is combined with the idea that
scripture has influence, it is clear that Schleiermacher is describing how scripture
functions as a constitutive norm. It actually creates Christian thought and language. The
language of Christian piety is rooted in scripture, and the common Christian orthodoxy of
88 As
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every age is formed this way by the reigning interpretation of Christian faith called forth
by scripture.91 Thus, as DeVries notes, for Schleiermacher, the language of piety is not
created anew by each individual believer, or chosen freely to express inner experiences.
Rather, it is formed in every age through the encounter with scripture. Furthermore, each
age’s articulation of the faith must be appropriate to the distinctive expressions of
scripture.92
Third, Schleiermacher understands a second kind of normative sufficiency. He
calls it the critical sufficiency of scripture, which, he writes, is often the only kind of
normativity one has in mind when discussing the concept of sufficiency. This relates to
the constitutive function of scripture as a strictly subordinate function, almost as a
shadow. As a critical norm, scripture tests the adequacy of any thought that purports to
be Christian but was not produced under the influence of the Holy Spirit in scripture.93
Schleiermacher believes that as the constitutive use of scripture in the church grows,
there will be less need for scripture’s critical role to sort out misinterpretations.
In summation, Schleiermacher argues for the norming authority of scripture
regarding Christian faith, based on its witness to faith in Christ. Since the canonical
writings are proximate to the direct influence of Jesus and his ministry, they serve as an
authoritative standard for all succeeding expressions of faith in Christ. This normative
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authority is both constitutive and critical. As constitutive of the language and thought of
Christian faith and as critical of any religious thinking that means to be Christian,
scripture is a sufficient norm for the Christian church.
Schleiermacher himself provides a succinct summary of the nature of the
normative authority of scripture for Christian faith in remarks he made in a June 25, 1830
sermon in which he discusses the ground of hope. What is the source of faith and hope?
Is it scripture or is it Christ himself? Schleiermacher affirms that it is Christ who ever
remains the source of faith. Then, he explains what is the normative value of scripture:
[I]f any dispute should arise about whether some specific item of doctrine or
practice in the Christian church is proper or not, the apostolic scripture gives us
the norm by which this can be judged, insofar as it shows that from the beginning
this norm has arisen from the Christian spirit and faith. Thus, we have an
important and permanent safeguard in scripture insofar as we truly have concord
solely in our faith in Christ, setting aside all human authority, and acknowledge
that no witness is valid for the development of doctrine and for the ordering of
life other than what is expressed in these writings.94
The kind of authority, then, which Schleiermacher understands scripture to
possess, is the kind of authority that norms “the development of doctrine” and “the
ordering of life.” According to him, scripture has constitutive authority as a languageforming norm for Christian thought and piety. It also has critical authority, which enables
the Christian church to sort out, by the standard of scripture, misinterpretations of that
language and thought. As scripture is used in these ways, it exerts authority that norms
the development of doctrine.
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But in addition, according to Schleiermacher, scripture has authority not only to
norm Christian faith or doctrine, but also to norm Christian life. This is so because, for
him, the New Testament provides a “divine” template for a particular way of life, a way
of living that is based upon the words and actions of one whose life is worthy of imitation
due to his perfect God-consciousness. This is the sense, for Schleiermacher, in which the
principle of love as it is articulated and defined in the writings of the New Testament,
exerts normative authority. Moreover, those passages that underscore the high
importance of this concept, the concept of love, define the church’s identity and mission
in the world: to love God and all of humanity, as Jesus did. These are some of the ways
in which scripture exerts authority that norms the ordering of life.
In the next and final chapter, I will offer an evaluation of Schleiermacher’s
doctrine of biblical authority. Also, I will identify some of the advantages that accrue to
his “third way” of understanding the authority of scripture.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Implications: The Strengths of Schleiermacher’s
Understanding of Biblical Authority
In Chapter Two of this study, I asserted that Schleiermacher’s understanding of
biblical authority represents a third way to consider this much-discussed doctrine in
Christian theology, as it does not fit neatly in either content-based/supernaturalist or
function-based/rationalist categories. In subsequent chapters I have tried to explicate his
conception of biblical authority. Chapter Three focused on his doctrine of revelation and
his understanding that God is revealed in and through the world, in the feeling of absolute
dependence, and in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. I presented evidence to the
effect that, although Schleiermacher believes in divine revelation, he nonetheless does not
believe there is warrant for the claim of a direct connection between divine revelation and
scripture. I unpacked his understanding of the meaning of inspiration in Chapter Four.
Here, I made the case that, for Schleiermacher, the locus of inspiration is the authors of
scripture, rather than their words, and that he understands the agent of inspiration, the
Holy Spirit, to be the common spirit of the church.
Chapter Five launched a more focused view of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of
biblical authority. Here, I introduced his view that the New Testament is the first
recorded expression of Christian faith, and, that as such, it serves as a kind of touchstone
or check on later generations. I explained in this chapter why Schleiermacher does not
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regard scripture as the starting point for Christian faith. Among other reasons, he
believes that faith springs from the effects of the Redeemer, rather than from scripture. In
brief, he feels that people catch the faith from seeing it at work in people they know
rather than by reading about it in a book.
Chapter Six continued the explanation of Schleiermacher’s understanding of
scripture by zeroing in on why he believes it has normative authority in the church. Here,
I identified what I believe to be Schleiermacher’s “canon within the canon,” and why he
ascribed normative authority to some parts of scripture over other parts. I discussed his
dismissal of the notion that the Old Testament shares the same normative worth as the
New and the priority he placed upon sections of the New Testament that reported the
words and deeds of Christ and that discussed the subjects of Christian and divine love.
My aims in this final chapter are twofold. First, I want to respond to
Schleiermacher’s controversial view regarding the status of the Old Testament in the
Christian canon and it’s normative worth and inspiration in comparison to the New.
Second, I want to discuss what I see as two significant strengths of his understanding of
biblical authority.

A Weakness: Schleiermacher’s Understanding of the Old Testament
In Christian Faith, §132, Schleiermacher makes two declarations regarding the
Old Testament as it compares to the New. First, he asserts that the Old Testament
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writings do not share the normative worth of the New Testament writings. Second, he
asserts that they do not share the inspiration of the New Testament writings.1
Regarding the non-inspiration of the Old Testament, he contends that the
inspiration of the Old Testament texts was not the activity of the same Spirit of Christ at
work in the church. From Paul’s treatment of the Law in Galatians and Romans, he
argues that if Paul is right to claim that the Law lacks the power of the Spirit from which
the Christian life must spring, then it cannot be claimed that the Law is inspired by the
same Spirit. He notes that Paul writes that God sends the Spirit into our hearts by virtue
of our joining with Christ. He adds that Christ himself never represents the sending of
the Spirit “as the return of something that was already present before and then afterward
disappeared for a time.”2
Regarding the inferior status of the Old Testament as an authoritative norm,
Schleiermacher argues that it can serve as neither a constitutive nor a critical norm for
Christian faith. That is, the Old Testament writings cannot function as a languageforming norm, nor are they well-suited to evaluate religious thinking that purports to be
Christian. If one accepts his worldview, Schleiermacher is right to assert that ideas are
present in the Old Testament that Christians cannot appropriate as pure expressions of
their piety. Indeed, there are some Christian doctrines, including, of course, the religious
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significance that Jesus has for Christians, that are new to the Christian faith and are,
therefore, doctrines for which there are no Old Testament proofs.
On balance, I admit that my disagreement with Schleiermacher’s claim regarding
the non-inspiration of the Old Testament has negligible impact on what I believe is his
larger claim that the Old Testament does not share the normative worth of the New
Testament. Why is this so? It is because whatever one claims regarding the inspiration
of the Old Testament, its authority is for a specific community, and not for the community
founded by Christ. In response to Schleiermacher’s argument, however, I do not feel that
for the Old Testament writings to be inspired, it is necessary that the common spirit of the
church be responsible for their production. They may be inspired by the common spirit
of the people of Israel, as Schleiermacher himself readily admits.3 That full divine
authority came with the revelation of God in Christ, does not mean that there was no
divine influence upon the writers of the Old Testament. This is especially true in light of
Schleiermacher’s belief in the potentiality of universal inspiration.4 In the New
Testament passages to which Schleiermacher alludes—Romans 7:6ff. and 8:3—Paul is
not making any claim regarding the inspiration of the Old Testament, or lack of it. Nor is
he asserting anything regarding the presence or activity in the world of holy spirit before
the coming of Christ.
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Furthermore, his argument that “God sends the Spirit into our hearts by virtue of
our joining with Christ,” in no way denies that divine spirit was active before the coming
of Christ. In fact, the Old Testament is replete with references to the presence and
activity of “divine spirit.”5 Also, that Christ never represents the sending of the Spirit
“as the return of something that was already present before and then afterward
disappeared for a time,” does little to prove that divine spirit was not present before the
advent of Christ. The silence of Jesus on this subject does not warrant the repudiation of
divine influence upon the Old Testament authors.
Schleiermacher’s contention that the Old Testament is unable to act as a
constitutive or critical norm for Christian doctrines is based on this underlying reason: he
understands that Old Testament writings express Jewish, not Christian, religion. For him,
Christianity was a completely new religion and stood in the same relation, religiously
speaking, to Judaism as to paganism, notwithstanding its historical ties to the former.6
Since his unwillingness to grant normative authority to the Old Testament is so closely
tied to his view of the church’s relation to Judaism,7 of chief concern is his argument that
Christianity is not to be understood as a continuation or development of Judaism.
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Among those who disagreed with Schleiermacher on the strict disconnection of
Christianity from Judaism was D. F. Strauss. Strauss believed that in his religion Jesus
was a Jew. He understood that even in its christological faith the church was still
primarily a Jewish phenomenon. For him, the New Testament’s witness to Jesus as the
messiah was born of a continuation of motifs found in the Old Testament. Hence, for
Strauss, the Old Testament and its interpretation in second-temple Judaism were the
formative influences upon the presentation of Jesus in the Gospels.8
Whether or not Christianity was a completely new religion, standing “in the same
relation, religiously speaking, to Judaism as to paganism,” is arguable. And one may
certainly grant Schleiermacher’s assertion that Old Testament writings do not share the
normative worth of the New, if only on the basis that Christ had not yet come. In this
sense, he is technically correct “[t]hat the Jewish codex does not contain any normative
statements of faith regarding distinctively Christian doctrines.”9 However, one must
accept the fact that Jesus was firmly rooted in the Old Testament Jewish tradition. His
Jewish character is undeniably portrayed in the Gospels.
For example, Jesus’ central message concerned the coming of God’s sovereign
reign (“the kingdom of God”), and he called his fellow Jews to be prepared to receive it.

8

Cf., David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. George
Eliot, Lives of Jesus Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 773; Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on
the Old Testament,” 313-14.
9
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This theme was a key Old Testament theme.10 Capetz claims that Jesus’ teaching and
ministry were firmly rooted in the Old Testament/Jewish tradition when he writes:
Without rejecting the Torah in principle, he differentiated between greater and
lesser commandments in it. He continued aspects of the prophetic tradition in his
concern for the poor and the oppressed. He pointed to God’s providential care in
the ordering of nature as had Israel’s wisdom teachers before him.11
Richard Niebuhr spoke of the faith that came to expression in Jesus’ words and
deeds as a paradigmatic illustration of Israel’s “radical” or thoroughgoing monotheism.
The historic significance of early Christianity, as Niebuhr noted, is that it made this faith
available to non-Jews without requiring their conversion to Judaism.12 This crucial step
required a sifting of the Jewish scriptures for the purpose of discerning what was still
valid for the new community. But this development did not negate the connection
between Jesus’ faith in God and the faith of Israel to which he was heir.
Rudolf Bultmann emphasized that no matter how critical Jesus may have been in
relation to the other Jewish teachers of his day, the content of his preaching was
nothing else than true Old Testament-Jewish faith in God radicalized in the
direction of the great prophets’ preaching. . . . [T]he concepts of God, world, and
man, of Law and grace, of repentance and forgiveness in the teaching of Jesus are
not new in comparison with those of the Old Testament and Judaism, however
radically they may be understood. And his critical interpretation of the Law, in
spite of its radicality, likewise stands within the scribal discussion about it.13

10

See, for example, 1 Chronicles 29:11-12; Isaiah 10:5-19; 45:6,7,12; 46:9-10; Psalm 103:10; Daniel 2:21;
7:13-14, 27.
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Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Old Testament,” 315.
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H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper, 1970), 39-40.
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Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. Kendrick Grobel, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner,
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Capetz notes that even the love-command that has been so important in Christian ethics
(and in Schleiermacher’s preaching) is derived from Jesus’ summary of the Torah.14
Jesus’ use of and reference to Old Testament writings is further evidence of his
Jewish character. For example, here are just a few samples of some of his references to
the Old Testament in the Gospel of John:15
—“And just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of
Man be lifted up” (John 3:14; Numbers 21:9).
—“Very truly, I tell you, it was not Moses who gave you the bread from heaven,
but it is my Father who gives you the true bread from heaven” (John 6:32; Ex. 16:4, 15).
—“It is written in the prophets, ‘And they shall all be taught by God’” (John 6:45;
Isaiah 54:13).
—“As the scripture has said, ‘Out of the believer’s heart shall flow rivers of living
water’” (John 7:38; Isaiah 44:3; 58:11).
When he spoke of the importance of love for God and neighbor, Jesus derived his
words from a summary of the Torah (Matthew 22:34-40). Further, the New Testament
records the story of a time when Jesus discussed the Old Testament with two disciples on

14

Capetz, “Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Old Testament,” 316.
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the way to Emmaus, that he began with Moses and all the prophets, and that he
“interpreted to them the things about himself in all the scriptures” (Luke 24:27).16
In addition, there is ample evidence in the biblical text that neither Jesus nor Paul
viewed their ministry as the creation of a new religion, but rather as the continuation,
even the fulfillment of Judaism.17 For instance, the Gospel of Matthew attributes to Jesus
this saying: “Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets; I have
come not to abolish but to fulfill” (Matthew 5:17).
Certainly, although Schleiermacher was right to locate what is new about
Christianity in the religious significance that Jesus has for Christians, to say that Jesus is
of central importance to them is not to say that everything important in Christianity began
with him.18 Neither can it be said that Jesus was not rooted in Jewish tradition. Jesus’
Jewish character is undeniable. This means that Jesus’ upbringing in the Jewish tradition
and his exposure to and use of Old Testament writings must have played an undeniable
role in his God-consciousness. This, of course, leaves in doubt the magnitude of the
chasm between the Christian and Jewish intuitions and therefore, challenges
Schleiermacher’s claim that Christianity must be viewed as a totally new religion that has
no significant connection to Judaism.
16

Similarly, Paul often quoted from the Old Testament in his writings. For example, in Galatians 4, he
refers to an Old Testament allegory about Sarah and Hagar. Based on that Old Testament story, he
commanded the Galatians to drive out the trouble-making legalists in their midst. His warrant for doing so
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See, e.g., Matthew 5:17; Romans 11:1-27; Galatians 6:16.

18

See also, Capetz, 322.

!182

That the Old Testament cannot be used as an authority for Christian writings does
not mean that it cannot be used for devotional purposes. Schleiermacher himself
acknowledges that “Christ and the apostles themselves refer to the Old Testament
writings as if to divine authorities advantageous for Christianity.”19 That is, he seems
willing to acknowledge the influence of Israelitish piety on Christians. He is willing to
affirm that the earliest Christians found some of the Old Testament writings to be
beneficial and helpful. He admits that Paul, for example, attested to the usefulness of the
Old Testament writings.20 In the same proposition, he writes that “even the noblest
psalms always contain something that Christian piety (christliche Frömmigkeit) cannot
appropriate as its purest expression.”21 So, even as he acknowledges that there are some
expressions in the Psalms, which cannot serve as either a constitutive or critical norm for
Christian faith, he seems to acknowledge in the same sentence that there are some
expressions there, which may be so appropriated. So, while he does not accept the
normative value of the Old Testament writings, he does envision the utility of at least
some of those writings.
To sum up, Schleiermacher does not believe that Old Testament writings are
normative for Christian faith. The Christian religious consciousness is not rooted in the
Old Testament, but in the experience of Christ. This does not mean, however, that
Christianity does not have its roots in Judaism, or that it is not organically related to it.
19

Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §132.3.
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Jesus was deeply rooted in the Jewish tradition, and his Jewish character surely played a
significant role in his God-consciousness. Neither does this mean that the Old Testament
cannot provide useful expressions of piety (fromm, Frömmigkeit) for Christians.22

Strengths of Schleiermacher’s Conception of Biblical Authority
Now, I want to identify what I see are two strengths of Schleiermacher’s doctrine
of biblical authority. The first is that it recognizes that scripture is both a human and a
divine product.

It Allows for a High View of Both Scripture and Church
As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, although Schliermacher understands that
God is revealed in and through the world, in the feeling of absolute dependence, and in
Christ, the supreme divine revelation, he conceives of only an indirect connection of
identity between divine revelation and scripture. He argues that there is no warrant for
the claim that the authoring of scripture directly and literally originated with God.
Likewise, although he believes that the individual books of the New Testament
are inspired by the Holy Spirit and that their collection has arisen under the guidance of
the Holy Spirit,23 he does not subscribe to the doctrine of inspiration as it is commonly
held among content-based supernaturalists: that the locus of inspiration is the words of
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scripture. Furthermore, as I explained in Chapter Four, Schleiermacher understands the
Holy Spirit much differently than do content-based supernaturalists; he views the Holy
Spirit to be the common or shared spirit of the church. The bottom line of all of the
above is that he understands the Christian Bible to be a human document.
However, he also holds in tension with his conviction that the divine spirit is not
responsible for or the author of the words of scripture his belief that God’s spirit
influenced scripture’s human authors. Consequently, Schleiermacher also believed that
God was active at some level in the process of the writing of scripture.
This same co-presence and co-activity of the supernatural and the natural is
apparent in Schleiermacher’s understanding of how the biblical canon was assembled.
For, although he understands the process of canon collection to be a thoroughly human
process,24 he also attributed its determination to the Holy Spirit.
What this means is that he takes a mediating position between the content-based
supernaturalists and the function-based rationalists on the nature of scripture. For him,
scripture is not the inerrant, inspired, and divinely-revealed document that many
supernaturalists understand it to be. However, neither is he willing to claim that God is
wholly absent from and uninvolved in the process, something which rationalists are
inclined to do.
The significance of this stance is that it may allow us to formulate a reasonable, if
yet murky answer to a question I raised in the last chapter: Where is authority located in

24
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the Christian religion? Is it in the canon itself or in the community of faith? I suggested
in Chapter 1 that content-based supernaturalists tend to assert the authority of scripture
over that of the church. Kevin Vanhoozer, for example, claims that final authority resides
in the divinely authorized and appropriated discourse of the canon.25 Nor does
Vanhoozer believe that scripture’s authority is conferred upon it by the church, but that it
possesses inherent authority due to its status as an inspired document.26 On the other
hand, function-based rationalists, such as David Kelsey, tend to attribute authority to the
church.27 They assert that whatever authority scripture exercises, it is, indeed, a
conferred authority.
Once again, Schleiermacher takes a mediating position in contrast to the above
perspectives. He claims that the Holy Spirit was active in the canonization process and
continues to be active in the decision-making of the church. At the same time, as I
demonstrated in Chapter Five, he recognizes the authority of the church since the canon
obtained its present form through the decision of the church. In light of this truth, it
seems unreasonable to claim that the authority of scripture is not one that is conferred
upon it by the church. Moreover, Schleiermacher asserts that it is the church’s
responsibility to continue to investigate what is canonical and normative, based on what
contributes to the preservation and well-being of the community of faith. In other words,
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according to him, the church has influence over what in scripture constitutes normative
authority.28 This is a high view of the church.
While he attributed authority to the church for the role it played and continues to
play in the determination of the canon, there is no doubt that he also ascribed authority to
some sections of the New Testament itself, as I showed in Chapters Five and Six. Those
sections act as a rule or standard by which the experience of the church is to be measured.
In such cases, of course, the church is submitting to the authority of scripture. This is a
high view of scripture.
Therefore, to the question of where authority is located, in the biblical canon or in
the church, Schleiermacher’s measured answer would surely be: “It is located in both.”
What this means for this study is that one of the strengths of his conception of biblical
authority is that it acknowledges and accentuates the value and importance of the/a faith
community, while at the same time, acknowledging scripture’s inherent authority.29

28
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It Allows Faith and Historical-Biblical Criticism to Coexist
A second strength of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority is that it
allows faith and the historical-critical method to coexist. That is, his understanding
empowers scholars, students, and lay people to be thoroughly critical of the biblical text.
In the Introduction to this study I asserted that one of the factors that may explain
the erosion of biblical authority since the Enlightenment is the advent of historical
criticism. Accordingly, some have seen the historical-critical method as an enemy of the
church and a threat to faith.30 For example, one prominent evangelical declares that
“orthodoxy and the historical-critical method are deadly enemies that are antithetical and
cannot be reconciled without the destruction of one or the other.”31 Alan Johnson adds:
“[T]he current use of the historical-critical method even in the hands of its most
responsible practitioners has led to historical-theological schizophrenia, while the
articulation of an adequate basis for religious authority flounders.”32
On the contrary, Schleiermacher does not consider critical examination of the
biblical text to be unfriendly to Christian faith. He acknowledges that he does not want
to restrain biblical criticism.33 Indeed, his exegetical writings demonstrate that he
embraces the historical-critical method and its findings.
30
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Before explaining why biblical criticism does not intimidate Schleiermacher’s
model of biblical authority or threaten faith for him, I need to add a very brief word
regarding the times in which he lived. Schleiermacher’s approach to theology was
certainly influenced by several factors, not the least of which is that he lived in the wake
of the Enlightenment. And as Vial notes in his book, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the
Perplexed, two of the greatest challenges left by the Enlightenment for Christian theology
were the rise of science and the rise of historical consciousness.34 These challenges
called into question the plausibility and historicity of some of the biblical accounts.
As an heir of the Enlightenment, it was important for Schleiermacher to find a
way to understand faith, as well as biblical authority, without being inconsistent with an
understanding from science or history. In other words, it was important to him that faith
is consistent with intellectual life and with the scientific, historical, and theological
advancements of his day. Regarding his doctrine of scripture, for example,
Schleiermacher admits that he is willing to accept the “scientific” findings of historicalcritical research. He confirms this when he writes: “But as for our doctrine of the canon
and of inspiration as a special activity of the Spirit producing the canon, we must take
care not to make any claims that conflict with the universally recognized results of
historical research.”35
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To clarify what this means for him and to illustrate my point, I refer to Vial’s
analysis of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of Christ. Vial notes that Schleiermacher’s
generation found itself confronted with two ways of approaching christology. On the one
side were the confessionalists and traditionalists, who believed that Jesus effects salvation
supernaturally. On the other side were the rationalists for whom Jesus was seen as a great
moral teacher. Regarding the christology of the traditionalists, Vial asserts:
Its weakness is that it [their understanding of the work and identity of Christ]
seemed to Schleiermacher to call for a sacrifice of the intellect . . . [for a denial
of] all the best fruits of the human intellectual and cultural endeavors that were so
exciting and empowering in his day.36
On the other hand, the strength of the rationalist view, Vial suggests, “is that it does not
require one to choose between scientific and philosophical advances and Jesus.”37
One of Schleiermacher’s chief critics understood his reluctance to make that
choice. Karl Barth writes of him that he was a man
who felt responsible . . . for the intellectual and moral foundations of the cultural
world into which a man was born at the end of the eighteenth century. He
wanted in all circumstances to be a modern man as well as a Christian
theologian.38
Likewise, Jack Forstman asserts that, for Schleiermacher, there was no alternative to
being a modern man, for as an heir of the Enlightenment, his intention was “to guard
against [making a sacrifice of the intellect] at every turn.” He explains:
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For Schleiermacher as for the Enlightenment there can be no conflict between
scientific statements (understanding ‘scientific’ in the wider sense) and
theological statements. If there are two contradictory statements, one with and
the other without solid support, then the first must be accepted and the second
rejected. If one makes a theological statement that differs in no apparent way
from a scientific statement but does not offer the kind of support for it that
scientific statements require then that statement is suspect. It cannot be accepted
without sacrificing the canons for understanding that one must continue to
uphold.39
Schleiermacher’s explanation of positions he took in Christian Faith to his friend,
Dr. Lücke, confirms his intention to be both “a modern man and a Christian theologian.”
For instance, he explains to his friend that in the Glaubenslehre he aimed to show “that
every dogma that truly represents an element of our Christian consciousness can be so
formulated that it remains free from entanglements with science.”40 Thus, it is important,
for him, that Christian faith and whatever post-Enlightenment intellectual advancements
of his day may prove to have been made are able to exist side-by-side.
What makes such a coexistence possible? I want to identify two justifications.
First, Schleiermacher believes that it is not possible to equate scripture with divine
revelation, as I have already discussed. What I am suggesting here is that there is a
definite cause-effect relationship between Schleiermacher’s unwillingness to accept the
alleged divine origin of scripture and his willingness to embrace a worldview that did not
threaten Christian faith. As I have mentioned repeatedly, for him, the biblical texts are
human reports of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. They are not inerrant, inspired,
39
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and revelatory in each and every word—at least, not in the sense or to the extent that
many content-based supernaturalists understand them to be. We may easily theorize that
one of the values of understanding Christian writings as human documents is the
opportunity thus afforded to scholars to be thoroughly critical in their approach to the
biblical text, without feeling the need to defend a theory of divine authorship.
A second reason that Christian faith and scientific advancements can coexist in
Schleiermacher’s theology, is his firm conviction that faith is not founded on a document.
I addressed this subject in Chapter Five. For him, scripture is not the starting point of
faith. Rather, faith begins in the shared experience of Christ in the community of
Christians. This explains why Schleiermacher is not afraid of the findings of biblical
criticism: they will never be able to imperil faith’s validity, since faith is based on an
experience instead of what may be written in a text.
Schleiermacher refers to the experience of redemption in Christ as what is
“essential.” He writes that he is assured that even if criticism challenges long-held
beliefs regarding the New Testament, “[w]e would not lose anything essential: Christ
remains the same and our faith in him remains the same.”41 Again, he suggests that
Christians must be willing to rid themselves of everything that is secondary and based on
presuppositions that are no longer valid. His reason for this point of view is “so that we
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might avoid becoming ensnared in useless controversies that might lead many easily to
give up hope of ever grasping what is essential.”42
Vial summarizes well the reason faith and science are able to exist side-by-side in
Schleiermacher’s system:
By defining religion as a matter of experience (feeling) rather than a matter of
knowing, like natural science and philosophy, or morals, and by defining
dogmatic theology as a second-order expression of religious experience,43
Schleiermacher declares some of the most troubling of these questions to be a
category mistake.44
He understood that there was “an eternal covenant between the living Christian faith and
completely free, independent scientific inquiry, so that faith does not hinder science and
science does not exclude faith.”45 Vial identifies this “eternal covenant” as “a
nonaggression pact, because each [Christian faith and scientific inquiry] uses its own
methods to undertake different tasks, tasks that do not overlap.”46 As a result, the
historical examination of the biblical texts does not threaten Christian faith. Vial
summarizes:
The Bible holds a special place for Schleiermacher because it is the first recorded
expression of Christian experience. But it is that experience, the experience of
redemption found in the Christian community, that is the source of faith and the
bedrock of theology. If it turns out that we know less than we thought we did
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about certain events or certain authors, that does not call into question that
experience of faith found in the community.47
Because the experience of redemption, rather than scripture, is the foundation of faith,
there is no need to divorce faith from rigorous critical thought that accepts the results and
methods of the sciences. That such a significant consequence is consistent with and
permitted by Schleiermacher’s doctrine of biblical authority is one of the great strengths
of that doctrine.
This study set out to demonstrate that Schleiermacher provides us with a third
way of understanding the doctrine of biblical authority. That this alternative to contentbased/supernaturalist and function-based/rationalist models has significant and distinctive
advantages over models in these two categories, is clear to me. Schleiermacher’s
conception of the authority of scripture is a robust one.
That understanding of biblical authority claims that scripture’s authority does not
lie in some property of the texts themselves that historians or unbelievers can take away.
It acknowledges that scripture is both a divine and a human product, and that as a
corollary, ecclesial and biblical authority exist side-by-side. It claims that scripture
constitutes the language of piety, viewing it as a record of experience rather than a set of
propositions about the world. It articulates the communal nature of Christian faith,
underscoring the value and authority of the Christian community. It does not require
people to contradict what they know to be the case about science, history, and philosophy.
It provides the irreplaceable witness of those who knew Jesus in the flesh, and, therefore,
47
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supplies the norm and standard for experience and faith that purports to be Christian. It
alleges that scripture is not the foundation of Christian faith, but the first expression of it,
and therefore, normative in a way that other presentations of Christian faith are not. To
be sure, Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical authority clarifies and affirms what
may be a continuing and central role for scripture in Christian religion today.
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